The Security of Citizens In Syria

Reality and Prospects

Photo: Free Police in Aleppo countryside (Enab Baladi)

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Omran for Strategic Studies

An independent non-profit organization legally registered in Turkey, as a research institution seeking to be a reference and a source for decision makers in Syria, and the region in the political, economic and social fields. The Center produces structured systematic studies that support the hands-on process of state and society institutions, and supports decision-making mechanisms, integrates information and maps priorities.

The Day After (TDA)

(TDA) is a Syrian organization working to support the democratic transition in Syria. Its focus is on the rule of law, transitional justice, security sector reform, electoral system design and the Constituent Assembly election, constitutional design, economic reform and social policies.

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Introduction

The term "security" raises much sensitivity for Syrians. It is linked to a long, violent history of attacking citizens under pretexts of national security, state security, military security, political security and others. The concept of security in Syria has always been used to crush the concepts of freedom, dignity and human rights in order to ensure the security of the regime, and in turn, burdening the local community with a complex security structure that has blocked civil movement and limited the possibility of its progress and development; and has subjected the Syrian citizen to all measures that are derogatory and contrary to the most basic human rights. In turn, this led Syrians (in addition to a group of other factors) in March 2011 to rise up and express their aversion to these practices. Several studies indicate that a strong factor leading to the uprising was the excessive practice of security measures in Syria. There were no plans when implementing those security practices, and local and civil institutions had no role in the formulation of security strategies. Additionally, security powers were designated to specific people/institutions without a published law regulating their work. The result was interference of the security apparatus in all aspects of the work of the state and society, spawning corruption by exploiting these powers without a supervisory or accounting authority.

Generally, most studies on the issue of security in Syria are based on political or military approaches or a major strategy to assess security implementation in institutions and environment, and in order to complement this, this survey will focus on how the Syrian citizen identifies with the perspective of the Syrian society towards security, due to its great importance and impact, based on what is known as the "satisfaction of life scale"; and its association with many challenges related to stability. Furthermore, the survey will examine the daily

suffering of Syrians, and their perspectives on the security situation, and its future trends in light of the complexity of the current political scene[1].

This survey is based on an understanding of the reality of the situation as seen and lived by the population in different regions of Syria. For reasons related to the difficulties of implementing such a survey in regime-held areas, or in areas retaken by the regime, and the security challenges, the survey focused on the security situation in areas outside the regime's control, in addition to covering how the Syrian diaspora, and Syrians in Syria envision the security situation in the next phase.

By carefully examining these issues, a better understanding of what can be done at the local (village or city) level, at the level of the currently controlled areas, or at a national level in the next phase, will be possible. Thus, this survey supports efforts to review and re-establish the structural and functional controls of the Syrian security services based on citizens' security, freedom and dignity. This report is divided into two main sections:

- The first section seeks to identify the state of citizen security in the current situation: the attacks on the civilian population (the social and demographic background of the aggressor and the objective of the attacks and subsequent procedures), the population assessment of the security situation in their areas, the risks and needs of the population to ensure their personal security, their perceptions of the security situation in Syria, and the security problems of residents abroad and the possibility of normal entry and exit to Syria.

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[1] The satisfaction of life scale in any institution (governmental or non-governmental) is based on three pillars; satisfaction with the general vision; the message; strategies; and the relationship between the institution and citizens concerned with the services of this institution.

The second section examines citizens' envisagement of a security structure, that meets their aspirations and guarantees their rights; the relationship between political transition and security stability, the necessary adjustments to the security services (its structure, timeline to achieve it, the obstacles); their views on engaging women in the security sector, and the integration of ex-combatants back into society, the role of non-governmental actors in civil society and in the maintenance of security, and understanding the necessary measures to reform the security sector.

The Sample and the Approach

In order to identify the situation of citizens' security in various regions of Syria, and their views and perceptions on the security sector reform process, The Day After (TDA) organization, and the Omran Center for Strategic Studies conducted a social survey covering the period between 12 August and 14 October 2018, which included 953 respondents from in and outside Syria: A total of 548 men and 405 women (395 residing outside Syria and 558 residing inside). A team of trained field researchers conducted face-to-face interviews deploying the questionnaire in four provinces in Syria, and in Gaziantep and Reyhanli in Turkey, Amsterdam, in the Netherlands, and Berlin in Germany.

Despite the many difficulties in collecting data during field work, especially under conditions like those in Syria, with the continuous war and displacement of the population, we were still able to pull out a multi-stage stratified cluster sample that allows for the analysis of results based on several demographic variables. The variables included administrative areas (provinces), military

zones, or ethnic groups (Arabic-Kurdish) (see Tables A and B). The main problems encountered during data collection were as follows:

Firstly, the team had to stop working in regime-held areas after conducting a few interviews. ISIS-held areas were never covered by The Day After when conducting surveys, because of the great risks that may have compromised the lives of the respondents. During previous surveys, TDA were able to work in regime-held areas, but this time regime-held areas pose the same difficulty to access as ISIS-held areas, especially when it comes to ensuring the respondents' safety.

The analysis of the data was conducted by a statistical analysis: to reject or accept the null hypothesis H0 (no statistically significant relationship or difference between two or more variables), and was based mainly on the scale of the "Chi-square" (Chi-square) / or equal to 0.05.

Table A. Stages of the main sample (first)

The first phase:	The second phase:
Total number of Syrians (residents and expatriates): 36,539,736 Level of trust: 95% Margin of error: 3.2% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q Sample size required: 938	Total population: 18,269,868 Level of confidence: 95% Margin of error: 4.2% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q Sample size required: 545 Total number of diaspora population: 18,269,868 ** Level of confidence: 95% Margin of error: 5% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q Sample size required: 385
The third phase:	**The fourth phase:**
Total male population: 9,831,064	In which a random clustered sample was adopted based on regions and provinces, in addition to religious and ethnic distribution. As

Level of confidence: 95% Margin of error: 4.2% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q Sample size required: 545 Total female population: 9.038.804 Level of confidence: 95% Margin of error: 4.9 Maximum heterogeneity: p = q Sample size required: 400	shown in table (b) and map. The sample does not include any areas under the control of ISIS or the Syrian regime. It should be noted that at this phase we are dealing with guidance samples that will help us gain a better understanding of the topic of our research, by comparing the different demographic and social groups, but the results should not be generalized to these geographic regions or religious or ethnic groups.

** For residents abroad, estimates differ widely. Recently, official statements have been issued that the number is similar to or close to the population inside Syria (see https://bit.ly/2Sdyvab). Therefore, we have mentioned here that the number is identical to the population inside Syria.

Table B. The Sample

Variable	Number	Percentage		Variable	Number	Percentage
Gender				**Occupation**		
Men	548	57,5		Has a job	548	57,5
Women	405	42,5		Student	123	12,9
Level of Education				Unemployed	144	15,1
Illiteracy	23	2,4		Housewife	138	14,5
Elementary	72	7,6		**Areas of territorial control**		
Junior High	119	12,5		Opposition-held	366	38,4
High School	262	27,5		Autonomous-Administration	192	20,1

College/University	477	50,1	Outside Syria/Diaspora	395	41,4
Ethnicity			**Location of interview**		
Arab	714	74,9	Aleppo, Azaz and countryside	93	9,8
Kurdish	170	17,8	Hama (Kafr Zita, Ltamenah)	115	12,1
Turkmen	4	0.4	Al-Hasakah, Qamishli and countryside	192	20,4
Armenian	8	0.8	Idlib (Arihah, Maarat Al-Numan, Al-Rami and Juzif in Jabal Zawiya)	158	16,6
Circassian	6	0.6	Diaspora (Amsterdam, Berlin, Reyhanli, Gaziantep)	395	41,2
Assyrian	3	0.3	**Ideology***		
Prefer not to answer	47	4.9	Refuses mixing religion with politics	425	44,6
Marital Status			Supports mixing religion with politics	457	48,0
Single	306	32,1	No clear stance	71	7,5
Married	595	62,4	**Age**		
Divorced	23	2,4	Up till 25 years of age	191	20,0
Widowed	29	3,0	Between 26 and 35 years of age	434	45,5
			Between 36 and 45 years of age	231	24,2
			Older than 45	97	10,2

* To understand the respondent's ideology, we asked: What do you think of the following statement "Before the election of any political leader, he must be a religiously committed person first and foremost." If the respondent agrees with the statement, this means that they support mixing religion with politics, and vice versa if the respondent disagrees with the statement.

