

**DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN
IN SYRIAN SOCIETY (II/II)
PERCEPTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE**



Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

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The Day After (TDA) is a Syrian organization which supports the democratic transition in Syria. Its scope of work focuses on the following areas: rule of law, transitional justice, security sector reform, electoral systems design, elections of the constituent assembly, constitutional design, economic reform and social policies.

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Excutive Summary

In order to identify the perception of domestic violence against women in Syrian society, The Day After has conducted a survey which included six Syrian provinces, in areas controlled by both the regime, Democratic self-governance and the opposition, in addition to the refugee camps in Turkey. The survey depended on a multistage stratified sample which adopted proportional allocation (men/women). The number of respondents totaled 2091; 1120 men and 971 women. Data was collected using a questionnaire and through personal interviews conducted by The Day After's trained researchers. This report presents the results of the data analysis.

The research begins by trying to identify the respondents' perception of the prevalence of domestic violence against women, and finds that women are more aware of abusive incidents of this kind, and that their concern for the children and "the feeling of shame and the desire not to share their problems with others", in addition to the absence of an institution that women trust can protect them, were the most prominent reasons why abused women remain silent. The percentage of women who said that they have experienced domestic violence is 21.2%, which is double the percentage of men who reported the same answer. In 61.5% of cases the abuser is the partner, but only a small percentage of victims (less than 7%) reported the abusive husband to one of the concerned institutions. In general, women do not report domestic violence practiced against them. The results also reveal that the majority of domestic violence incidents (69.2%) occur in the presence of minors (sons, relatives or others). In more than a third of these assaults these minors are also exposed to violence.

In the second chapter, emphasis is placed on one of the most prevalent forms of domestic violence against women; spousal violence. The greater percentage of men (more than one-third) believe that the prevalence of this kind of violence is small or rare, while the largest percentage of women (43.3%) say it is prevalent to some extent, or that it is widely prevalent. The analysis of the results shows that there is a moderate and positive relationship between exposure to domestic violence and the belief in the prevalence of spousal violence, as those who were personally exposed to domestic violence tend to believe that spousal violence is widely prevalent. Despite the fact that there is almost a consensus that physical abuse and deprivation of liberty are cases of violence that require legal accountability, around a third of respondents do not believe that this applies to verbal threats and abuse. However, looking at the data based on gender shows a dramatic difference in attitudes, as half of the men do not wish to punish the perpetrator of physical abuse, and the majority of them reject such punishment for the perpetrator of the deprivation of liberty. The areas, along with the social and demographic groups, in which the percentage of those who do not agree with punishing the perpetrator is high are later defined.

To create a deeper understanding of the respondents' perception of spousal violence against women, the study devotes the third chapter to the justifications for such violence and finds wide acceptance for religious justification (Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases) and for laying the responsibility on women for the violence committed against them, being the ones who push their husband to commit violence in some cases. In both cases, the proportion of those who refused these two justifications is up to one-third. Justification by comparison (the cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries) appears to be the most common (opposed by only 16.9%). The least popular justification was laying responsibility on the woman for being uneducated (women who have experienced or are experiencing violence from their spouses are usually uneducated) which was opposed by 45% of respondents. What is interesting is the big difference in the demographic and social characteristics of categories among which this latter justification prevails, in comparison to other justifications; among Secularists, not Islamists, among the minorities, and not the majority of Sunnis or Arabs, and in large cities (Damascus, Aleppo and Homs), and not in Idlib and the camps in Turkey.

In the last chapter of this report a very sensitive issue is addressed; what is known as "Honor" killings. The city of Al-Hasakah has the highest percentage of respondents who stated that they had heard about violent incidents of this kind during the past year, yet these respondents are the most supportive of dealing with such acts like any other crime. The general attitude is biased towards addressing this type of crime in a way different from other murders. However, women are much stricter on this issue than men, with around a third of them stating, in almost all cases (except in the event of an illicit relationship), that it must be dealt with like any other murder, compared to around a quarter of the number of men. It seems that the collective (men and women) tend substantially towards the commutation of sentence in the event of the discovery that the victim engaged in an illicit relationship. Hence, tremendous efforts to influence views in this regard will be required.

This study does not only provide estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence and its perception in Syrian society, but also provides details, as it defines the demographic and social characteristics of the categories where the refusal to deal with honor killings as any other murder is increasing, as well as the refusal of legal accountability for the aggressor in the case of spousal violence. This study also defines the justifications that accompany such aggressions. This information will help organizations and authorities develop the plans and programs necessary to work on achieving what Syrian activists initiated earlier in 2005 under the title of "the national campaign against honor killings," and other activities intending to end all forms of discrimination against women in Syria.

Summary of Main Findings

Chapter I: The Perception of Domestic Violence

- The largest percentage of women (46%) said that they know a woman that has been exposed to violence by a family member, while the majority of men (59.6%) said that they are not aware of any woman who has been exposed to such an experience.
- Reporting cases of aggression against a woman by a family member in the total sample (men and women) is found more among the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people, housewives, Islamists, age category 36-45, individuals with low income, in Damascus, Idlib and in areas under the control of Self-governance, the opposition, and Sunnah.
- The two most important reasons, in the opinion of the respondents, which prevent women from speaking about or reporting their exposure to domestic violence to the competent authorities were "the concern for the children" and "the feeling of shame and the desire not to share their problems with others." The comparison between the results of men and women shows that women mentioned a third reason; namely, "the absence of a credible authority that can protect them". 42.5% of women mentioned this in comparison to 25.2% of men.
- Abused women are more likely to mention each of the following reasons than those who say they have not been abused in the home: "The absence of a credible authority that can protect them", "fear of the consequences of the complaint" and because she "considers it a normal matter."
- More than a quarter of respondents said that they had been personally exposed to or had witnessed cases of domestic violence (27.2%), and 55.6% stated that they had neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation.
- 21.2% of women reported their exposure to domestic violence, while 16.9% refused to answer this question. Women report abuse more than men (almost double).
- Reporting personal exposure to domestic violence, in the sample of women, reaches its highest level among less educated, Islamists, Arabs, married and divorced women, the young, women with higher income, in Aleppo, Idlib, the camps in Turkey, and in the areas under the control of the opposition, including non-besieged opposition areas.
- In 40% of cases in which violence occurs inside the home, the aggressor is the partner.
- 61.5% of women said that the latest case of violence inside the home that they were personally exposed to or had witnessed, was undertaken by the partner, with brothers coming in second place (17.1%) and parents in third (8.8%).
- Women do not report violence occurring against them inside the home: the percentage of those who said that they reported the incident slightly increased to reach 13.9% when the aggressor was a relative of the victim or was someone from outside the family. In the case of the husband's aggression, only 6.8% reported the incident to one of the competent authorities.

- Around 18% of cases of domestic violence include a female minor. The majority of this kind of violence incidents (69.2%) occur in the presence of minors (sons, relatives or others). In more than a third of these assaults these minors are also exposed to violence.

Chapter II: The Perception of Forms of Violence Against Women and Attitudes Towards Them

- Women are more aware of spousal violence against women than men, as the largest percentage (43.3%) say that it is prevalent to some extent, or that it is widely prevalent; compared to 30.9% who say that it is not prevalent and only 18% who say it rarely happens. On the other hand, over a third of men say that it is somewhat or widely prevalent, while the largest percentage, which amounted to 36.3%, apparently believe that it is not common and around a quarter of them say that it rarely happens.
- Those who have already been exposed to assaults inside the home tend to believe that spousal violence against women is widely prevalent.
- Those who have witnessed an assault inside the home (but have not been personally exposed to it) tend to believe that such violence is prevalent to some extent.
- Those who have neither been exposed to an assault inside the home nor witnessed any such situation, tend to believe that the prevalence of this kind of violence is little or rare.
- Those who choose not to declare whether they have been exposed to violence inside the home tend not to express a clear attitude towards the prevalence of spousal violence.
- Reporting spousal violence against women in the sample of women reaches its highest level among young women (less than 25 years), those with a lower income, in Damascus, Al-Hasakah, Idlib, and in areas under the control of the regime and democratic self-governance, including non-besieged opposition areas.
- Reporting spousal violence against women in the sample of men reaches its highest level among the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamist, in Idlib, Damascus Rural Province, in areas under the control of the opposition and among Arabs, Sunnis, and married individuals.
- Both verbal threats and verbal abuse are not perceived as violence that requires legal punishment by around a third of respondents. This proportion differs largely in the case of physical violence and the deprivation of liberty inside the home where we find some consensus among respondents that these abusive acts require legal accountability.
- 72.4% of women say that in the case of physical abuse, the perpetrator must be punished, while the percentage declines to around half among men.
- More than half the women say that the deprivation of liberty requires punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage declines to 38.4% among men.
- Around a quarter of women say that verbal threats or insults require punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage declines to 17% among men.

- In the case of physical abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those older than 56 years, those with the lowest income, those in the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the opposition, among Arabs, Sunni, married and widowed women.
- In the case of physical abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among the less educated, Islamists, those in Damascus, Aleppo, the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the opposition, and among Arab, married and Shi'a.
- In the case of verbal abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in Homs, Aleppo and the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition, non-besieged opposition areas and among Arabs and married women.
- In the case of verbal abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, those who practice some work, those older than 36 years, those in Homs, Damascus, Aleppo, the camps in Turkey, in areas under regime and opposition control, and among Arabs and married men.
- In the case of verbal threats, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, the widowed or married, the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those with a low/moderate income, those in Homs, the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition.
- In the case of verbal threats, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, Islamists, those with a moderate/high income, those in Homs, the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition.
- In the case of deprivation of liberty, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, Sunnis, the married/widowed, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those with a low/moderate income, those in the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the opposition, including non-besieged areas.
- In the case of the deprivation of liberty, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the employed,

Islamists, those with moderate income, those in the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition, including non-besieged opposition areas.

- The majority of women want to hold the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases (67.5%), although they want some leniency in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threats. The percentage of agreement for full accountability declines to just over half among men (54.3%).