Map of Syria and map of where the Syrian diaspora are based

Section I: The Current Security Situation

Attacks on the Civilian Population

The social and demographic background of the victims

At first, we tried to identify those who had been assaulted and asked respondents whether they or any member of their family (parents, partners, children, brothers) had been directly assaulted or ill-treated by militants in their area (whether by a sharp object or firearms). As shown in Figure 1, the vast majority (82.3%) said that neither they, nor their family members were exposed to any of the above incidents.

Figure 1. Direct assault / ill treatment from militants

Yes, it happened to me personally	It did not happen to me, but to a member of my family	Yes, it happened to me and to a family member	No, none of us were exposed to it	I prefer not to answer
4.5	6.6	1.8	82.3	4.8

What concerns us here is to identify the most vulnerable, or to be more accurate, identify the most vulnerable to these violations. To answer this, we examined the social and demographic background of those who responded positively to the previous question of being personally subjected to such attacks or ill-treatment. Table (1) shows all the variables that we found to be related to abuse or ill-treatment by militants:

- The percentage is significantly higher in opposition-held areas than in the areas of the Democratic Self-Administration: 4.7% ＜10.4%.

- Idlib is where these attacks occurred much more than in other areas. The percentage of attacks on citizens dropped from 20% in Idlib to less than 5% in the rest of the regions. Note that a high percentage of respondents in Aleppo and Hama refused to answer this question.

- The percentage of those who said that they were subjected to such attacks was almost identical between the internally displaced community, and the towns' residents, but note that a high percentage of respondents refused to answer the questions — most from the displaced community. Perhaps this can be explained by their fear of being outcast, and their efforts in avoiding problems in their new place of residence.

- The Arabs were more exposed to such attacks than the Kurds:

10.6%＞3.3% respectively.

- Groups with a high income are the most vulnerable to these types of attacks.

- The percentage of those who support mixing religion with politics, and those who oppose it or do not want it, is close in number. But the percentage of those who refused to answer the question altogether increased in the latter.

- Employees or the workforce are more vulnerable than others to these attacks (at 12.2%), followed by students (at 6.1%), while the percentage of unemployed citizens and housewives is close in number.

In short, these are the most vulnerable groups:

Employees and the workforce ＞ students, unemployed citizens and housewives

High-income earning individuals ＞ moderate/less earning individuals Arabs ＞ Kurds

Idlib population and opposition-held areas ＞ Democratic Self-Administration areas

Most likely, we can add to this list the internally displaced communities, and those who do not support or refuse mixing religion with politics, as the high percentage of those who refused to answer the questions, may be an indicator of fear and caution, to avoid causing problems. Certainly, these results raise many questions about the cause of the attacks, and this is what we will try to identify in the report.

Table 1. Exposure to attacks according to some social and demographic variables

	Was not attacked personally	Was personally attacked	Prefer not to answer
Area of territorial control			
Opposition-held	%82,2	%10,4	%7,4
Democratic Autonomous-Administration	%95,3	%4,7	%0,0
Province			
Idlib	%77,2	%19,6	%3,2
Al-Hasakah	%95,3	%4,7	%0,0
Hama	%89,6	%1,7	%8,7
Aleppo	%81,7	%5,4	%12,9
IDPs/Original residents			
Residents of the town before 2011	%88,8	%8,4	%2,8
Arriving from another town after 2011	%83,0	%8,5	%8,5
Ethnicity			
Arab	%82,6	%10,6	%6,8
Kurdish	%96,7	%3,3	%0,0
Monthly income			
Less than 25,000 SL	%89,2	%3,6	%7,2
Between 25,000-75,000 SL	%84,1	%11,2	%4,7
More than 75,000SL	%84,0	%14,9	%1,1
I prefer not to answer	%90,3	%3,7	%6,0
Ideology			
Supports separating religion from politics	%84,6	%7,1	%8,2
Does not support separating religion from politics	%88,6	%10,2	%1,3
No clear stance	%89,1	%7,3	%3,6
Occupation			
Has a job	%84,0	%12,2	%3,8
Student	%89,8	%6,1	%4,1
Unemployed	%86,6	%3,1	%10,3
Housewife	%94,6	%2,2	%3,2

The purpose of the attacks and subsequent procedures

Most of the attacks appear to occur for reasons of freedoms (40.3%) that include political activity, media or expression of opinion. These findings may help to understand the high percentage of those who refused to answer were citizens who did not support mixing religion with politics, as well as those who were displaced from different areas, and have arrived at new areas controlled by military forces, and are treated with high suspicion. The second reason is extortion, theft and looting (selected by a quarter of respondents). It also helps to understand what we have found earlier about the increased reporting of attacks among high-income earners compared to others. In addition, about 1 out of 5 respondents said they were attacked without any justification. Interestingly, there is a high percentage that answered this question differently. (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. What was the cause of the assault, in case there was more than one incident, please describe the last incident

Figure 3. Have you or the person subjected to the assault/ill treatment filed any complaint to a concerned party?

2.8

23.6

73.6

■ Yes ■ No ■ I prefer not to answer

The vast majority of those exposed to such attacks are not reported (73.6%) (Figure 3). In view of this, the security situation is catastrophic: more than half fear that they will suffer complications if they file complaints (to avoid problems or because the aggressors are the biggest force in the region). The rest of the respondents expressed the futility of the complaint or the absence of any party to resort to in such cases. This is in addition to the significant percentage number that chose "other reasons" for not filing complaints, reaching about 20% (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Reasons for not filing a complaint

I prefer not to answer	There is no one to complain to	Because it is useless to complain, no one cares	Other	Because the aggressor is the biggest force in the region	To avoid problems
1.9	11.3	13.2	20.8	22.6	30.2

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
Population's Assessment of the Security Situation in their Areas

Figure 5. How do you evaluate the current

The majority of respondents assessed the security situation in their region positively (56.8%) (Figure 5). However, given the results based on the areas of military control, we find important differences; results in opposition-held areas varied, as the vast majority in area of the Autonomous Administration said that the situation was good (60.9%) or very good (8.9%) (Figure 6). The same is true when looking at results based on provinces. Aleppo and Al-Hasakah appear to be the safest according to respondents' assessment. In Idlib and Hama, the majority evaluated the situation negatively (Figure 7).

Figure 6. Security situation by areas of territorial control

Figure 7. Security situation by province

Overall, the situation has somewhat improved. The majority of respondents said it had improved slightly or a lot. A small percentage said it had declined, and about a quarter said it remained the same (Figure 8). The change occurred mainly in opposition-held areas. As for the

areas of the Autonomous-Administration, the respondents were divided mainly between those who said the security situation remained the same or improved (Figure 10). Bearing in mind however, that the Autonomous -Administration areas are more stable than the opposition-held areas, which have undergone major changes over the past year. The respondents in Aleppo reveal significant positive changes that occurred during the period preceding the survey. There is almost unanimous agreement that the security situation had somehow improved. In Al-Hasakah and Hama, the majority said the security situation improved for the better, although a significant percentage felt it remained the same. Idlib appears to be less stable, with a significant percentage saying that the situation has taken a turn for the worse (Figure 9). However, in summary, it appears that the security situation has improved in most of the surveyed areas, albeit to varying degrees.

Figure 9. Improvement in security compared with the previous year by province

Legend:
- I don't know / Prefer not to answer
- Significantly detriorated
- Slightly detriorated
- Stayed the same
- Significantly improved
- Slightly improved

Idlib: 3.20%, 7.60%, 13.90%, 26.60%, 5.70%, 43.00%

Al-Hasakah: 0.50%, 0.00%, 7.30%, 35.40%, 17.20%, 39.60%

Hama: 0.90%, 3.50%, 7.00%, 21.70%, 13.90%, 53.00%

Aleppo: 0.00%, 0.00%, 1.10%, 2.20%, 39.80%, 57.00%

Figure 10. Improved security compared with the previous year by territorial control

Under the autonomous administation control: 0.50%, 0.00%, 7.30%, 35.40%, 17.20%, 39.60%

Under the opposition control: 1.60%, 4.40%, 8.50%, 18.90%, 16.90%, 49.70%

Legend:
- I don't know / Prefer not to answer
- Significantly detriorated
- Slightly detriorated
- Stayed the same
- Significantly improved
- Slightly improved

Figure 11. What is the main factor that led to this?

I don't know / Prefer not to answer: 3.7
Other: 19.8
Establishing new bodies to ensure security: 24.1
Understandings between factions in the region: 15.6
Cease-fire: 36.8

It seems that the improvement of the situation was the result of several factors (Figure 11). Significant differences were also observed based on the areas of military control and provinces. The cease-fire in opposition-held areas played a key role. In the areas of the Democratic Autonomous-Administration, the improvement of the security situation was due to the coordination of work among the different forces there; their understandings and the

formation of new bodies (figure 12). These understandings and agreements are almost non-existent in opposition-held areas. The case of Hama was most interesting, as the overwhelming majority of respondents reported "other reasons" for the improvement of the security situation (Figure 13).

Figure 12. Main factor for improved security situation by areas of territorial control

Figure 13. Main factor for improved security situation by province

Risks and Population Needs to Ensure Personal Security

Figure 14. What is the main security threat in your area?

Threat	Value
Aerial bombardment	23.8
Proliferation of weapons	22.2
Explosions	16.3
Military incursions	9.5
Infighting	6.6
Terrorist organizations	6.1
External interventions	4.7
I don't know / Prefer not to answer	3.2
Arbitrary arrests	3.2
Spread of crime	2.2
Other	1.1
Checkpoints transgressions	1.1

The main factors threatening security: Air strikes ranked first (at 23.8%), the proliferation of weapons (at 22.2%), and explosions third (at 16.3%). The percentage drops to 10% for factors such as military incursions, internal fighting and terrorist organizations (Figure 14). When we compare the various areas of territorial control we find significant differences. In opposition-held areas, aerial bombing comes first, then conventional bombings, followed by military incursions. In the Democratic Autonomous-Administration areas, proliferation of weapons comes first, followed by explosions, followed by terrorist attacks. (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Main factor for improved security situation by areas of territorial control

Factor	Under the autonomous administration control	Under the opposition control
I don't know / Prefer not to answer	7.80%	0.80%
Other	2.10%	0.50%
External interventions	8.90%	2.50%
Infighting	8.90%	5.50%
Explosions	17.20%	15.80%
Terrorist organizations	12.00%	3.00%
Military incursions	0.00%	14.50%
Aerial bombardment	2.10%	35.20%
Arbitrary arrests	1.60%	4.10%
Spread of crime	1.00%	2.70%
Checkpoints transgressions	1.60%	0.80%
Proliferation of weapons	37.00%	14.50%

Important differences are also observed in provinces within opposition-held areas. People in Idlib are threatened by 1) aerial bombardments, 2) military incursions and 3) conventional bombings. In Aleppo, people are threatened by 1) bombings, 2) military incursions and 3) arbitrary arrests. In Hama, people are threatened by 1) aerial bombardment, 2) proliferation of weapons, and 3) internal fighting (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Main factor for improved security situation by province

Factor	Idlib	Al-Hasakah	Hama	Aleppo
I don't know / Prefer not to answer	0.60%	7.80%	1.70%	0.00%
Other	0.00%	2.10%	1.70%	0.00%
External interventions	3.80%	8.90%	0.90%	2.20%
Infighting	2.50%	8.90%	8.70%	6.50%
Explosions	15.80%	17.20%	1.70%	33.30%
Terrorist organizations	6.30%	12.00%	0.00%	1.10%
Military incursions	20.30%	0.00%	1.70%	20.40%
Aerial bombardment	31.60%	2.10%	60.90%	9.70%
Arbitrary arrests	1.30%	1.60%	0.00%	14.00%
Spread of crime	1.30%	1.00%	3.50%	4.30%
Checkpoints interventions	1.30%	1.60%	0.00%	1.10%
Proliferation of weapons	15.20%	37.00%	19.10%	7.50%

The measures adopted by the population to preserve their personal security were in line with the nature and magnitude of the risks they faced. It is noted, for example, that refrainment from expressing political opinions is a significantly common measure (second place) (Figure 17). This meant that threats against personal freedoms are still present. Other common measures to avoid problems of physical extortion and theft are: not going out at night, hiding valuables and avoiding some streets that seem more dangerous than others. What is striking here is the large percentage of arms possession (about

one-third of respondents). It is useful here to identify differences based on areas of territorial control and provinces. This may help to understand the key challenges in each region and how to deal with them.

Figure 17. Measures to increase personal security

Procedures are similar in most areas of territorial control, but there are some differences nevertheless. Residents of opposition-held areas avoid going out at night and are careful not to show any valuable possessions more so than the areas of Democratic Autonomous-Administration. However, residents of DAA areas avoid checkpoints or walking in particular neighborhoods or streets more so than the residents in opposition-held areas (Figure 18).

Figure 18. Measures to increase personal security by areas of territorial control

Prefer not to answer — 2.10% / 2.50%
Other — 6.80% / 4.40%
Demonstrate a religious attitude that differs from my true beliefes (by word, practice, or attire) — 3.10% / 6.80%
Not being outspoken about anything political and political positions — 44.30% / 41.00%
Avoid checkpoints — 21.90% / 10.10%
Not show ownership of anything expensive — 28.60% / 38.80%
Avoid walking in some streets in town — 32.30% / 15.00%
Avoid leaving the house after a certain hour — 41.70% / 60.40%
Keep a weapon at home — 22.90% / 22.10%
Always carry a weapon — 7.80% / 11.20%

☐ Under the autonomous administration control ☐ Under the opposition control

It is noted that fear of expressing opinions and political position is the highest in Hama, and is significantly different from the rest of the regions. Aleppo ranks highest in the proliferation of weapons among civilians, a factor which seems to be consistent with the high risk of looting or theft: 64.5% said they did not reveal any expensive possessions. The main measure taken in Idlib by residents to protect their security was not to leave the house after a certain hour — a measure that came in second for residents in the Autonomous Administration areas. The measure that came in first for the DAA areas however, was the same as that in Hama: refrainment from expressing opinions and their political position (Figure 19).

Figure 19. Measures to increase personal security by province

Regarding the needs of the population to enhance their personal security, first comes the requirement to improve logistics such as lighting dark places and setting up surveillance cameras, and secondly the demand for accountability

of the abusers and corrupt officials. The third is to improve the way officials deal with citizens. (Figure 20).

Figure 20. The three most urgent measures that authorities must implement for maintenance of security but have not been implemented so far

Analysis of results by areas of territorial control shows some differences in prioritization. In opposition-held areas for example, the three demands are first to improve security logistics, secondly hold abusers and corrupt officials accountable, and thirdly improve the way they deal with citizens and to form a specific mechanism in which citizens can file a complaint against them.

Those same demands are the three most important in the areas of Autonomous Administration, but are ranked differently: hold abusers and corrupt officials accountable first; improve security logistics second; improve the way officials deal with citizens third. (Figure 21).

Figure 21. The three most urgent measures that authorities must implement for maintenance of security but have not been implemented so far by areas of territorial control

The same can be said that the three most important demands or needs in provinces that are opposition-held, are the same as the aforementioned ones, but ranking differently (improvement of security logistics, holding abusers and corrupt officials accountable; improving the way they deal with citizens. However, there is an important difference that emerges in the case of Aleppo. The need to hold abusers and corrupt officials' accountable ranks first, and the improvement of security logistics second, and increase the number of patrols

in the streets third, while the demand to improve the way officials deal with citizens fourth, albeit a small difference (Figure 22).

**Figure 22. The three most urgent measures that authorities must implement for maintenance of security but have not been implemented so far by province**

Confidence in the authorities maintaining security

Figure 23. Confidence in those responsible for maintaining security

7.0   10.4
12.7
69.9

- I trust them all
- I trust some of them
- I do not trust any of them
- Prefer not to answer

The majority of respondents (69.9%) said they trusted some of the authorities responsible for maintaining security in their region, and there were close percentages between respondents saying that they trusted all authorities, or did not trust any of them, adding up to about 10% (Figure 23). The percentages are very close when looking at results by areas of territorial control (Figure 24), or by province (25%).

Figure 24. Confidence in those responsible for maintaining security by areas of territorial control

	I trust them all	I trust some of them	I do not trust any of them	Prefer not to answer
	9.00% / 13.00%	71.00% / 67.70%	13.40% / 11.50%	6.60% / 7.80%

- Under the opposition control
- Under the autunomous administration control

Figure 25. Confidence in those responsible for maintaining security by province

	Aleppo	Hama	Al-Hasakah	Idlib
I trust them all	9.70%	8.70%	13.00%	8.90%
I trust some of them	71.00%	68.70%	67.70%	72.80%
I do not trust any of them	15.10%	15.70%	11.50%	10.80%
Prefer not to answer	4.30%	7.00%	7.80%	7.60%

- I trust them all
- I trust some of them
- I do not trust any of them
- Prefer not to answer

Confidence was very low or almost non-existent regarding the regime's Syrian Arab Army, National Defense and Intelligence, where the percentage of mistrust exceeded 60% (Figure 26). In general, the percentages were not very different between areas of territorial control (or even between provinces) (Figures 27 and 28). The differences are in the ranking. In the areas of the Democratic Autonomous Administration, doubts about the role of the National Defense came first, then the Intelligence second, and the army last. In opposition-held areas, the army came first (almost unanimous at 91.2%), then the Intelligence, and the National Defense second (both at about the same percentage of 68%). Relationships with other powers such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, was mentioned by the residents of opposition-held areas more so than the residents of the Autonomous-Administration areas. This is due to HTS' geographical presence, which is absent from the DAA areas (Figure 27).