Chapter III: The Justifications of Spousal Violence Against Women

- Only a third of respondents oppose the argument that "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases."
- Only 16.9% reject the hypothesis that the situation in Syria is not the worst, in comparison with other Arab countries.
- Only 35.8% oppose the argument that women should bear responsibility, being the ones who push their husbands to commit violence in some cases.
- Less than half of the respondents refuse to lay responsibility on women under the pretext that women are uneducated.
- In the case of religious justification (Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Arabs, Sunnis, the married/widowed, the less educated, those who are responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those older than 36 years, those with a moderate income, those in the camps in Turkey, in Aleppo, Idlib, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- In the case of religious justification (Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Arabs, the less educated, those who are responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamists, the young (younger than 25 years), those with a low income, those in the camps in Turkey, those in Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus Rural Province and in areas under the control of the opposition and non-besieged opposition areas.
- In the case of the justification of comparison (the cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Arabs, housewives, Islamists, females with a moderate/high income, those in the camps in Turkey, in Homs and in areas under the control of the opposition.
- In the case of the justification of comparison (the cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Sunni, Islamists, those with low and middle incomes, those in the camps in Turkey, Aleppo, Damascus, in Self-governance areas, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.

- In the case of the justification of assuming that women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Christians, Secularists, single women, widows, the elderly, those in Homs, Damascus and in areas under the control of the regime. The percentage of rejection increases in besieged areas compared with non-besieged opposition areas, and among Arabs compared with Kurds.
- In the case of the justification of assuming that women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Shiites, Alawites, Secularists, married people, those with a high income, those in Homs, Aleppo and in areas under the control of the regime and in besieged areas.
- In the case of the justification of assuming the existence of logical reasons for violence against women (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Arabs, Sunnis, the married/widowed, the less educated, those who are responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in the camps in Turkey, in Idlib, in Aleppo, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- In the case of the justification of assuming the existence of logical reasons for violence against women (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Arabs, married people, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamists, young people, those with a low income, refugees in the camps in Turkey, those in Idlib, in Aleppo, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.

Chapter IV: "Honor Killings"

- Only 15.5% said they had heard of an honor crime occurring during the last year in their area. Around one-third of respondents in the province of Al-Hasakah say that they had heard of an honor crime that took place in their area over the past year. The percentage drops to a quarter in Damascus and Homs, to 11.1% in the camps in Turkey and to less than 8% in Damascus Rural Province, Aleppo, and Idlib.
- Respondents in Self-governance areas reported the most on the occurrence of an honor crime occurring in their area over the past year, followed by respondents in areas under the control of the regime (15.9%) and then respondents in areas under the control of the opposition (11.6%).
- The general attitude is biased towards addressing this type of crime in a way different from other murders. However, women are much stricter on this issue than men, with around a third stating that in almost all cases (except in the event of an illicit relationship),

it must be dealt with like any other murder, compared to around a quarter of the number of men. It seems that they (men and women) tend substantially towards the commutation of sentence in the event of the discovery of an illicit relationship between the murderer and the victim.

- The percentage of those who state that they had heard of the occurrence of an honor crime increases in besieged areas compared to non-besieged opposition areas.
- If the motive of the crime is an illicit relationship, the support for “dealing with the crime like any other murder” reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, the married/widowed, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those between 26 and 55 years, those with a moderate income, those in Idlib, in Homs, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- If the motive of the crime is an illicit relationship, the support for “dealing with the crime like any other murder” reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Shiites, Arabs, those who are married, non-university graduates, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six or more), the unemployed, Islamists, those older than 46 years, those with a moderate income, those in Homs, in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, those who are married, those who have not yet finished secondary school, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, females with a moderate income, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, those who are married, those who are not university graduates, educated people, widows, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the non-university educated, Islamists, those older than 46 years, those with a moderate income, those in Idlib, in Homs, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, the married/widowed, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.

- If the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, the less educated, Islamists, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.
- If the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder drops in the sample of women among those educated without gaining a high school diploma, Arabs, the married/widowed, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged areas.
- If the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, the married, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamists, men younger than 56 years, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas.

Introduction

This study demonstrates the second part of the report detailing Discrimination against Women issued by The Day After. To avoid prolongation and repetition, and to be better informed of the contexts of this research, we refer the reader to Part I, titled “Discrimination against Women in Syrian Society (I/II): Awareness of Women Rights and Freedoms”. Very briefly, the question asked throughout the research in Part I is “how do Syrians perceive women's rights and freedoms?”, whereas the question in Part II is “how do Syrians perceive domestic violence and, in particular, its most common form (spousal violence)? What is the nature of its prevalence? What are the perceptions and attitudes of Syrians towards the different forms of this type of violence? Which areas or social/demographic categories have the highest percentage of acceptance or occurrence of this sort of violence?” What concerns us in this research is the respondents’ perception of violence. Thus, this study does not approach what is known as symbolic violence, which includes forms of violence that are often unperceived by the victims. We must note that difficulties accompanied this work; we were obliged to exclude a question related to one of the primary forms of spousal violence, namely sexual assault. The question focused on "the punishment which the perpetrator of such an assault deserves", but during the stage testing phase of the questionnaire we noticed a strong refusal to answer the question and, in addition, we received many complaints from field researchers requesting that this question be deleted due to the sensitivity of the subject, especially in conservative areas.

This research is divided into four chapters:

The first chapter is dedicated to the perception of domestic violence against women.

The second chapter deals with one of the most prevalent types of domestic violence, spousal violence against women.

The third chapter delves into the justifications of spousal violence.

The fourth and final chapter researches the issue of what is known as "honor killings" in detail.

Procedural Terms and Definitions

Areas under Self-governance: Areas controlled by what is known as the Democratic Self-governance forces. The project of self-governance was first proposed by the Democratic Union Party, headed by Salih Muslim. The announcement of "Democratic Self-Governance", which is based on the principle of decentralization, was declared in 2014. After the support received by the Kurdish units and what is known as the Syrian Democratic Council from the international coalition, as well as the Federal Republic of Russia, the governance dramatically expanded and is currently composed of three territories, Al-Jazira (Al-Hasakah), Afrin and Kobani.

Areas under the control of the Regime: Areas controlled by the regime or one of its allied troops from the foreign forces.

Areas under the control of the opposition: Includes all areas controlled by one of the Syrian opposition forces.

Besieged areas: In our sample, the areas under the control of the opposition and besieged by the regime forces or its allies.

Our sample does not include any of the areas under the control of The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria "ISIS" in Syria.

Methodology and Sample

The Day After conducted a field survey, during the period of September 17th to November 22nd 2016, which aimed to identify the perception of domestic violence in Syrian society. Trained field researchers conducted 2091 personal interviews, using a questionnaire, with 1120 men and 971 women in various Syrian provinces.

Despite all of the difficulties faced during the data collection through fieldwork phase in conditions such as those currently experienced in Syria (a raging war and a continuous displacement of the population) The Day After was able to draw from a multistage stratified sample using proportional allocation (men/women). As for the analysis of data, statistical analysis was conducted: to reject or accept the null hypothesis H₀ (there is no association or statistical significance between two or more variables), Chi-square test was applied, based on levels of significance less than or equal to 0.05. We also applied two types of Multivariate Analysis; Cluster Analysis and Correspondence Analysis.

Sampling phases*

Phase I:

The total population of Syria: 18,215,868

Trust level: 95%

Margin of error: 2.2%

Maximum heterogeneity: $p = q$

The required sample size: 1985

Phase II:

Total number of men in Syria: 9,214,866

Trust level: 95%

Margin of error: 3%

Maximum heterogeneity: $p = q$

The sample size required: 1067

Total number of women in Syria: 9,001,002

Trust level: 95%

Margin of error: 3.2%

Maximum heterogeneity: $p = q$

The required sample size: 938

Phase III:

A random cluster sample was used throughout the regions and provinces in this phase. We also took into consideration the religious and ethnic distribution; as shown in the following Table (A) and map. The sample does not include any areas under the control of The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria "ISIS." The difficulty and risks of working in the areas under the control of the regime affected the size and nature of samples based in those areas. . It is worth mentioning that in this stage we are dealing with indicative samples which help us to better understand the topic of our research by comparing various demographic and social categories. However, we can neither generalize the results for these areas nor for religious or ethnic categories.

* These figures were estimated from the population in 2015. There are no current accurate statistics (see <http://countrymeters.info/en/Syria>).


Table (A). The Distribution of Sample

Governorate	Men	Women	Total
Hasakeh (Syrian Democratic Forces-held area)	222	141	363
Aleppo (Mashhad district in the city of Aleppo, Azaz)	84	88	172
Idlib (al-Zawiya mountains, Kafruma, Mara al-Nu'man)	236	231	467
Homs (al-Waer district in the city of Homs, al-Rastan, districts in regime-held areas)	255	68	323
Damascus (Districts in regime-held area)	77	43	120
Damascus suburbs (Yalda, Babila, Beit Sahem, Douma, al-Tal, and towns in regime held areas)	172	106	278
Camps in Turkey (Islahiya, Kalas)	74	294	368
Total	1120	971	2091
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	225	84	309
Areas under the control of the Opposition	676	739	1415
Areas under the control of Democratic Self-governance	219	148	367
Total	1120	971	2091
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged	282	132	414
Non-Besieged	394	607	1001
Total	676	739	1415
Nationality – Ethnicity			
Arab	921	828	1749
Kurdish	160	109	269
Turkmen	4	8	12
I prefer not to answer	31	25	56
Other	4	1	5
Total	1120	971	2091
Religion - Sect*			
Sunnis	868	833	1701
Alawites	28	3	31
Shiites	31	2	33
Christians	5	10	15
I prefer not to answer	180	118	298
Other	8	5	13
Total	1120	971	2091

* We withhold mention of details in areas controlled by democratic self-government or the regime in order to protect our field researchers.

**Lower numbers or complete absence of some sects does not mean they were not present. A large percentage were most likely present among those who preferred not to answer this question. Our previous study (Sectarianism in Syria. Survey study, TDA, February 2016) showed that the greatest percentage of those refusing to answer the question about sectarian affiliation came from areas in which there was supposed to be a significant presence of a given minority (e.g. Suweida) or areas having a religious or ethnic plurality (Hasakeh and Homs). Nonetheless, we preserved the small numbers because they are useful for comparison and in cases where the sample was less than 30, we mentioned the number rather than the percentage so as not to produce any misunderstanding resulting from these small samples.

A map showing the distribution of the sample inside Syrian territory and the Turkish refugee camps




Chapter I: The Perception of Domestic Violence

The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in the Social Environment

The largest percentage of women (46.0%) say that they know a woman who has been exposed to violence by a family member, and the majority of men (59.6%) say that they are not aware of any woman who has been exposed to such a situation (Fig. 1). However, we should pay attention to the fact that considering an action as "violent" is related to the respondent's concept of violence. To gain a deeper understanding of the respondents' view of what violence is, we will later investigate their understanding of many forms of violence. What concerns us in this research is whether the respondents themselves perceive violence, and we proceed to identify their opinions and attitudes based on that understanding.

We will study the variation of the answers of respondents (men and women) based on demographic and social characteristics.

Figure 1. Do you know a woman who has been assaulted by one of the members of her family?



Variables that are related to reporting violence are summarized in Table (1) as follows:

Education: Reporting incidents of an assault on a woman by a member of her family declines with the progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six and above) tend to report less than those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people.

Profession: Reporting such violence increases among housewives (48.1%). This is followed by the unemployed (40.1%) and workers and students (around one third).

Ideology: Reporting such violence increases among Islamists compared with Secularists.

Age: Most of those reporting acts of domestic violence in their social environment were between 36-45 years old..

Income: Reporting incidents of domestic violence drops with the increase of income.

Province: Around half of the women in Damascus say they know a woman who has been exposed to violence by a family member. The percentage declines to 43.7% in Idlib, to 39.9% in Al-Hasakah, to around a third in Aleppo, Damascus Rural Province, the camps in Turkey, and to a quarter in Homs.

Region: The reporting percentage in areas under the control of the regime amounts to 27.8%, while the percentages in areas under the control of the opposition and Self-governance areas are approximately the same (around 40%).

Religion-Sect: Sunnis tend towards reporting incidents of this type (40%), the percentage drops among Alawites (16.1%), while a third of Shiites refused to show a clear attitude.

Table (1). Knowing a woman who was assaulted by one of her family members, according to some socio-demographic variables

	Yes	No	Do not know / No answer
Education			
Illiterate	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%
Primary	41.9%	45.2%	12.9%
Intermediate	40.5%	48.5%	11.1%
High School	35.0%	54.5%	10.4%
University	36.3%	57.2%	6.5%
No. of individuals to sustain			
Up to 2 people	39.7%	52.9%	7.3%
3-5 people	38.5%	53.4%	8.1%
6 people and above	33.3%	50.3%	16.4%
Profession			
Working	35.3%	55.4%	9.3%
Student	31.6%	59.2%	9.2%
Unemployed	40.1%	48.2%	11.7%
Housewife	48.1%	41.9%	10.0%
Ideology *			
Extreme Secularist	31.5%	62.6%	5.9%
Secularist	26.5%	60.6%	12.8%
Center	40.3%	53.1%	6.7%
Islamist	43.0%	44.7%	12.2%
Extreme Islamist	37.9%	53.4%	8.7%
Age			
Up to 25 years	36.8%	54.6%	8.6%
26-35 years	37.8%	54.3%	7.8%
36-45 years	41.0%	50.0%	9.0%
46-55 years	34.1%	49.8%	16.1%
56 years and above	36.6%	47.3%	16.1%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	45.2%	47.9%	6.9%
Between 25-75 thousand	36.0%	54.6%	9.4%
More than 75 thousand	34.4%	59.8%	5.8%
Province			
Homs	25.1%	59.4%	15.5%
Damascus Rural Province	34.5%	54.7%	10.8%
The camps in Turkey	37.2%	46.7%	16.0%
Aleppo	37.8%	59.9%	2.3%
Al-Hasakah	39.9%	53.4%	6.6%
Idlib	43.7%	49.0%	7.3%
Damascus	51.7%	47.5%	0.8%

Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	27.8%	56.0%	16.2%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	39.4%	51.5%	9.1%
Self-governance areas	40.1%	53.7%	6.3%
Sect			
Sunnis	40.0%	50.9%	9.1%
Shiites	12.1%	54.5%	33.3%
Alawites	16.1%	80.6%	3.2%
Christians (in figures)	2	10	3

* we relied on the respondent's self-placement on a scale from 0-10 where zero is the secular extreme and 10 is the extreme of political Islam. We asked the respondents to determine the position closest to their perspective on this issue. We then recoded the data in the following way: 0 is extreme secularism; 1, 2, and 3 are secular; 4, 5, and 6, are moderate; 7, 8, and 9 are Islamist; and 10 is extreme political Islam.

Minors Involved in Domestic Violence

The data analysis shows that around 18% of cases of domestic violence against women occur against a female minor (Figure 2). The majority of this type of violence (69.2%) occurs in the presence of minors (sons, relatives or others) (Figure 3). In more than a third of these assaults, these minors are also exposed to violence (Figure 4).

Figure 2. Do you know whether the age of the victim is more or less than 18 years?




Figure 3. Do you know if there were any minors (younger than 18 years) with the victim? Sons, brothers or relatives?





Figure 4. Were they also exposed to violence in the incident(s)?



The Reasons for Silence (not reporting the assault)

According to the opinions of the respondents, what makes women submit to domestic violence?

It seems the two main reasons, in their view, are the concern for the children, and the shame and desire not to let other people know about these problems (Fig 5). These answers were given by the

general collective, but when looking in detail and comparing the answers of women respondents an interesting difference arises. The percentage of those who stated, among the reasons, the absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect her increases to 42.5% in the sample of women compared to around a quarter of men. It is also noted that men mention the justification that “the husband is right” (Table 2) more than women do.

Figure 5. What are the three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member? (Three options)





Table 2. The three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member (by gender)

	Men	Women
For the children	76.5%	74.8%
The shame and the desire not to let others know about these problems	62.8%	68.8%
The absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them	25.2%	42.5%
Fear of the consequences of the complaint	39.2%	34.0%
The absence of income to support herself	26.7%	25.8%
She considers it normal.	17.6%	14.1%
Islamic law allows it in some cases	19.4%	12.0%
She believes her husband is right	15.1%	10.3%
The high cost of litigation	8.1%	8.9%

Now we will compare the answers of women who say they have been personally subjected to domestic violence and those who have not been exposed to such violence.

In general, the responses do not differ greatly. Notable differences came in the fact that abused women mentioned the absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them, the fear of the consequences of the complaint, and because she considers it normal (Figure 6).

Figure 6. The three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member



Domestic Violence in the Home


Domestic Violence between Men and Women

More than a quarter of respondents said that they had been personally exposed to or had witnessed cases of domestic violence (27.2%), and 55.6% stated that they had neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation (Fig. 7). The proportion of those who preferred not to answer this question is observed to be relatively high. For women, the percentage of those who reported their exposure to domestic violence reached 21.2%, while 16.9% of them refused to answer this question. Women report abuse more than men (almost double) (Fig. 8).

Figure 7. Have you ever been personally exposed to or witnessed cases of domestic violence?



Figure 8. Personal exposure to violence inside the home (by gender)



Personal Exposure to Domestic Violence Among Women

Variables related to reporting personal exposure to domestic violence in the sample of women are summarized in Table (3) as follows:

Education: Reporting personal exposure to such violence drops with the progress in education.

Ideology: Islamist women report their exposure to domestic violence more than Secularist women.

Age: In general, reporting this type of violence declines with age. Most noteworthy, when comparing the results in relation to age, is an important increase in the proportion of those who refuse to answer this question as the respondents get older.

Income: Reporting such violence increases among those with a high income compared to those with a low income.

Province: Around a quarter of women in Aleppo, Idlib and the camps in Turkey say that they have been personally exposed to domestic violence. 18.6% of women in Damascus and 13.2% in Damascus Rural Province state the same. The proportion declines dramatically in the cities of Al-Hasakah and Homs.

Region: Women in areas under the control of the opposition are most likely to report such violence (around a quarter). The percentages from the areas under the control of the regime and Self-governance areas are almost the same (around 9%).

Women in non-besieged opposition areas are more likely to report such violence in comparison to women in besieged areas.

Nationality-ethnicity: Around a quarter of Arabic women say they have been exposed to domestic violence compared to 5.5% of Kurdish women.

Civil Status: Reporting such violence increases among divorced women, followed by those who are married, then by widows, while single women are the least likely to report.

Table (3). Personal exposure to domestic violence among women (by socio-demographic variables)

	Has been personally exposed to domestic violence	Has never been exposed to domestic violence	Prefers not to answer
Education			
Illiterate	38.9%	52.8%	8.3%
Primary	31.6%	53.3%	15.1%
Intermediate	22.1%	59.3%	18.6%
High School	20.3%	64.0%	15.8%
University and above	15.4%	66.3%	18.3%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	12.1%	71.7%	16.2%
Secularist	5.8%	74.2%	20.0%
Center	22.7%	62.2%	15.1%
Islamist	22.5%	57.6%	19.9%
Extreme Islamist	40.2%	52.2%	7.6%
Age			
Up to 25 years	17.1%	70.4%	12.6%
26-35 years	15.1%	69.5%	15.4%
36-45 years	16.3%	63.6%	20.1%
46-55 years	14.9%	61.8%	23.3%
56 years and above	10.8%	61.3%	28.0%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	19.3%	69.6%	11.1%
Between 25-75 thousand	22.0%	62.7%	15.3%
More than 75 thousand	26.0%	63.5%	10.4%
Province			
Homs	2.9%	66.2%	30.9%
Al-Hasakah	9.2%	73.8%	17.0%
Damascus Rural Province	13.2%	67.0%	19.8%
Damascus	18.6%	81.4%	0.0%
The camps in Turkey	27.2%	61.9%	10.9%
Idlib	27.3%	48.1%	24.7%
Aleppo	28.4%	61.4%	10.2%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	9.5%	69.0%	21.4%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	24.9%	58.9%	16.2%
Self-governance areas	8.8%	73.6%	17.6%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged	12.1%	69.7%	18.2%
Non-Besieged	27.7%	56.6%	15.7%
Nationality - Ethnicity			
Arabic Women	23.7%	59.1%	17.3%
Kurdish Women	5.5%	80.7%	13.8%
Turkmen Women	0	8	0
Religion-Sect			
Sunnis	23.5%	60.6%	15.8%

Christians (in figures)	0	7	3
Civil Status			
Single	14.3%	74.2%	11.5%
Married	23.1%	58.4%	18.6%
Widowed	18.8%	62.4%	18.8%
Divorced	39.1%	47.8%	13.0%

Who is the Aggressor?

In 40% of cases where domestic violence occurs, the aggressor is the partner, followed by parents and brothers (Figure 9). However, the answers vary by gender:

61.5% of women said that the latest case of violence inside the home that they were personally exposed to, or had witnessed, was committed by the partner, with brothers coming in second place (17.1%) and parents in third (8.8%). (Fig. 10). Only around a quarter of men mentioned the partner and parents.