Figure 26. Entities with no confidence

Entity	Percentage
Syrian Arab army	72.30%
National defence forces	66.90%
Intelligence	62.10%
Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham	24.10%
Forces emanating from political parties (Baath brigades,…	19.70%
Tribal armed factions	14.60%
Police	12.30%
Prefer not to answer	10.00%
Palestinian forces	9.50%
Other	8.70%
Security offices of factions	6.90%
Ahrar Al-Sham	5.60%

Figure 27. Entities with no confidence by areas of territorial control

Legend:
- Under the autonomous administration control
- Under the opposition control

Entity	Under the autonomous administration control	Under the opposition control
Prefer not to answer	25.40%	2.30%
Other	12.30%	6.90%
Palestinian forces	4.60%	11.90%
Forces emanating from political parties (Baath brigades, Eagles of…	16.20%	21.50%
Tribal armed factions	25.40%	9.20%
Ahrar Al-Sham	13.80%	1.50%
Security offices of factions	7.70%	6.50%
Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham	10.80%	30.80%
National defence forces	64.60%	68.10%
Intelligence	48.50%	68.80%
Syrian Arab army	34.60%	91.20%
Police	10.00%	13.50%

Figure 28. Entities with no confidence by province

- Prefer not to answer
- Other
- Palestinian forces
- Forces emanating from political parties (Baath brigades, Eagles of the whirlwind, etc…)
- Tribal armed factions
- Ahrar Al-Sham
- Security offices of factions
- Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham
- National defence forces

Idlib
2.60%
2.60%
25.20%
37.40%
16.50%
3.50%
7.80%
65.20%
78.30%
86.10%
83.50%
9.60%

Al-Hasakah
25.40%
12.30%
4.60%
16.20%
25.40%
13.80%
7.70%
10.80%
64.60%
48.50%
34.60%
10.00%

Hama
2.50%
11.40%
0.00%
1.30%
3.80%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
79.70%
86.10%
96.20%
30.40%

Aleppo
1.50%
9.10%
3.00%
18.20%
3.00%
0.00%
12.10%
7.60%
36.40%
18.20%
98.50%
0.00%

The Security Situation in Syria

The majority of the respondents (40.8%) believe that the most accurate depiction of the current security situation is that it is subject to the agreements of regional and international forces, and that the role of the Syrian authorities is limited to implementation only. The second description, scoring 32.2%, is that the current situation is a general chaos and a complete lack of security. The third description— the absence of central security bodies, scored the lowest at 18.4% (Figure 29).

Figure 29. The following statements describe the security situation in Syria

Residents outside Syria seem to have a completely different view of those at home about the security situation in Syria. It is also noted that the percentage of those who reside outside Syria who said that it is a general chaos and a complete lack of security was significantly higher than those who said so in the DAA areas (Figure 30). Results are more polarized when looking at results based on provinces: 60% of the population in Hama said that it is a general chaos and a complete lack of security, and 30.4% in Idlib reported the same answer — while the percentage significantly dropped in both Al-Hasakah and Aleppo (Figure 31).

**Figure 30. The following statements describe the security situation in Syria by areas of territorial control**

Legend:
- There are no central security agencies / or the decline of their role due to the emergence of other parties
- The security situation is linked to understandings of regional and international powers, and the Syrian security authorities have no role but implementation
- General chaos and total insecurity
- I don't know / Prefer not to answer

Under the opposition control: 13.70%, 44.50%, 32.80%, 9.00%
Under the autonomous administration control: 19.80%, 45.80%, 16.10%, 18.20%
Outside Syria: 22.00%, 34.90%, 39.50%, 3.50%

Figure 31. The following statements describe the security situation in Syria by province

Legend:
- There are no central agencies / or the decline of their role due to the emergence of other parties
- The security situation is linked to understandings of regional and international powers, and the Syrian security authorities have no role but implementation
- General chaos and total insecurity
- I don't know / Prefer not to answer

Aleppo: 16.10%, 79.60%, 3.20%, 1.10%
Hama: 14.80%, 17.40%, 60.00%, 7.80%
Al-Hasakah: 19.60%, 45.90%, 16.50%, 18.00%
Idlib: 11.40%, 43.70%, 30.40%, 14.60%

As for the relationship between citizens and the regime's security apparatus, clearly explained in Figure (32), shows there is almost a unanimous negative response: 20.9% said it is bad, and 64.1% described it as very bad, while only 10% said it is acceptable or good.

Figure 32. Relationship between citizens and official security agencies

| Very poor	Poor	Acceptable	Good	Very good	I don't know	Prefer not to answer
64.1	20.9	7.7	3.3	0.4	1.8	1.9

The relationship of citizens with the legislative authority does not appear to be better than its relationship with the security apparatus, but it is less severe in the sense that it appears as a formal entity with no significant role in security matters as the majority of respondents (61.9%) stated. Only 0.9% said the entity has a positive role with the community, while 19.4% said it has a negative role (Figure 33).

Figure 33. Parliament and security affairs

I don't know / Prefer not to answer 17.8%
Positive role 0.9%
Negative role 19.4%
Has no role 61.9%

Residents Outside Syria and the Probability of Return

Figure 34. Can you normally enter and exit Syria?

- Yes - No - Prefer not to answer

Many Syrians abroad are unable to visit their country. The results show that the majority is unable to return for a specific reason (55.5%) (Figure 34). More than a third believe that they will be persecuted by the regime for security reasons and about a quarter (21.6%) for reasons of military service (Figure 35). The percentage is large, but we assume that it is even larger. There has been a misunderstanding of this question among Syrians living in Turkish camps, because they are able to enter Syria to opposition-held areas without any trouble. As shown in Table (2), 92.1% said they visit Syria without any issues.

Figure 35. The reason for the inability to enter and exit Syria with no issues

As Table (2) shows, the problem of not being able to visit or return to Syria stands out mainly among:

- Young Syrians (More than 63% of those under 36 years of age said they cannot return or do not want to go back now). In general, visiting Syria is easier for those who are older. Despite that, more than a third of those older than 45 years of age cannot return.

- Supporters of mixing religion and politics compared to those who reject the notion, as the percentage drops from those who support 73.2%, to those who don't 32.7%.
- Students and those who are unemployed compared to others.
- Single individuals compared with those who are married: 71.2% single, and 51.0% married, respectively.
- Kurds 68.8% compared with Arabs 53.7%
- The more educated compared to the less educated.
- Men 74.2% compared to women 33.5%
- Those who live in Europe and in Gaziantep compared to those who live in camps, bearing in mind that those living in Turkish camps enter Syria to opposition-held areas.

Table 2. The possibility of entry and exit to Syria without any issues according to some demographic and social variables

	Yes	No
Age		
Up until 25 years of age	%36,7	%63,3
Between 26-35 years	%35,1	%64,9
Between 36-45 years	%52,8	%47,2
Older than 45 years	%64,4	%35,6
Ideology		
Supports separating religion from politics	%67,3	%32,7
Does not support separating religion from politics	%26,8	%73,2
No clear stance	%25,0	%75,0
Occupation		
Has a job	%40,5	%59,5
Student	%30,0	%70,0
Unemployed	%31,9	%68,1
Housewife	%88,4	%11,6
Marital Status		
Single	%28,8	%71,2
Married	%49,0	%51,0
Divorced	6	8

|		
Widowed	19	2
Ethnicity		
Arab	46,3%	53,7%
Kurdish	31,3%	68,8%
Level of Education		
Secondary school	%78,9	%21,1
High school	%45,3	%54,7
University/Higher learning	%36,2	%63,8
Gender		
Man	%25,8	%74,2
Woman	%66,5	%33,5
Location		
Camp in Turkey	92,1%	7,9%
Gaziantep	25,3%	74,7%
Berlin	21,2%	78,8%
Amsterdam	28,9%	71,1%

Section II: The Security Sector in the Future

The relationship between political transition and security/stability

The majority of respondents linked political change and security/stability, with 60.1% of respondents saying it is a must. However, about a third of respondents do not see a correlation: to them, political change is a secondary factor (according to 22.1%), and may or may not affect security and stability. The latter can occur without the first (according to 10.9%). A small percentage that did not exceed 3% considered that security and stability are contingent on the return of the regime's authority as it was pre-2011 (Figure 36).

Figure 36. Do you think that a political change would ensure a transition to a system of government that respects human rights?

As shown in Table (3), the majority of the population living outside Syria or in opposition-held areas link political transition to security and stability. But the attitude of the population in Self-Autonomous Administration areas of control reject the linkage. Respondents believe that political stability can occur without political transition. In opposition-held areas, while there is near unanimity in Aleppo and Idlib in linking security and stability to political transition, respondents in Hama dispute the notion.

The percentage of those who reject the link between political transition and security and stability is more common among supporters of mixing religion and politics compared with others; more common in those who are employed and working compared to students and those who are unemployed; more common among those who have at least reached a secondary-level of education, compared with those of lower education; and more common among Kurds compared with Arabs.

Table 3. Political transition and security change according to some social and demographic changes

	Yes, a necessary condition	No, it is not a condition, but a secondary factor	There will be no stability unless there is a return to the system of government prior to 2011	There is no connection between political transition and stability	I don't know/No answer
Area/region					
Opposition-held	%74,6	%17,5	%1,1	%3,8	%3,0
Democratic Autonomous-Administration	%30,7	%25,0	%5,7	%25,0	%13,5
Outside Syria	%61,0	%25,1	%2,0	%10,6	%1,3
Province					
Aleppo	%94,6	%3,2	%0,0	%0,0	%2,2
Hama	%40,9	%45,2	%0,0	%8,7	%5,2
Al-Hasakah	%30,9	%25,3	%5,7	%24,7	%13,4
Idlib	%87,3	%5,7	%2,5	%2,5	%1,9
Ideology					
Supports separation of religion from politics	%65,9	%21,9	%2,1	%7,5	%2,6
Does not support separation of religion from politics	%58,2	%23,0	%2,2	%13,1	%3,5
No clear stance	%38,0	%18,3	%5,6	%16,9	%21,1
Occupation					
Has a job	%58,2	%23,2	%2,9	%12,6	%3,1
Student	%64,2	%24,4	%0,0	%8,1	%3,3
Unemployed	%68,8	%15,3	%2,1	%7,6	%6,3
Housewife	%55,1	%23,2	%2,9	%10,1	%8,7
Monthly income					
Less than 25,000SL	%66,1	%20,9	%0,0	%6,1	%7,0
Between 25,000 and 75,000SL	%55,0	%23,9	%4,1	%11,5	%5,5
More than 75,000SL	%54,7	%24,8	%1,7	%17,1	%1,7
I prefer not to answer	%64,7	%11,5	%4,3	%8,6	%10,8
Level of Education					
Illiterate	14	2	0	2	5
Elementary school	%62,5	%12,5	%4,2	%12,5	%8,3
Secondary school	%54,6	%25,2	%3,4	%10,1	%6,7

High school	%57,6	%26,3	%1,1	%11,1	%3,8
University/Higher learning	%62,5	%21,2	%2,7	%10,9	%2,7
Ethnicity					
Arab	%66,0	%21,1	%2,5	%7,8	%2,5
Kurdish	%38,2	%22,9	%2,9	%22,4	%13,5

Modifications/Reforms: their form, the time needed to achieve them, obstacles, and means of their application

While conducting the survey, it was necessary to distinguish between those who believe that the security services are a problem, and therefore it is necessary to carry out reforms, and between those who are satisfied with their services. As Figure 37 shows, there is almost unanimous agreement among respondents that the security services are one of the main catalysts for the outbreak of events in Syria. The majority of respondents believe that radical changes must be made immediately that transform the function of these apparatuses to serve the citizens. However, about one-third of respondents said they should be gradual over long periods rather than immediate (fig. 38). Most respondents expected a period of one to five years to be sufficient to achieve reforms, while about a quarter think it takes more than five years to achieve the desired reforms (figure 39).

42

Figure 37. Do you agree with the statement "The practices and violations of the security services were one of the main reasons for the outbreak of events in Syria"?

| I Strongly agree	I agree	I object	I strongly object	I don't know / Prefer not to answer
57.3	28.9	4.0	1.2	8.7

Figure 38. How should the new/future authorities deal with these security agencies to ensure stability in the country in the future?

Radical changes must be made immediately so that their mission is to serve the citizens	Modifications should occur gradually and over long periods	Keep the situation as it is without any modifications	I don't know / Prefer not to answer
66.9	30.6	0.6	1.9

Figure 39. Time needed to implement reforms

Less than a year	1-3 years	3-5 years	More than 5 years	I don't know / Prefer not to answer
9.0	29.7	30.2	27.4	3.7

As for the form of these changes, or their modifications/reform, 51.9% of the respondents preferred the option that the existing apparatuses should be dissolved and restructured within one unified system, while 26.4% considered the less radical option which does not require dissolving the apparatuses, but rather restricts their functions to merely collecting information according to

clear regulations. A high percentage of respondents who cited "other" was also observed (Figure 40).

Figure 40. The nature of the reforms

But what are the factors that may impede the achievement of these changes/reforms?

As shown in Figure 41, there seems to be multiple factors, almost all of the possibilities we mentioned to the respondents were in their view, real threats. There was near unanimity (and in closeness in numbers) that the proliferation of weapons, the multiplicity of militias and factions with external links, the administration and branches of the regime's security and intelligence, the continuous change in military conditions and influence, and the resistance of the security forces to any initiatives for reform or restructuring, will most probably hinder the success of any security sector reform attempts.

Figure 41. Reformation hindrances

Overcoming these challenges also requires various actions. All the procedures we proposed were approved by the overwhelming majority of respondents and were as follows: Ending the state of multiple security agencies and forming a central body that preserves security and is committed to human rights within the framework of the rule of law and constitution. The implementation of transitional justice, a process that includes the prosecution of perpetrators of violations, and compensates victims for their losses, and form committees to reveal the reality of what has happened on the ground during conflict, and reform state institutions; in addition to the implementation of legal reforms to ensure that do not circumvent the new constitution. Especially the reform of the security services, and to include new articles in the constitution that limits the powers of the security services and ensure its full reform (Figure 42). As for the problem of multiple security agencies and lack of coordination among them, it seems that the respondents prefer to adopt one set of laws, to be followed by security authorities as a more appropriate option to deal with this problem (Figure 43).

**Figure 42. Proposed measures for reforming the security sector**

Legend:
- Not necessary at all
- Not necessary
- Somewhat necessary
- Necessary
- Very necessary
- I don't know / Prefer not to answer

End the state of multiple security agencies and establish a central entity that maintains security and is committed to human rights within the rule of law and constitution
- 4.70%
- 2.60%
- 7.40%
- 13.90%
- 66.70%
- 5.30%

Establish a governing body with full powers to oversee the progress of the transitional phase
- 4.60%
- 3.90%
- 8.60%
- 17.60%
- 61.10%
- 5.30%

Implement what is known as transitional justice, which includes prosecuting perpetrators of violations, compensating victims, establishing committees to uncover the truth, and reforming institutions
- 2.90%
- 2.80%
- 7.10%
- 10.70%
- 71.70%
- 5.40%

Carry-out legal reforms that must not circumvent the provisions of the new constitution regarding the reform of security services
- 6.00%
- 3.50%
- 14.30%
- 21.40%
- 49.50%
- 6.30%

The new constitution embedding provisions that limit the powers of security services and guarantees their full reform
- 4.70%
- 3.50%
- 10.90%
- 19.60%
- 57.10%
- 5.30%

Figure 43. Options to face multiple security agencies and lack of coordination among them

Option	Value
Adoption of unified laws by all security authorities and adhere to it	42.2
Incorporate / transition security entities into local police	12.6
Redistribute security responsibilities between central and local security forces	9.0
Dissolve all non-Syrian organizations	8.2
Train / Develop the performance of employees in the security services, and then have them join official security agencies	7.3
Other	6.5
Return to what it was before 2011	4.8
Dissolve all Syrian local authorities, that were established post-2011	4.7
I don't know / Prefer not to answer	4.4
Keep the situation without any change	0.2

Women in the Security Sector

Figure 44. Attitude towards women joining forces concerned with maintaining security

The majority of respondents support the idea that women should join establishments concerned with maintaining security. But note that a significant percentage of them reject the notion (Figure 44). Furthermore, a majority of respondents (61%) believe that there are some tasks that women cannot do as well as men. Only a quarter of respondents supported the idea that women are able to work as efficiently as men in all tasks (Figure 45). The tasks that were listed by respondents that women cannot perform as well as men were: combat military tasks and police field missions, such as chasing wanted persons, and so forth. It seems that in their view, the proper place for women in security services is for office work/desk jobs (Figure 46).