The two following chapters pay particular attention to spousal violence, as it is the most widespread of all types of domestic violence towards women. See figure (10).

Figure 9. Who was the main aggressor in the most recent incident you were exposed to/witnessed?






Figure 10. Aggressor (by gender)



Reaction to the Assault

In general, women do not report domestic violence which occurs against them, regardless of the identity of the aggressor. As Figure (11) shows, the percentage of those who said that they reported the incident slightly increased to reach 13.9% when the aggressor was a relative of the victim or was someone from outside the family (20.0%). In the case of the husband's aggression, only 6.8% reported the incident to one of the competent authorities.

Figure 11. Reporting the assault in the sample of women




Chapter II: The Perception of Forms of Violence Against Women and Attitudes Towards Them

The Prevalence of Violence

Women are more aware of spousal violence against women than men, as the largest percentage of females (43.3%) say that it is prevalent to some extent or that it is widely prevalent, compared to 30.9% who say that it is sparse and 18% who say that it rarely happens. On the other hand, over a third of men say that it is common or prevalent to some extent, while the largest percentage of them (around 36.3%) believe that it is sparse and around a quarter of male respondents say that it rarely happens (Figure 12).

Figure 12. To what extent, in your opinion, is spousal violence against women prevalent in your area?




However, is there any relation between the perception of the prevalence of domestic violence and previous exposure to domestic violence? If any, what is the nature of this relation?

To answer this question we conducted a Correspondence Analysis, and found a moderate relationship between exposure to violence and reporting the prevalence of spousal violence against women, as clearly shown in Figure (13):

- Those who have already been exposed to assaults inside the home tend to believe that spousal violence against women is widely prevalent.
- Those who have witnessed an assault inside the home (but have not been personally exposed to it) tend to believe that such violence is prevalent to some extent.
- Those who have neither been exposed to an assault inside the home nor witnessed any such situation, tend to believe that the prevalence of this kind of violence is little or rare.
- Those who choose not to declare whether they were exposed to domestic violence tend not to express a clear attitude towards the prevalence of spousal violence.

In the following section we identify in detail the demographic and social characteristics of those who say that the prevalence of spousal violence is not common or does not exist at all.

Figure 13. Exposure to domestic violence in relation to views on the prevalence of spousal violence



The Sample of Women

The analysis of the results shows a relationship between the perception of the prevalence of spousal violence against women and all other variables, which are summarized in detail in Table (4):

Age: Young women (younger than 25 years) report more than other age groups on the prevalence of this type of violence.

Income: The proportion of those reporting the prevalence of such violence drops among women with a high income compared to those with a low income.

Province: The majority of women in Damascus say that this type of violence is prevalent, along with around half of the women in Idlib and Al-Hasakah, also 42.5% of those in Damascus Rural

Province. The majority of respondents in Aleppo, Homs and the camps in Turkey say this type of violence is “not common.” However, an important percentage of the latter regions do say that such violence is dramatically prevalent.

Region: Around half of the women in areas under the control of the regime and self-governance areas say that this kind of violence is prevalent, while the percentage declines to 40.6% in opposition controlled areas.

The proportion of women in non-besieged opposition areas who say that such violence is not common/rare reached around half, while in the besieged areas the percentage drops to 42.4%.

Table 4. Views on the prevalence of spousal violence in relation to demographic and social variables in the sample of women

	Prevalent	Not common/ rare	No Clear Attitude
Age			
Up to 25 years	45.2%	44.2%	10.6%
26-35 years	43.3%	51.2%	5.5%
36-45 years	44.0%	50.9%	5.2%
46-55 years	33.3%	54.7%	12.0%
56 years and above	41.2%	35.3%	23.5%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	47.1%	46.4%	6.4%
Between 25-75 thousand	46.7%	45.5%	7.8%
More than 75 thousand	42.7%	55.2%	2.1%
Province			
Aleppo	23.9%	71.6%	4.5%
Homs	36.8%	60.3%	2.9%
The camps in Turkey	38.1%	56.1%	5.8%
Damascus Rural Province	42.5%	36.8%	20.8%
Idlib	50.6%	39.8%	9.5%
Al-Hasakah	51.8%	41.8%	6.4%
Damascus	62.8%	37.2%	0.0%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	48.8%	48.8%	2.4%
Areas controlled by the opposition	40.6%	50.6%	8.8%
Self-governance areas	53.4%	40.5%	6.1%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged	40.9%	42.4%	16.7%
Non-Besieged	40.6%	52.3%	7.1%

The Sample of Men

The study found a relationship between the perception of the prevalence of spousal violence against women and all of the following variables in the sample of men (Table 5):

Education: The less educated are most likely to report this type of violence, while the percentage drops to 40% among those who gained a primary/intermediate level education, and lowers to around 30% among those who gained a high school level education and above.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six and above) report the prevalence of such violence the most.

Profession: The percentage of those who say spousal violence is prevalent increases among unemployed men in comparison to those who work/study.

Ideology: There is a growing conviction that such violence is widely prevalent among Islamists as opposed to Secularists.

Age: Although the percentages are close in the various age groups, the lowest percentage, which says that such violence is rare or does not exist, is among young people (younger than 25 years).

Province: Men in Idlib (40.7%) and Damascus Rural Province (37.2%) are reported the prevalence of spousal violence most, while the men in Al-Hasakah, Damascus, and Aleppo are the least aware (around a quarter).

Region: The proportion of those in areas under the control of the opposition who say that it is prevalent (more than one third) is increasing in comparison to those in areas under the control of the regime and Self-governance areas (up to a quarter).

Nationality-Ethnicity: Arab men tend more towards considering such violence common (one-third) in comparison to Kurds (one-quarter).

Religion-Sect: One third of Sunnis and one quarter of Shiites say that spousal violence is prevalent.

Civil Status: Single men report the prevalence of spousal violence against women less than those who are married.

Table 5. Views on the prevalence of spousal violence in relation to demographic and social variables in the sample of men

	Prevalent	Not common/does not exist	No Clear Attitude
Education			
Illiterate (in figures)	5	9	6
Primary	40.2%	49.6%	10.2%
Intermediate	40.7%	51.8%	7.5%
High School	28.1%	63.9%	7.5%
University and above	30.3%	62.7%	7.0%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	29.7%	56.4%	13.9%
3-5 people	31.2%	61.6%	7.3%
6 people and above	39.6%	55.3%	5.0%
Profession			
Working	33.0%	59.4%	7.6%
Student	20.6%	60.3%	19.0%

Unemployed	42.7%	49.4%	7.9%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	17.1%	69.9%	13.0%
Secularist	22.9%	69.5%	7.6%
Center	35.9%	55.4%	8.7%
Islamist	43.1%	53.2%	3.7%
Extreme Islamist	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%
Age			
Up to 25 years	32.7%	52.0%	15.4%
26-35 years	32.4%	61.4%	6.2%
36-45 years	33.3%	62.2%	4.5%
46-55 years	37.4%	55.2%	7.5%
56 years and above	28.9%	63.2%	7.9%
Province			
Al-Hasakah	25.7%	63.1%	11.3%
Damascus	27.3%	71.4%	1.3%
Aleppo	28.6%	57.1%	14.3%
Homs	32.9%	62.0%	5.1%
The camps in Turkey	35.1%	64.9%	0.0%
Damascus Rural Province	37.2%	52.3%	10.5%
Idlib	40.7%	49.6%	9.7%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	25.3%	68.9%	5.8%
Areas under the control of the opposition	38.8%	53.3%	8.0%
Self-governance areas	24.2%	64.4%	11.4%
Nationality - Ethnicity			
Arab	35.6%	57.0%	7.4%
Kurdish	21.9%	65.0%	13.1%
Religion - Sect			
Sunnis	36.9%	55.4%	7.7%
Shiites	25.8%	64.5%	9.7%
Alawites (in figures)	5	20	3
Civil Status			
Single	29.7%	58.0%	12.3%
Married	34.8%	58.2%	7.1%
Widowed (in figures)	2	7	0
Divorced (in figures)	2	11	0


Views on Punishment for the Abusive Spouse

It is not easy to determine the meaning of spousal violence as different people's perceptions of it may differ. How do respondents perceive all of the following cases: physical violence, verbal abuse, verbal threats and deprivation of liberty inside the home?

Figure (14) shows how both verbal threats and verbal abuse are not perceived as violence that requires legal punishment by around a third of respondents. This proportion drops to a great extent in the case of physical abuse and the deprivation of liberty inside the home, as we find some

consensus among respondents that these cases require legal accountability. Yet, what is the punishment that the perpetrator deserves, for each case, according to the opinions of respondents?

Figure 14. How should the law deal with a man who commits any of the following acts?



The women’s answers differ substantially from the men’s on the necessity to deal with such violence legally. 72.4% of women say that in the case of physical abuse the perpetrator must be punished, while the percentage decreases to around half among men (Table 6).

More than half the women say that the deprivation of liberty requires punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage decreases to 38.4% among men (Table 6).

Around a quarter of women say that verbal threats or insults require punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage decreases to 17% among men (Table 6).

We review, in what follows, each type of domestic violence and analyse the social and demographic backgrounds of those who are lenient towards the punishment of the perpetrator.

Table 6. Opinions concerning punishment of the perpetrator, in relation to demographic and social variables

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished	I do not know/ No answer
The sample of women				
Physical Abuse	72,4%	22,1%	5,0%	0,4%
Verbal Abuse	27,3%	46,0%	23,4%	3,3%
Deprivation of Liberty	56,0%	32,4%	10,2%	1,3%
Verbal Threats	26,6%	43,3%	26,9%	3,3%
The sample of men				
Physical Abuse	49,8%	40,2%	8,8%	1,3%
Verbal Abuse	18,1%	38,2%	38,8%	4,8%
Deprivation of Liberty	38,4%	39,9%	17,9%	3,8%
Verbal Threats	16,8%	38,6%	40,1%	4,6%

The Sample of Women

The following variables, which have a relationship with attitudes towards physical abuse in the sample of women, are shown in Table (7):

Education: The conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator increases with the progress in education. Around a third of illiterate women have this conviction, compared to 82.5% of women who reached university level and above.

Sustenance: Women who are responsible for the sustenance of a greater number of individuals are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator.

Profession: Housewives are the least likely to support the punishment of the perpetrator of physical abuse, and working women are the most supportive of it.

Ideology: There is consensus among Secularists concerning the necessity of punishing the perpetrator; the percentage exceeds 80% in this group, while it drops among Islamists.