Figure 45. If women worked in the security services (police, army, intelligence) do you think they are able to accomplish the tasks assigned to them as efficiently as men?

Figure 46. What are the tasks that women cannot perform as efficiently as men?

15.1	58.8	5.3	15.1	5.8
Police field missions (pursuit of wanted persons, patrols in the streets, etc…)	Combat military tasks on the fronts	Investigations	All of the above	Other

The main reason for opposing the idea of women working in security establishments is gender-biased (e.g. women have their jobs and men have theirs), rather than being a religious issue that dismisses women working. The overwhelming majority said that the reason for its refusal was that women were unable to function effectively in the security sector, while less than a quarter said it contradicted the idea of what jobs women hold in general (contradicted the stereotype) (Figure 47).

Figure 47. Reason for discouraging women working in the security sector

|			
72.8	20.9	4.5	1.7
This is a task that women cannot do efficiently	I oppose the work of women in general	Other	Prefer not to answer

Integration of Ex-Combatants

The option supported by more than half of the respondents was to secure jobs for ex-combatants, or grant them financial loans to include their families helping them start a new life. There seems to be no support for their inclusion in the army. The percentage of those who supported the idea of forming local

police units comprised of ex-combatants did not exceed a quarter of respondents (Figure 48).

Figure 48. Procedures for the integration of ex-combatants

Regarding results by areas of territorial control, it seems that a large percentage supports including ex-combatants in the security forces (army or police) in opposition-held areas (45.1%). The rate however, significantly dropped in SAA areas, as most citizens support the integration of ex-combatants in the labor market (77.1%) (Figure 49). In Idlib, more than half of the respondents want the ex-combatants to join the security forces. Hama was divided between integrating ex-combatants in the security forces, and into the labor market. The latter option was the preferred choice for citizens in Aleppo, which was chosen by the majority (59.1%) (Figure 50).

**Figure 49. Integration of ex-combatants by areas of territorial control**

Under the opposition control / Under the autonomous administration control

Category	Under the opposition control	Under the autonomous administration control
Form local trained police units composed of ex-combatants from the region	31.70%	11.50%
To be integrated in the army	13.40%	5.70%
Secure job opportunities for them or grant them financial loans and to their families to help them start new business ventures	50.00%	77.10%
Other	4.10%	1.00%
I don't know / Prefer not to answer	0.80%	4.70%

Figure 50. Integration of ex-combatants by province

Legend:
- I don't know / Prefer not to answer
- Other
- Secure job opportunities for them or grant them financial loans and to their families to help them start new business ventures
- To be integrated in the army
- Form local trained police units composed of ex-combatants from the region

| Province	I don't know / Prefer not to answer	Other	Secure job opportunities	To be integrated in the army	Form local trained police units
Idlib	0.00%	4.40%	51.90%	7.00%	36.70%
Al-Hasakah	4.60%	1.00%	76.80%	5.70%	11.90%
Hama	1.70%	4.30%	40.00%	14.80%	39.10%
Aleppo	1.10%	3.20%	59.10%	22.60%	14.00%

In addition, there is a consensus on the need to ensure the return of child soldiers to school (96.5%). The vast majority support the idea of establishing psychological support programs for ex-combatants and their families, as well as awareness-raising campaigns in the community for them to accept the return of combatants back into their lives. E.g. focusing on two axes: the first related to ex-combatants and their families, and the second to the community in which they will practice their normal lives again (fig. 51).

Figure 51. Proposals to deal with combatants who have decided to leave the arms

Civil Society and the Local Community in Maintaining Security

Figure 52. Is maintaining security solely the state's responsibility?

- Yes, solely
- No, not solely
- I don't know / No answer

The overwhelming majority said that the responsibility for maintaining security did not rest with the State alone (fig. 52). Regarding tasks that non-governmental parties may engage in to maintain security, would include, firstly, awareness-raising campaigns to ensure the safety and security of citizens (64.9%), and second, establish a mechanism to monitor the work and performance of the security services (48.8%) (Figure 53). Basically, work on two axes, one supervisory and the other awareness.

Figure 53. Tasks that can be undertaken by non-governmental actors to participate in the maintenance of security

There seem to be significant differences the results were analyzed by areas of territorial control. In opposition-held areas, monitoring the work and performance of security services fell second place, preceded by "mediating conflicts." The latter option ranked third among residents outside Syria, however, its importance declined in SAA areas (Figure 54). Even within opposition-held areas, there are important differences: in Idlib, "conflict mediation" came second, while monitoring the work of security services came first. In Hama and Aleppo, awareness-raising campaigns came first, followed by mediating conflicts, while the option of monitoring the work of security services significantly dropped (Figure 55).

Figure 54. Tasks that can be undertaken by non-governmental entities to engage in the maintenance of stability by areas of territorial control


Figure 55. Tasks that can be undertaken by non-governmental entities to engage in the maintenance of stability by province

But what are the obstacles to the engagement of non-state actors in maintaining security? What about the role of the local communities?

It seems that the problem is due to two main reasons according to respondents: the first is the state's total dominance over everything, including non-governmental organizations, and the absence of legal bases for such participation (Figure 56). There seems to be a desire to engage representatives of major families, communities, religious or ethnic groups, tribal sheikhs and clans. The disagreement arises however, when pondering whether this type of engagement must be limited to the transition period or to extend beyond that period (Figure 57).

**Figure 56. Obstacles that prevent non-state actors from policing**

Figure 57. The role of civil society in maintaining stability

	No, never	Yes, but only in the transitional phase	Yes, always
Tribal sheikhs or notables	14.80%	48.60%	36.80%
Notables or representatives of religious or ethnic communities	15.20%	36.10%	49.00%
Representatives of major families in the region	18.30%	38.40%	43.50%

polarized, and a large percentage of them said that they did not know what the role of parliament should be. The larger percentage, exceeding only a quarter, wanted the parliament to have a larger role in monitoring all security matters. But about a quarter of the respondents felt that the task of parliament should be limited to following up on citizens' complaints/concerns only (Figure 58).

Figure 58. The Parliament and Security affairs

	Value
To be limited to the task of approving the general budget of the security sector	3.5
None of the above	9.5
To contribute to the formulation of the overall security strategy	17.4
I don't know / Prefer not to answer	18.0
To be limited to the task of following up citizens' complaints about violations that may be exposed to them by security services	22.1
Parliament should monitor all matters related to security affairs in the country	29.4

There is a general support for all the actions proposed in the research, with the exception of non-governmental organizations' participation in policing. Although the majority of respondents supported that non-governmental organizations help maintain security, yet they preferred that governmental

entities handle security first and foremost, and in later stages may engage non-governmental entities (Figure 59). The recommendations were as follows: training the security services and having them respect human rights, reforming the educational curricula in a way that allows students to realize their rights and duties, enhancing the role of the media in maintaining security through educating citizens and uncovering violations committed by the security services, possibly via a local police station, and increasing the engagement of non-governmental organizations in policing.

Figure 59. Proposed measures for security sector reform

Summary and recommendations

This report came in two chapters:

- Chapter 1: Focused on studying the current security situation in Syria. The study showed differences in the security situation according to the areas of territorial control, but also within the same area of territorial control, such as opposition-held areas, where responses differed because the areas are sub-divided according to the ruling military faction. The research also revealed that a considerable percentage of respondents refrained from answering some questions because of fear from the dominant forces in their region. Responses also varied regarding the security situation between Syrians living inside Syria, and the Syrians living outside. It is worth mentioning that a significant percentage trust some parties in maintaining security, and there are those who believe that the security situation improved since the previous year, despite the shelling on some areas, and internal fighting among the opposition factions as well as the proliferation of weapons, and the spread of crime.

- Chapter 2: This section of the report focused on the future phase, and revealed that a large segment believed that security/ stability is linked to political transition and the formation of a transitional governing body, and bringing about radical changes in the security services structure and the governing law, and control of the judiciary, and arms control and rehabilitation of fighters and integration and involvement of women in security apparatuses. All this confirms the high awareness of Syrian citizens, despite the current dire situation of institutional reform, especially security.

> This awareness, should be a cornerstone from which decision-makers must establish their policies.

The purpose of the study was not to extrapolate the security situation, but rather to understand the needs to work on building a roadmap for governance, and the functionality of the security services at the current stage, post-conflict and during political transition. This requires concerted efforts by all concerned Syrian political bodies, local councils, and organizations, to overcoming difficulties and challenges, and find solutions that would lead to a stable security situation — hence, creating a platform for building sustainable peace in Syria.