Age: Women younger than 35 years are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, while those least likely to support it are women older than 56 years.

Income: The percentage of those who oppose the punishment of the perpetrator increases among women with a high income.

Province: Women in the camps in Turkey are the least supportive of punishing the perpetrator, even though the majority of them do support it (61.2%). There is a consensus in Homs and Al-Hasakah on the need to punish the perpetrator (over 85%), which is shared by the majority of women in Idlib, Aleppo, Damascus and its rural region (between 67% -77 %).

Region: Women in areas under the control of the opposition are the least supportive of punishing the perpetrator, although the majority of them do support it (67.8%). The percentage of support reaches a type of consensus in the the areas under the control of the Regime and self-governance, at 84.5% and 91% respectively.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Arab women are less supportive than Kurdish women of punishing the perpetrator, although the majority of them support it.

Religion-Sect: No Christian women, in our small sample, oppose the punishment of the perpetrator, while a quarter of Sunni women show opposition.

Civil Status: Married women are less supportive than single women concerning the punishment of the perpetrator, although the majority of them do support it.

Table 7. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of physical abuse in the sample of women

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
Education			
Illiterate	37,1%	34,3%	28,6%
Primary	58,0%	30,0%	12,0%
Intermediate	66,3%	28,5%	5,2%
High School	76,0%	22,2%	1,8%
University and above	82,5%	15,4%	2,1%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	75,2%	18,7%	6,1%
3-5 people	74,2%	22,4%	3,4%
6 people and above	60,4%	33,1%	6,5%
Profession			
Working	79,8%	15,8%	4,4%
Student	78,2%	21,1%	0,8%
Unemployed	72,9%	23,4%	3,7%
Housewife	64,5%	28,0%	7,5%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	93,9%	5,1%	1,0%
Secularist	86,6%	11,8%	1,7%
Center	69,3%	27,7%	3,0%
Islamist	69,6%	27,3%	3,1%
Extreme Islamist	55,4%	16,3%	28,3%
Age			
Up to 25 years	74,5%	20,9%	4,6%
26-35 years	76,7%	19,0%	4,4%
36-45 years	69,1%	26,1%	4,8%
46-55 years	66,7%	26,7%	6,7%
56 years and above	35,3%	41,2%	23,5%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	71,5%	23,1%	5,4%
Between 25-75 thousand	74,5%	20,8%	4,7%
More than 75 thousand	75,0%	11,5%	13,5%
Province			
The camps in Turkey	61,2%	27,2%	11,6%
Aleppo	67,0%	31,8%	1,1%
Damascus Rural Province	67,9%	30,2%	1,9%
Damascus	69,8%	20,9%	9,3%
Idlib	76,5%	21,3%	2,2%
Homs	86,8%	13,2%	0,0%
Al-Hasakah	92,0%	5,8%	2,2%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	84,5%	10,7%	4,8%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	67,8%	26,7%	5,6%
Self-governance areas	91,0%	6,2%	2,8%
Nationality - Ethnicity			
Arab Women	70,1%	24,3%	5,6%
Kurdish Women	88,8%	10,3%	0,9%
Turkmen Women (in figures)	5	3	`
Religion - Sect			
Sunnis	69,0%	25,4%	5,7%
Christians (in figures)	10	0	0
Civil Status			

Single	84,7%	12,5%	2,8%
Married	69,3%	24,8%	5,9%
Widowed	64,3%	31,0%	4,8%
Divorced (in figures)	20	2	1

The Sample of Men

Table (8) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards physical abuse in the sample of men:

Education: Less educated men have minimum support for the punishment of the perpetrator.

Sustenance: The percentage of those who say that the perpetrator must not be punished increases among those responsible for the sustenance of a small number of people compared with those responsible for the sustenance of more people. However, the main division is between the belief in the necessity of punishing the perpetrator and the possibility of tolerance in some cases.

Ideology: Islamists are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than Secularists.

Province: The majority of those in the cities of Al-Hasakah, Homs and Damascus Rural Province support the punishment of the perpetrator. The respondents are divided in Idlib and Damascus, while the majority in the camps in Turkey and Aleppo say that each case must be examined individually. It is noted, though, that the highest percentage of respondents who say the perpetrator must not be punished is found in Damascus (around a quarter), while the percentage drops in Aleppo and the camps in Turkey.

Region: The majority of men in areas under the control of the Regime (71.1%) say that the perpetrator must be punished, along with the majority of respondents in Self-governance areas (62.4%). The percentage declines to 39.5% in areas under the control of the opposition.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs support the punishment of the perpetrator less than Kurds: 46.6% compared to 65.6%.

Religion-Sect: The majority of Shiites and Alawites say that the perpetrator must be punished, while Sunnis are divided.

Table 8. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of physical abuse in the sample of men

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
Education			
Illiterate	52,6%	47,4%	0,0%
Primary	43,9%	43,9%	12,2%
Intermediate	40,6%	49,3%	10,1%
High School	51,4%	38,1%	10,6%
University and above	60,1%	34,8%	5,2%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	50,2%	37,7%	12,1%
3-5 people	48,7%	41,7%	9,6%

6 people and above	53,6%	41,3%	5,0%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	64,2%	35,0%	0,8%
Secularist	82,5%	14,8%	2,7%
Center	45,7%	45,7%	8,6%
Islamist	32,4%	53,8%	13,9%
Extreme Islamist	40,0%	44,5%	15,5%
Province			
Aleppo	24,7%	62,3%	13,0%
The camps in Turkey	27,0%	56,8%	16,2%
Damascus	35,1%	37,7%	27,3%
Idlib	45,3%	47,8%	6,9%
Damascus Rural Province	57,1%	39,4%	3,5%
Homs	59,2%	29,4%	11,4%
Al-Hasakah	62,9%	35,3%	1,8%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	71,1%	19,6%	9,3%
Areas under the control of the opposition	39,5%	49,5%	11,0%
Self-governance areas	62,4%	35,8%	1,8%
Nationality – Ethnicity			
Arab	46,6%	42,9%	10,5%
Kurdish	65,6%	33,1%	1,3%
Religion - Denomination			
Sunnis	41,3%	47,5%	11,1%
Shiites	77,4%	19,4%	3,2%
Alawites (in figures)	24	4	0

In the Case of Verbal Abuse

The Sample of Women

The following variables, summarized in Table (9), highlight attitudes towards verbal abuse in the sample of women:

Education: Those who most oppose the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal abuse are the less educated.

Sustenance: Those who are responsible for the sustenance of fewer individuals are most supportive of punishing the perpetrator.

Profession: Housewives are most opposed to the punishment of the perpetrator, while students and working women are the least opposed to it.

Ideology: Islamists oppose the punishment of the perpetrator more than Secularists.

Province: Women in Al-Hasakah support the punishment of the perpetrator the most (more than half), while those who support it the least are women in Homs, Aleppo and the refugee camps in Turkey.

Region: More than half of the women in Self-governance areas agree with punishing the perpetrator, while the percentage drops to around a quarter in the areas under the control of the regime and the opposition.

Women in besieged areas are more favorable towards supporting the punishment of the perpetrator in comparison to women in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than Kurds.

Civil Status: Those who are married are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, while the most supportive of punishment are single and divorced women.

Table 9. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal abuse in the sample of women

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
Education			
Illiterate	11,8%	44,1%	44,1%
Primary	15,2%	41,4%	43,4%
Intermediate	24,9%	48,5%	26,6%
High School	32,7%	48,6%	18,7%
University and above	33,7%	49,3%	17,0%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	32,6%	43,9%	23,6%
3-5 people	26,4%	49,3%	24,3%
6 people and above	19,3%	54,8%	25,9%
Profession			
Working	37,7%	43,8%	18,5%
Student	32,3%	51,5%	16,2%
Unemployed	24,3%	53,4%	22,3%
Housewife	19,6%	48,0%	32,4%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	60,2%	36,6%	3,2%
Secularist	27,2%	58,8%	14,0%
Center	24,4%	51,2%	24,4%
Islamist	25,4%	47,9%	26,8%
Extreme Islamist	20,0%	32,2%	47,8%
Province			
Homs	15,8%	54,4%	29,8%
Aleppo	16,1%	65,5%	18,4%
The camps in Turkey	17,4%	47,8%	34,8%
Damascus	30,2%	18,6%	51,2%
Idlib	31,4%	43,8%	24,8%
Damascus Rural Province	33,7%	59,2%	7,1%
Al-Hasakah	54,8%	40,0%	5,2%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	23,3%	39,7%	37,0%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	23,9%	49,5%	26,6%
Self-governance areas	53,2%	41,8%	5,0%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	29,6%	56,0%	14,4%
Non-besieged areas	22,5%	48,2%	29,2%

Nationality - Ethnicity			
Arab Women	24,3%	48,7%	27,0%
Kurdish Women	48,1%	47,2%	4,7%
Turkmen Women (in figures)	3	4	1
Civil Status			
Single	38,3%	44,2%	17,5%
Married	23,2%	50,4%	26,4%
Widowed	37,0%	35,8%	27,2%
Divorced	43,5%	43,5%	13,0%

The Sample of Men

The analysis of the results shows a relationship between each of the following variables, which are summarized in Table (10), in relation to attitudes towards verbal abuse in the sample of men:

Sustenance: The largest percentage (44.5%) of those responsible for the sustenance of up to two people say that the perpetrator must not be punished, while the rest of the categories are divided between those who oppose the punishment of the perpetrator and those who prefer leniency in some cases.

Profession: The percentage of respondents who say that they are against the punishment of the perpetrator substantially drops among students compared to unemployed respondents. Students are the most supportive of punishment.

Age: Young people (younger than 25 years) are more inclined to support the punishment of the perpetrator (25.2%), while support declines as the respondents get older.

Province: Men in Damascus Rural Province are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator (more than one-third). The percentage drops to around a quarter in Idlib and Al-Hasakah, while it dramatically drops in other areas, and reaches a low of 7.1% in Homs.

Region: In areas under the control of the regime the majority tend to oppose the punishment of the perpetrator, while respondents in Self-governance areas tend to be lenient in some cases. As for respondents in areas under the control of the opposition, they are divided between leniency and non-punishment.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurdish men support a case by case study on the issue of verbal abuse, while Arabs are more divided, with a tendency towards opposing the punishment.

Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents agree to the punishment of the perpetrator, while the percentage of those who agree with punishment does not exceed 20% among Sunnis.

Civil Status: Those who are married are less supportive than single people with regards to the punishment of the perpetrator.

Table 10. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal abuse in the sample of men

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	24.3%	31.2%	44.5%
3-5 people	19.8%	40.6%	39.6%
6 people and above	13.6%	46.6%	39.8%
Profession			
Working	17.7%	41.3%	41.1%
Student	28.8%	44.1%	27.1%
Unemployed	26.8%	24.4%	48.8%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	25.9%	55.4%	18.8%
Secularist	13.5%	50.7%	35.7%
Center	13.4%	40.6%	46.0%
Islamist	17.2%	31.7%	51.2%
Extreme Islamist	43.2%	29.7%	27.0%
Age			
Up to 25 years	25.2%	35.7%	39.1%
26-35 years	21.5%	40.1%	38.4%
36-45 years	16.6%	40.4%	43.0%
46-55 years	10.2%	46.4%	43.4%
56 years and above	15.1%	39.7%	45.2%
Province			
Homs	7.1%	32.4%	60.5%
Damascus	10.4%	9.1%	80.5%
Aleppo	12.0%	68.0%	20.0%
The camps in Turkey	13.9%	27.8%	58.3%
Al-Hasakah	21.1%	61.0%	17.8%
Idlib	23.8%	34.4%	41.9%
Damascus Rural Province	36.6%	39.6%	23.8%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	7.2%	31.3%	61.5%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	22.4%	36.1%	41.5%
Self-governance areas	20.5%	61.4%	18.1%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	17.9%	35.8%	46.3%
Kurdish	20.3%	63.4%	16.3%
Sect			
Sunnis	19.9%	37.1%	43.1%
Shiites	0.0%	43.3%	56.7%
Alawites (in figures)	2	10	13
Civil Status			

Single	24.8%	37.6%	37.6%
Married	17.2%	41.5%	41.3%
Widowed (in figures)	1	4	4
Divorced (in figures)	3	1	9

In the Case of Verbal Threats

The Sample of Women

There is a relationship between attitudes towards verbal threats and each of the following variables (Table 11):

Education: The support for the punishment of a person who makes verbal threats against his wife increases with the progress in education, as it rises from 11.8% among the illiterate to reach 33.6% among university graduates.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people.

Profession: Workers and students are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator (around one third) while housewives are the least supportive (17.4%).

Ideology: Secularists are more favorable towards supporting the punishment of the perpetrator in comparison to Islamists.

Income: The largest proportion of those who have a low/moderate income tend to be lenient in some cases (around 40%).

Province: The majority of women in Al-Hasakah wish for the perpetrator to be punished, while the percentage substantially drops in other areas. The majority of those in Aleppo, Damascus Rural Province and Homs prefer leniency in some cases along with the largest percentage of respondents in the camps in Turkey, while women are divided in Idlib between leniency and opposition.

Region: The majority of women in areas under Self-governance wish to punish the perpetrator, while the largest percentage of those in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition prefer leniency in some cases as they believe the issue must be studied on a case-by-case basis.

The percentage of those who oppose the punishment of the perpetrator substantially increases to 34.7% in besieged areas, in comparison to 15.3% in non-besieged areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The largest percentage of Arab women prefer leniency in some cases, while the majority of Kurdish women wish to punish the perpetrator in all cases.

Civil Status: Married women are less supportive of punishing the perpetrator than single women (23.4% and 39.8%, respectively).

Table 11. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal threats in the sample of women

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
Education			
Illiterate	11.8%	44.1%	44.1%
Primary	12.6%	44.1%	43.4%
Intermediate	23.8%	48.2%	28.0%
High School	31.6%	48.8%	19.5%
University and above	33.8%	41.2%	25.1%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	33.1%	40.5%	26.4%
3-5 people	25.0%	47.0%	28.0%
6 people and above	16.3%	51.9%	31.9%
Profession			
Working	36.7%	38.0%	25.3%
Student	35.1%	46.6%	18.3%
Unemployed	24.3%	52.4%	23.3%
Housewife	17.4%	48.0%	34.6%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	71.3%	26.6%	2.1%
Secularist	32.7%	54.9%	12.4%
Center	22.9%	50.0%	27.1%
Islamist	20.6%	44.0%	35.4%
Extreme Islamist	16.7%	36.7%	46.7%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	30.0%	40.0%	30.0%
Between 25-75 thousand	27.9%	39.4%	32.7%
More than 75 thousand	36.2%	33.0%	30.9%
Province			
Homs	15.0%	58.3%	26.7%
The camps in Turkey	16.7%	44.0%	39.2%
Idlib	21.3%	37.3%	41.3%
Damascus	23.3%	27.9%	48.8%
Damascus Rural Province	25.5%	67.3%	7.1%
Aleppo	34.5%	63.2%	2.3%
Al-Hasakah	65.4%	29.3%	5.3%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	19.7%	47.4%	32.9%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	21.4%	47.2%	31.4%
Self-governance areas	63.3%	30.2%	6.5%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	22.6%	62.1%	15.3%
Non-besieged areas	21.0%	44.2%	34.7%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	21.6%	47.2%	31.2%
Kurdish	59.6%	34.6%	5.8%
Turkmen (in figures)	3	3	2

Civil Status			
Single	39.8%	42.7%	17.5%
Married	23.4%	45.6%	31.0%
Widowed (in figures)	27.2%	42.0%	30.9%
Divorced (in figures)	6	11	5

The Sample of Men

Table (12) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards verbal threats in the sample of men:

Sustenance: The largest proportion of those responsible for the sustenance of up to two people oppose the punishment of the perpetrator. Those responsible for the sustenance of three to five people are divided. Being the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, the largest proportion of those responsible for the sustenance of six people and above say there must be tolerance in some cases.

Ideology: Secularists tend to be lenient in some cases, while Islamists prefer not to punish the perpetrator.

Income: The percentage of those who support the punishment of the perpetrator declines with the increase in income. It drops from around a quarter among people with a low income and reaches a low of 16.7% among people with a high income, i.e. more than 75 thousand per month.

Province: Men in Damascus Rural Province and Al-Hasakah are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator (more than a quarter), while the percentage drops and reaches its lowest level in the camps in Turkey (only 4.3%) as the vast majority of respondents in this region say that the perpetrator must not be punished. The majority of men in Damascus and Homs share the same opinion along with the largest percentage in Idlib (around half).

Region: Men in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition tend to oppose the punishment of the perpetrator, while men in self-governance areas prefer leniency in some cases.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Arabs (around half) prefer not to punish the perpetrator, while the majority of Kurds tend to be lenient in some cases.

Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents agree to the punishment of the perpetrator, while the proportion of those who agree with punishment does not exceed 17.4% among Sunnis.

Table 12. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal threats in the sample of men

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	24.8%	33.7%	41.5%
3-5 people	17.6%	39.3%	43.2%
6 people and above	11.9%	47.6%	40.5%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	30.6%	52.3%	17.1%
Secularist	16.9%	51.7%	31.4%
Center	16.6%	41.9%	41.5%

Islamist	10.9%	30.2%	58.9%
Extreme Islamist	28.6%	34.8%	36.6%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	25.3%	33.8%	40.9%
Between 25-75 thousand	15.3%	38.9%	45.8%
More than 75 thousand	16.7%	47.1%	36.3%
Province			
The camps in Turkey	4.3%	27.1%	68.6%
Homs	5.9%	32.8%	61.3%
Damascus	11.7%	11.7%	76.6%
Aleppo	13.5%	74.3%	12.2%
Idlib	17.6%	32.6%	49.8%
Al-Hasaka	27.6%	58.4%	14.0%
Damascus Rural Province	31.9%	42.9%	25.2%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	6.3%	35.6%	58.2%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	18.0%	36.5%	45.5%
Self-governance areas	27.5%	57.3%	15.2%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	14.8%	37.1%	48.1%
Kurdish	29.4%	56.2%	14.4%
Sect			
Sunnis	17.4%	37.4%	45.2%
Shiites	0.0%	43.3%	56.7%
Alawites (in figures)	2	11	12

In the Case of Deprivation of Liberty

The Sample of Women

Table (13) shows the relationship between attitudes towards the deprivation of liberty and each of the following variables in the sample of women:

Education: Support for the punishment of the perpetrator increases with progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a greater number of people are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator.

Profession: Housewives are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, while students are the most supportive.

Ideology: Secularists support the punishment of the perpetrator more than Islamists.

Income: Individuals with a higher income are more inclined to support the punishment the perpetrator than those with a lower income (i.e. low/moderate).

Province: There is almost a consensus among women in Al-Hasakah on the necessity of punishing the perpetrator (88.8%), along with the majority of respondents in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus Rural Province. More than half of the women in Idlib share the same attitude, while women in

Damascus are divided. The important difference occurs in the case of the refugee camps in Turkey, as the largest percentage (46.4%) of respondents tend to be lenient in some cases.

Region: There is a consensus on the necessity of punishing the perpetrator among the women in Self-governance areas along with the majority of women in areas under the control of the regime, while the percentage drops to around half in areas under the control of the opposition.

Women in besieged areas are more supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator in comparison to women in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: There is almost a consensus among Kurdish women on the necessity of punishing the perpetrator, while the proportion declines to around half among Arab women.

Religion-Sect: Half of the Sunni respondents and all of the Christian respondents support punishment of the perpetrator.

Civil Status: Single women are the most supportive of punishment (over 68.9%) while married women are the least supportive (53%).