Recommendations:

1.   The path to sustainable peace lies in the reform of the security sector in any country that is subjected to war. Therefore, all Syrian human rights organizations working to build peace must join forces to spread a culture of peace in Syrian society.

2.   It is important to engage individuals and groups in working on the reformation of the security sector because they are first in line to be impacted by the security situation, and to avoid a fragmented and crime-ridden society, and raise awareness on the importance of engagement of each individual to make the desired change in the security sector.

3.   Building on the positive responses shown by a significant percentage of respondents in this report regarding the improvement of the security situation, and confidence in some security agencies, and work to strengthen this confidence through increasing the efficiency and capabilities of these bodies

by training and rehabilitation to deal with citizens in the best manner and in accordance with human rights laws.

4.   To work with the local councils and non-governmental organizations and hold joint meetings to exchange views and experiences on citizens' security, in order to build a plan of action and raise it to the political offices of the military factions to improve the security situation. This approach will impact other economic, sociological and education aspects of the Syrian society, and will reduce the spread of crime.

5. Work on the formation of joint committees comprised of local councils and political offices of the military factions to control and restrict the use of arms. This will help disarm individuals and groups, and hand the arms over to the next government. Civil society organizations should spare no effort in this area, and should raise awareness among citizens and local and military authorities on the importance of such actions.

6.   Since a wide range of respondents believed that security/stability are linked to political transition, and the creation of a transitional governing body, this requires us to adhere to the relevant international resolutions, in particular resolution 2254 and the Geneva 1 resolutions as the basis for any political solution in Syria.

7. To adhere to the principle of accountability, because without it, the regime that committed atrocities against Syrians will continue to do so, and there will be no stability or peace in Syria.

8. To work in the future on dissolving the current security services and lay off those found guilty of committing atrocities and holding them accountable for their actions. Additionally, establishing a qualified and well-trained central security apparatus, that respects human rights, and operates in accordance with a regulated law that is subject to the control of parliament.

9. Working to include in the next Syrian constitution texts that define the structure of security, and its powers, functions and mechanisms of control.

10. Working to make security services directly subordinate to the Parliament, considering that the Parliament is the legislative authority and the representative of the people, and is best able to control security, and determine its financial budget and mechanisms of disbursement, as well as the power to question leadership in the event there were any suspicious actions.

11. To work on building an independent and coherent judicial system to fulfill its role in investigating and prosecuting suspicious acts and criminal behavior of the security apparatus.
12. To rehabilitate child soldiers, and to return them to school.

13. To rehabilitate militants who did not commit crimes and reintegrate them into the security apparatus.

14. Support women in undertaking roles in the security field, and raise awareness on the ability of women to do this work like men.

15. Work on the reform of prisons and detention centers and detention mechanisms, which will have a great impact on controlling the security apparatus, and will reduce the excesses in dealing with detainees and prisoners.

16. Activating popular control over the work of the security apparatuses by giving way to human rights organizations to monitor detention centers and prisons.

Questionnaire

1. **The area where the interview took place is:**
   - Controlled by the regime
   - Under opposition control (if so, go to question 1.1)
   - Under Democratic Self-Autonomous Administration control
   - Outside Syria (if so, go to question 12)

   1.1. Is it

   - A besieged area
   - Euphrates Shield
   - Olive branch
   - Other

2. **Have you personally or a member of your family (parents, partner, children, brothers) experienced any direct assault or ill-treatment by militants in your area (whether using sharp objects or firearms) over the past year?**
   - Yes, I did personally
   - I did not personally, but a member of my family was
   - Yes, I did, in addition to family members
   - No, none of us did (go to question 5)
   - I prefer not to answer (go to question 5)

3. **What was the cause of the assault? In the case there was more than one incident, please describe the last incident you were subjected to.**
   - Looting, theft or financial blackmail
   - Political activism

- Media activism
- A different political opinion
- Religious reason
- With the aim of sexual harassment
- Without any justification
- I do not know / no answer
- Other

4. **Have you or the person who has been assaulted or ill-treated raised a complaint to anyone?**

- Yes (go to question 4.2)
- No (go to question 4.1)
- I prefer not to answer (go to question 5)

4.1 Why?

- Because the aggressor is the largest force in the region
- Because it is useless to raise a complaint, no one cares
- There is no one to complain to
- To avoid problems
- I tried it, but the establishment I complained to convinced me to withdraw the complaint
- Other
- I prefer not to answer

4.2. Who is it?

- The police
- The Syrian Arab Army
- Intelligence
- National Defense
- Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham
- Security offices of the armed opposition factions
- Ahrar Al-Sham
- Tribal / clan armed factions
- National Defense Forces
- Forces emanating from political parties (Baath Brigades, Eagles of the whirlwind)
- Palestinian forces
- Other

- I prefer not to answer

4.3. How was their treatment?
- Very good
- Good
- Normal
- Bad
- Very bad
- I prefer not to answer

5. How would you evaluate the current security situation in your area?
- Very bad
- Bad
- Good
- Very good
- I don't know / no answer

6. How do you evaluate it compared to last year?

- Slightly improved (go to question 6.1)
- Significant improvement (go to question 6.1)
- Same with no change
- A little bit worse
- Significantly worse
- I don't know / no answer

6. 1. What is the main factor that led to this?
- Ceasefire
- Understandings between factions in the region
- Formation of new bodies to ensure security
- Other
- I don't know / no answer

7. What is the main security threat in your area?
- The proliferation of weapons
- Checkpoints
- Spread of crime
- Arbitrary arrests
- Aerial bombardment
- Military incursions
- Terrorist organizations
- Explosions

- Infighting
- External interventions
- Other
- I don't know/I prefer not to answer

8. Which of the following do you commit to, to increase your current personal security? (choose multiple answers)
- Always carry a weapon
- Keep a weapon at home
- Avoid leaving the house after a certain hour
- Avoid walking in some streets in town
- Not show anything expensive
- Avoid approaching barriers
- Not being outspoken about political views
- Demonstrating a religious position that differs from my true beliefs (by word, practice or dress)
- Other
- I prefer not to answer

9. What are the three most urgent actions that you believe security personnel can do in your area that they have not yet done? (choose multiple answers)
- Increase the number of patrols in the streets
- Improve logistical security services (lighting dark places, setting up surveillance cameras in hazardous places, assigning a unified telephone number to call in case of emergency)
- Improve the way they deal with citizens and create a specific mechanism where citizens can raise a complaint against them
- Increase their presence in the area they're in
- Coordinate better among themselves
- Hold corrupt officials accountable for their actions
- Other
- I don't know / no answer

10.   Do you trust those responsible for maintaining security in your area?

- I trust them all
- I trust some of them (go to question 10.1)

- I do not trust any of them
- I prefer not to answer

10 a. Please specify who you do not trust (multiple answers- do not read options to respondent)
- The police
- The Syrian Arab Army
- Intelligence
- National Defense
- Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham
- Security offices of the armed opposition factions
- Ahrar Al-Sham
- Tribal / clan armed factions
- National Defense Forces
- Forces emanating from political parties (Ba'ath Brigades, Eagles, etc.)
- Palestinian forces
- Other
- I prefer not to answer

11.   If a problem occurs and you contact them, how do you expect their response speed? On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 is too slow, 10 extremely fast

- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
- I do not know / I prefer not to answer

12.   Which of the following statements best describe the security situation in Syria today?
- There is no central security agencies / or there is a decline in their power due to the emergence of other parties.
- The security situation is linked to the understandings of regional and international powers, and the Syrian security authorities are mere implementers.
- General chaos and total insecurity.
- I don't know / I prefer not to answer.

13.   Do you think that a political change that ensures a transition to a system of government that respects human rights is a prerequisite for achieving security/ stability in the country?

- Yes, it is a must
- No, it is not a condition but a secondary factor
- Security/stability will only be achieved by returning to the prevailing system of government before 2011
- There is no connection between political change and security/stability
- I don't know / no answer

14.   Do you agree with the following statement: "The practices and violations of the security services was one of the main reasons for the outbreak of events in Syria"?

- Strongly agree (to question 14.1)
- I agree (to question 14.1)
- I disagree
- I strongly oppose
- I do not know / no answer

14.1.   How should the new/next authorities deal with these security services to ensure stability in the country in the future?