Table 13. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of deprivation of liberty in the sample of women

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
Education			
Illiterate	30.3%	39.4%	30.3%
Primary	41.9%	36.5%	21.6%
Intermediate	49.1%	40.4%	10.5%
High School	62.7%	30.5%	6.8%
University and above	64.8%	29.0%	6.2%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	62.6%	26.1%	11.3%
3-5 people	55.5%	36.1%	8.4%
6 people and above	41.6%	46.0%	12.4%
Profession			
Working	61.9%	28.9%	9.1%
Student	64.6%	30.8%	4.6%
Unemployed	56.6%	34.0%	9.4%
Housewife	49.6%	36.8%	13.6%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	91.7%	7.3%	1.0%
Secularist	75.4%	18.6%	5.9%
Center	62.6%	31.0%	6.4%
Islamist	40.3%	47.3%	12.4%
Extreme Islamist	41.3%	28.3%	30.4%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	57.9%	28.9%	13.2%
Between 25-75 thousand	56.5%	32.9%	10.6%
More than 75 thousand	62.5%	22.9%	14.6%
Province			
The camps in Turkey	32.4%	46.4%	21.2%
Damascus	44.2%	44.2%	11.6%

Idlib	54.1%	34.9%	10.9%
Damascus Rural Province	68.0%	30.1%	1.9%
Aleppo	72.7%	26.1%	1.1%
Homs	77.9%	20.6%	1.5%
Al-Hasakah	88.8%	9.0%	2.2%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	67.9%	26.2%	6.0%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	49.4%	38.2%	12.4%
Self-governance areas	88.7%	9.2%	2.1%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	65.9%	31.8%	2.3%
Non-besieged areas	45.9%	39.5%	14.6%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	52.2%	36.5%	11.3%
Kurdish	86.7%	10.5%	2.9%
Turkmen (in figures)	3	4	1
Sect			
Sunnis	52.0%	36.2%	11.8%
Christians	10	0	0
Civil Status			
Single	68.9%	25.0%	6.1%
Married	53.0%	35.4%	11,6%
Widowed (in figures)	55.3%	31.8%	12.9%
Divorced (in figures)	13	9	1

The Sample of Men

The analysis of the results shows a relationship between each of the following variables, which are summarized in table (14), in relation to attitudes towards the deprivation of liberty in the sample of men:

Education: Support for the punishment of the perpetrator increases with progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a greater number of people are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator.

Profession: Students and unemployed individuals are more supportive of punishment than those in work.

Ideology: Secularists are more supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator compared to Islamists.

Income: Those with a moderate income are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than those in other income groups.

Province: The majority of men in Damascus Rural Province and Al-Hasakah say that the perpetrator must be punished, while the respondents are divided in Homs. The percentage of support drops to less than a third in Idlib and Aleppo, and to less than a quarter in Damascus.

However, unexpected results were found in the camps in Turkey, where less than 3% said that he must be punished.

Region: The percentage of support for the punishment of the perpetrator reaches its peak in Self – governance areas (56.9%), and drops to around a third in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition.

Men in besieged areas are more supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than men in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: 60% of Kurdish men support the punishment of the perpetrator, while only one third of Arabs wish for the perpetrator to be punished.

Religion-Sect: Around one-third of Sunnis and Shiites wish to punish the perpetrator. None of the Alawite respondents, in the small sample, oppose the punishment of the perpetrator (0.0% said the perpetrator should not be punished, while this percentage reaches around a quarter among Sunnis and Shiites).

Table 14. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of deprivation of liberty in the sample of men

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished
Education			
Illiterate (in figures)	8	6	5
Primary	33.6%	42.0%	24.4%
Intermediate	34.8%	46.4%	18.7%
High School	38.2%	42.2%	19.5%
University and above	48.1%	37.0%	14.8%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	47.8%	30.3%	21.9%
3-5 people	40.0%	39.7%	20.3%
6 people and above	33.3%	53.7%	12.9%
Profession			
Working	38.7%	42.0%	19.3%
Student	48.3%	48.3%	3.3%
Unemployed	46.3%	31.7%	22.0%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	60.3%	34.5%	5.2%
Secularist	51.4%	38.5%	10.1%
Center	40.4%	40.4%	19.2%
Islamist	26.7%	45.4%	27.9%
Extreme Islamist	34.6%	46.2%	19.2%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	43.2%	34.2%	22.5%
Between 25-75 thousand	34.8%	47.7%	17.5%
More than 75 thousand	41.3%	43.0%	15.7%
Province			
The camps in Turkey	2.7%	47.3%	50.0%
Damascus	23.4%	41.6%	35.1%

Idlib	28.9%	59.6%	11.5%
Aleppo	30.3%	61.8%	7.9%
Homs	34.7%	34.7%	30.7%
Al-Hasakah	57.5%	35.5%	7.0%
Damascus Rural Province	68.3%	24.0%	7.8%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	36.2%	42.1%	21.7%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	35.7%	42.9%	21.4%
Self-governance areas	56.9%	36.5%	6.6%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	51.3%	23.8%	24.9%
Non-besieged areas	23.6%	57.6%	18.8%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	35.3%	43.4%	21.4%
Kurdish	60.0%	34.2%	5.8%
Sect			
Sunnis	35.6%	42.7%	21.7%
Shiites	33.3%	43.3%	23.3%
Alawites (in figures)	15	13	0


One of the most suitable methods to summarize these results is to conduct a type of Multivariate Statistical Analysis, which is known as Cluster Analysis. This analysis enables us to classify data into different groups, according to the distinctive characteristics of each cluster, so that we can create groups based on attitudes towards the issues mentioned above.

The first group wishes to hold the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases. They say that he must be punished in cases of physical abuse and the deprivation of liberty, and they show leniency in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat.

The second group wishes for leniency in the cases of physical abuse and the deprivation of liberty and opposes legal accountability in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat.

Figure (15) shows that the majority of women wish to hold the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases (67.5%), although some show leniency in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat. The proportion of support for full accountability drops among men to just over half (54.3%).

Figure 15. Holding the perpetrator legally accountable (among men and women)



Chapter III: The Justifications of Spousal Violence Against Women

In the previous chapter, we learned about attitudes towards spousal violence against women. However, what are the excuses which justify such acts? What are the social and ideological characteristics of those who do not oppose domestic violence? To understand these points, we introduced two different types of common justifications:

- The first does not hold women responsible for violence occurring against them, and involves two interpretations. One is based on religious interpretations, as Islamic Law is used to justify such violence, while the second uses comparisons with neighboring Arab countries to show that violence against wives in Syria is not the most extreme example.
- The second holds the victim responsible for violence occurring against her, as it assumes that these acts occur because women are uneducated, or because they are the ones who push men to resort to violence.

Figure (16) shows the following:

- Only a third of respondents oppose the argument that "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases."
- Only 16.9% reject the hypothesis that the situation in Syria is not the worst example, in comparison with other Arab countries.
- Only 35.8% oppose the argument that women bear responsibility, being the ones who push their husbands to commit violence in some cases.
- Less than half of the respondents refuse to lay responsibility on women under the pretext that women are uneducated.

We will later understand the demographic and social characteristics of those who agree with these statements.

However, in view of the differences between men and women, the attitudes of both genders are summarized in Table (15) which shows how men are more supportive of these statements in comparison to women.

Figure 16. Which attitude do you have towards the following statements?




Table 15. The attitude towards statements (by gender)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Women					
Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases	7,2%	35,1%	15,1%	27,1%	15,4%
The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries	11,7%	32,2%	36,5%	13,7%	5,9%
Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated	5,4%	24,2%	18,6%	32,6%	19,2%
The existence of logical reasons for violence against women	6,6%	31,3%	13,9%	30,2%	18,0%
Men					
Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases	14,2%	41,5%	16,0%	20,6%	7,7%
The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries	13,5%	42,1%	29,9%	12,4%	2,1%
Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated	3,7%	33,8%	22,1%	31,6%	8,8%
The existence of logical reasons for violence against women	12,9%	44,7%	17,3%	18,9%	6,1%

Justifications which do not lay responsibility on the female victim

Religious Justification: "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases."

The Sample of Women

There is a relationship between the attitudes towards religious justification and each of the variables summarized in detail in Table (16):

Education: Agreement with this statement declines with progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are the ones who are most inclined to agree with the religious justification, compared to those who are responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people.

Profession: Housewives are the most supportive of this justification, while students and working women are the most opposed to it.

Ideology: The percentage of respondents who agree with religious justification dramatically increases among Islamists compared with Secularists.

Age: The percentage of respondent agreement increases among those older than 36 years compared to younger women.

Income: Those with a moderate income are the most supportive of this justification, while those with a lower income are most opposed (around half of the respondents).

Province: The majority of women refugees in the camps in Turkey (%65.3) agree with this religious justification (63.6%), as well as around half of the respondents in Aleppo and Idlib. The percentage substantially drops in Damascus and Damascus Rural Province to around a quarter, drops again to 14.7% in Homs, and reaches a low of 5% in Al-Hasakah.

Region: The vast majority of respondents in areas under the control of the regime and Self – governance areas oppose the religious justification, while half of the women in areas under the control of the opposition support it.

Women in non-besieged opposition areas are more supportive of this justification than women in besieged areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: There is almost a consensus among Kurdish women on opposing this justification, while half of Arab women support it.

Religion-Sect: All Christian women, in our small sample, oppose this justification, while around half of Sunni women support it.

Civil Status: Single women tend to oppose this justification, while less than half of the married women support it.

Table 16. The attitude towards the statement "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases" in the sample of women

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Education			
Illiterate	58,3%	19,4%	22,2%
Primary	60,5%	6,6%	32,9%
Intermediate	44,8%	15,1%	40,1%
High School	38,3%	14,9%	46,8%
University and above	35,0%	18,3%	46,8%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	36,8%	12,8%	50,4%
3-5 people	45,3%	15,3%	39,4%
6 people and above	51,8%	22,3%	25,9%
Profession			
Working	39,9%	13,2%	46,9%
Student	32,3%	18,8%	48,9%
Unemployed	43,5%	13,9%	42,6%
Housewife	47,6%	15,9%	36,5%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	7,1%	7,1%	85,9%
Secularist	14,2%	17,5%	68,3%
Center	36,5%	17,1%	46,4%
Islamist	59,6%	18,0%	22,5%
Extreme Islamist	69,6%	3,3%	27,2%
Age			
Up to 25 years	41,3%	14,2%	44,6%
26-35 years	38,7%	13,4%	48,0%
36-45 years	43,1%	20,7%	36,2%
46-55 years	56,0%	10,7%	33,3%

56 years and above	64,7%	11,8%	23,5%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	34,6%	10,7%	54,6%
Between 25-75 thousand	43,9%	16,9%	39,2%
More than 75 thousand	34,4%	18,8%	46,9%
Province			
Al-Hasakah	5,0%	9,9%	85,1%
Homs	14,7%	11,8%	73,5%
Damascus	25,6%	9,3%	65,1%
Damascus Rural Province	28,3%	18,9%	52,8%
Idlib	48,5%	26,0%	25,5%
Aleppo	55,7%	19,3%	25,0%
The camps in Turkey	65,3%	8,2%	26,5%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	13,1%	11,9%	75,0%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	52,8%	16,4%	30,9%
Self-governance areas	6,8%	10,8%	82,4%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged	31,1%	16,7%	52,3%
Non-Besieged	57,4%	16,3%	26,2%
Nationality – Ethnicity			
Arab	48,2%	16,2%	35,6%
Kurdish	5,5%	8,3%	86,2%
Turkmen (in figures)	5	1	2
Sect			
Sunnis	48,7%	15,7%	35,5%
Christians (in figures)	0	0	10
Civil Status			
Single	30,4%	12,9%	56,7%
Married	45,7%	15,6%	38,7%
Widowed	48,2%	15,3%	36,5%
Divorced (in figures)	9	5	9

The Sample of Men

The variables associated with attitudes towards religious justification are summarized in Table (17) as follows:

Education: Agreement with this statement declines with progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are more likely to agree with this justification.