- Radical changes must be made immediately so that their mission is to serve the citizens and ensure their security.
- Modifications should occur gradually and over long periods.
- Keep the situation as it is without any modifications
- I don't know / no answer

14.2.   How long do you think that process will take?

- Less than a year
- Between 1-3 years
- 3-5 years
- More than five years
- I do not know / no answer

14.3.   What is the nature of these amendments?

- To limit their functions by collecting information according to clear and set regulations.
- Dissolve existing apparatuses and remodel them with a single, unified apparatus.
- Other
- I don't know / no answer

15. **The large number of security agencies, and lack of coordination between themselves is one of the most prominent problems that may hinder the achievement of stability in the future. In your opinion, which of the following suggestions are closer to your perceptions of how to overcome this problem?**

- The adoption of unified laws followed by all security authorities
- The transfer of these security bodies to local police
- Redistribution of security responsibilities between central and local security forces
- Dissolution of all Syrian local authorities that were established after 2011, and rely only on the central security services
- Develop / train the performance of local security personnel and then assign them to official security agencies.
- Dissolution of all non-Syrian organizations
- Keep the situation without any change
- Return to what it was before 2011
- Other
- I don't know / no answer

16. **Which of the following do you think could be a hindrance to the success of stabilizing security in Syria?**

I don't know /no answer	No hindrance	A hindrance	A major hindrance	
				The constant change in military conditions and areas of influence
				The variety of militias and factions with external ties
				The agencies and branches of security and intelligence
				The proliferation of weapons
				The security forces resisting any reform or restructuring

17. **Which of the following measures do you think is necessary for the success of Security Services Reform in Syria? On a scale from 1 to 5, 1 is absolutely unnecessary and 5 is very necessary:**

I don't know/No answer	55	44	33	22	11	
						The new constitution includes provisions that limit the powers of the security services and guarantees their full reform

					Carry out legal reforms to ensure that the provisions of the new constitution regarding reform of the security services are not circumvented
					Apply transitional justice, which includes prosecuting perpetrators, compensating victims, forming committees to uncover the truth, and reforming institutions
					Forming a governing body with full powers to oversee the progress of the transitional phase and end its mission with the end of the transitional stage
					Dissolve the multiple security agencies and establish a central body that preserves security and is committed to human rights within the rule of law and the Constitution

18.   What is your position on women joining the forces concerned with maintaining security?

- Strongly agree (go to question 18.1)
- Agree (to Question 18.1)
- Object (to question 18.3)
- Strongly object (to question 18.3)
- I don't know / no answer (go to question 19)

18.1.   If you work in security services (police, army, intelligence), do you think that women are able to accomplish the tasks assigned to them as efficiently as men?

- Yes, in all tasks
- Yes, in some tasks (go to question 18.2)
- No, men are always better
- I don't know / no answer

18.2. What are the tasks that cannot be performed as efficiently as men?

- Police field missions (pursuit of wanted persons, patrols in the streets, etc.)
- Combat on the fronts
- Investigation
- All the above
- Other

18.3. Why?

- This is a task that women cannot do efficiently
- I oppose the work of women in general
- Other
- I prefer not to answer

19.   Which of the following is closer to your perceptions of what to do, after the war, in order to encourage the fighters to leave the arms?

- To form local police forces comprised of ex-combatants from the region
- To include them in the army
- To provide work opportunities for them, or grant them and their families financial loans to help them start new business ventures
- Other
- I don't know / No answer

20.   What do you think of each of the following propositions to deal with fighters who decide to give up arms after the war?

I don't know/I prefer not to answer	Not important	Important	
			Organizing awareness campaigns in the community to accept the return of fighters who choose to give up their arms
			Establish psychological support programs for ex-combatants and their families
			Work on returning child" soldiers back to school

21.   Is the responsibility for maintaining security solely the responsibility of the State?

- Yes
- No (go to Question 21.1)
- I don't know, no answer

21.a. What tasks can non-governmental actors do to engage in the maintenance of security? (Choose multiple answers)

- Collect and provide information
- Mediating disputes
- Organizing awareness campaigns to ensure citizens' security and safety

- Forming a monitoring mechanism of the work and performance of the security services
- Other
- I don't know / no answer

21.b. What is the main obstacle to such cooperation between non-State actors and the State?

- There are no legal grounds for this
- Lack of interest by civil society organizations in security issues
- Civil society organizations are institutionalized and linked to specific entities
- Practices and policies of the ruling authorities in all Syrian regions
- State domination over everything, including non-governmental organizations.
- Other
- I don't know / no answer

21.c. Which of the following groups should the state cooperate with in order to maintain security in the future?

No	Yes but only during the transitional phase	Yes always	
			Tribe notables and heads of tribes
			Representatives of religious or ethnic communities and their notables
			Representatives of major families in the region

22.   How do you describe the relationship between citizens and security agencies in Syria now?
- Very bad
- Bad
- Acceptable
- Good
- Very good
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer

23.   How do you assess the role of the current parliament in security affairs?
- No role

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- Negative role
- Positive role
- I don't know / no answer

24. **The Parliament (or the People's Assembly) can contribute to the country's stability in several ways. I will list to you the most important factors, and I want to know your opinion on what the task of parliament should be in regard to security affairs**
- To contribute to the formulation of the overall security strategy
- To be limited to the task of following up on citizens' complaints about violations that may be exposed to them by the security services
- To be limited to the task of approving the general budget of the security services
- Parliament should monitor all matters related to security affairs in the country
- None of the above

25. **Which of the following issues do you believe is important for improving the relationship between citizens and security agencies in the future?**

Not important at all	Not important	Important	Very important	
				Enhancing the engagement of non-governmental organizations in maintaining security
				Strengthen the role of local administrations in maintaining security by relying on a local police force (local or regional)
				Enhancing the role of the media in maintaining security through educating citizens and exposing violations that may be committed by the security services
				Reforming educational curricula so that students can understand their rights and obligations towards the security services
				Training the security services and guiding them to respect human rights

26. **Gender**
- Man
- Woman

27. **Age _____**

28. **Current Occupation:**
- Government employee in non-military / non-security sectors
- Employee or private sector worker
- Staff member of a non-governmental organization
- Fighter (go to question 28.1)
- Employee - non-combatant in the security sector (to question 28.j)
- Non-combatant in a military sector
- Freelance/Free trade (work for me and under my responsibility)
- Student
- Unemployed
- Housewife

28.a Was this your profession before 2011?

- Yes (go to question 28.3)
- No
- I prefer not to answer (to question 28.3)

28.2. Assuming that the war is over and you can return to your previous job, will you return to it?

- Yes, I will definitely return
- I'm not sure
- Best work would be in the army or police forces
- I prefer not to answer

28.3. What are the specialized courses that you have attended?

- Courses on information collection and analysis.
- Courses related to the laws governing the work of the security services.
- Human rights.
- Investigation
- Courses related to the physical, psychological and combat aspects.
- Other
- I have not attended any courses
- I prefer not to answer

29. **Are you a resident of the town before 2011, or have you come from another area after 2011?**

- I am a town resident before 2011
- I came from another town after 2011 (go to question 29.1)
- I prefer not to answer

29.a. Do you live in a camp?

- Yes
- No
- I prefer not to answer

30. **Level of education**
- Illiterate
- Primary
- Junior high
- Secondary education
- University / Graduate Studies

31. **Ethnicity**
- Arab
- Kurdish
- Turkmen
- Circassian
- Armenian
- Assyrian
- I prefer not to answer
- Other

32. **Your monthly income**
- Less than 25 thousand Syrian lira
- Between 25-75 thousand Syrian lira
- More than 75 thousand Syrian lira
- I prefer not to answer

33. **Marital status**
- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Widowed

34. Religion - Sect
- Sunni
- Shiite
- Top
- Ismaili
- Druze
- Yezidi
- Christian
- I prefer not to answer

35. What do you think of the following statement "Before the election of any political leader, he must be a religiously committed person"
- Strongly support
- Support
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- I don't know / no answer

36. Location the interview
- Damascus
- Damascus Countryside
- Aleppo
- Homs
- Hama
- Deir Ez-Zur
- Al-Hasakah
- Ar-Raqqah
- Daraa
- Idlib
- As-Suwayda
- Tartus
- Latakia
- Al-Qunaitra
- Outside Syria (to question 36.1)

36.1. Can you enter and exit Syria without any issues?

- Yes (go to question 37)

- No
- Prefer not to answer

36.2. Why?

- Wanted for security reasons
- Wanted by the regime for military service
- Wanted by the Free Syrian Army
- Wanted by Hayat Tahrir Al-sham
- Wanted by the Syrian Democratic Forces
- Wanted by various regime and opposition entities
- Family problems
- I do not want to go back in the current circumstances
- Other
- I prefer not to answer

37. Town/City: _____

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