Profession: The unemployed are most likely to agree with religious justification (67.4%), while those least likely to support it are students (around half).

Ideology: The percentage of those agreeing with this justification dramatically increases among Islamists compared with Secularists.

Age: Young respondents (younger than 25 years) agree with religious justification the most.

Income: Those with a higher income show more opposition to religious justification than those with a lower income.

Province: There is almost a consensus among respondents in the camps in Turkey and Idlib on supporting this justification along with the majority of respondents in Aleppo and Damascus Rural Province. The percentage drops to half in Damascus and reaches 40% in Homs. The percentage of respondents in agreement reaches its lowest in Al-Hasakah, where this justification is only supported by around a quarter of men.

Region: The vast majority of respondents in areas under control of the opposition (around 77%) agree with this justification, along with around 25% in areas under control of the regime and Self – governance areas.

The support of this justification increases in non-besieged opposition areas compared to besieged areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Arab men support this justification, while the majority of Kurdish men oppose it (over 60% in both cases).

Religion - Sect: The majority of Shiites refuse to give a clear attitude (58.1%), while the majority of Sunnis support this justification (68.4%).

Civil Status: Around a third of single men oppose this justification, which is higher than among married men (around a quarter).

Table 17. The attitude towards the statement "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases" in the sample of men

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Education			
Illiterate (in figures)	7	6	7
Primary	62,2%	14,2%	23,6%
Intermediate	63,6%	20,0%	16,4%
High School	56,5%	16,8%	26,7%
University and above	47,0%	11,5%	41,5%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	51,9%	10,9%	37,2%
3-5 people	55,0%	16,0%	28,9%
6 people and above	60,1%	20,1%	19,8%
Profession			
Working	55,1%	17,1%	27,8%
Student	49,2%	7,9%	42,9%
Unemployed	67,4%	10,1%	22,5%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	20,3%	17,9%	61,8%
Secularist	14,8%	30,0%	55,2%
Center	60,3%	16,7%	23,1%
Islamist	81,0%	8,6%	10,3%
Extreme Islamist	84,2%	7,0%	8,8%
Age			
Up to 25 years	66,1%	11,0%	22,8%
26-35 years	55,1%	11,9%	33,0%
36-45 years	52,4%	18,3%	29,3%

46-55 years	45,4%	25,9%	28,7%
56 years and above	57,9%	22,4%	19,7%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	70,7%	7,9%	21,4%
Between 25-75 thousand	56,0%	18,8%	25,1%
More than 75 thousand	44,9%	17,4%	37,7%
Province			
Al-Hasakah	23,0%	17,6%	59,5%
Homs	40,8%	27,1%	32,2%
Damascus	49,4%	6,5%	44,2%
Damascus Rural Province	64,0%	12,8%	23,3%
Aleppo	73,8%	16,7%	9,5%
The camps in Turkey	82,4%	1,4%	16,2%
Idlib	83,9%	12,3%	3,8%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	23,6%	32,0%	44,4%
Areas under the control of the opposition	77,1%	10,2%	12,7%
Self-governance areas	22,8%	17,4%	59,8%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	70,2%	8,9%	20,9%
Non-besieged areas	82,7%	10,2%	7,1%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	63,2%	15,7%	21,1%
Kurdish	18,8%	19,4%	61,9%
Sect			
Sunnis	68,4%	12,4%	19,1%
Shiites	19,4%	58,1%	22,6%
Alawites (in figures)	1	3	24
Civil Status			
Single	55,1%	11,6%	33,3%
Married	56,2%	17,3%	26,5%
Widowed (in figures)	0	5	3
Divorced (in figures)	9	0	4

The Justification of Comparison: "The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries."

The Sample of Women

Table (18) summarizes all variables that have a relationship with the justification of violence through comparison to neighboring countries and the assumption that such violence is less prevalent in Syria:

Profession: Housewives accept this justification the most.

Ideology: Islamists accept this justification more than Secularists.

Income: Those with a higher/moderate income accept this justification more than those with a lower income.

Province: The majority of women in the camps in Turkey (around 57%) and around half in Homs, accept this justification. The percentage declines to 40% in Damascus, Idlib and Aleppo, reaches around a third in Damascus Rural Province and around a quarter in Al-Hasakah.

Region: Around half of the respondents in areas under the control of the opposition accept this justification, along with 42.9% in areas under the control of the regime and around a quarter in self-governance areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs (45.9%) accept this justification more than Kurds (27.5%).

Religion-Sect: Half of the Christian respondents in our small sample accept this justification along with 45.9% of Sunnis.

Table 18. Attitudes towards the statement “The violence against wives in Syria is few in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries” in the sample of women

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Profession			
Working	42,8%	34,3%	22,9%
Student	32,3%	47,4%	20,3%
Unemployed	42,6%	35,2%	22,2%
Housewife	49,4%	35,0%	15,7%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	30,3%	45,5%	24,2%
Secularist	40,8%	35,0%	24,2%
Center	41,8%	38,2%	20,1%
Islamist	48,9%	36,8%	14,3%
Extreme Islamist	51,1%	21,7%	27,2%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	43,6%	30,7%	25,7%
Between 25-75 thousand	47,5%	32,2%	20,4%
More than 75 thousand	47,9%	30,2%	21,9%
Province			
Al-Hasakah	24,1%	50,4%	25,5%
Damascus Rural Province	31,1%	47,2%	21,7%
Aleppo	43,2%	50,0%	6,8%
Idlib	43,7%	34,2%	22,1%
Damascus	44,2%	18,6%	37,2%
Homs	50,0%	26,5%	23,5%
The camps in Turkey	57,1%	28,6%	14,3%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	42,9%	21,4%	35,7%
Areas under the control of the Opposition	47,8%	35,5%	16,8%
Self-governance areas	25,7%	50,0%	24,3%
Nationality - Ethnicity			
Arab	45,9%	34,5%	19,6%
Kurdish	27,5%	54,1%	18,3%
Turkmen (in figures)	6	1	1
Religion - Sect			
Sunnis	45,9%	36,3%	17,9%

Christians (in figures)	5	3	2
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The Sample of Men

Table (19) shows variables associated with attitudes towards the justification of violence through comparison to neighboring countries and the assumption that such violence is less prevalent in Syria, in the sample of men:

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of three to five people hold the highest percentage of acceptance for this justification, while those responsible for the sustenance of six people and above oppose it the most.

Ideology: Islamists accept this justification more than Secularists.

Income: Agreement with this statement drops among those with a higher income in comparison to those with a lower income.

Province: The vast majority of respondents in the camps in Turkey and Aleppo accept this justification, along with the majority in Damascus (62.3%) and half of the respondents in Idlib, Damascus Rural Province, Al-Hasakah and Homs.

Region: This justification is accepted by the majority in areas under the control of the opposition (59.6%), by around half of the respondents in Self-governance areas, and by 45.8% of respondents in areas under the control of the Regime.

Those in non-besieged opposition areas agree with this justification more than those in besieged areas.

Religion-Sect: The proportion of opposition to this justification increases among Shiites compared to Sunnis.

Table 19. Attitudes towards the statement “The violence against wives in Syria is few in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries” in the sample of men

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	54,9%	26,3%	18,8%
3-5 people	61,4%	27,4%	11,2%
6 people and above	46,2%	37,1%	16,7%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	61,8%	27,6%	10,6%
Secularist	48,0%	32,7%	19,3%
Center	54,8%	26,3%	18,9%
Islamist	57,2%	32,2%	10,6%
Extreme Islamist	60,5%	29,8%	9,6%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	58,1%	26,6%	15,3%
Between 25-75 thousand	60,4%	28,5%	11,1%
More than 75 thousand	47,8%	31,6%	20,6%
Province			

Homs	46,7%	31,0%	22,4%
Al-Hasakah	51,8%	35,1%	13,1%
Damascus Rural Province	53,5%	31,4%	15,1%
Idlib	53,8%	36,0%	10,2%
Damascus	62,3%	7,8%	29,9%
The camps in Turkey	74,3%	24,3%	1,4%
Aleppo	78,6%	17,9%	3,6%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	45,8%	28,4%	25,8%
Areas under the control of the opposition	59,6%	29,0%	11,4%
Self-governance areas	53,0%	34,2%	12,8%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged	55,0%	27,7%	17,4%
Non-Besieged	63,4%	29,6%	7,1%
Religion-Sect			
Sunnis	57,1%	29,7%	13,1%
Shiites	41,9%	35,5%	22,6%
Alawites (in figures)	17	7	4

Justifications which lay responsibility on the female victim

Assuming that Women Exposed to Spousal Violence are Uneducated

The Sample of Women

Analysis of the results shows a relationship between each of the following variables, which are summarized in Table (20), in relation to attitudes towards violence against women being justified by assuming that the victims are uneducated:

Ideology: Secularists are more supportive of this justification than Islamists.

Age: Agreement with this justification increases as the respondents get older.

Province: Homs and Damascus are the provinces which hold the most support for this justification (61.8% and 51.2%, respectively). This support declines to approximately a quarter in Damascus, the camps in Turkey, Idlib and Al-Hasakah, while only 13.6% of respondents in Aleppo support the statement.

Region: The majority of women in areas under the control of the Regime agree with this justification (66.7%), while the proportion of agreement drops to around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition and in Self – governance areas.

Respondents in besieged areas oppose this justification more than respondents in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs oppose this justification more than Kurds.

Religion-Sect: There is a consensus of agreement among Christians in relation to this justification, which is echoed by a quarter of Sunnis.

Civil status: Married women oppose this statement the most, while single and widowed women are the most supportive of it.

Table 20. Attitudes towards the statement "Women exposed to spousal violence are uneducated" in the sample of women

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	27,3%	26,3%	46,5%
Secularist	49,2%	19,2%	31,7%
Center	25,0%	15,1%	59,9%
Islamist	27,5%	22,8%	49,7%
Extreme Islamist	29,3%	5,4%	65,2%
Age			
Up to 25 years	24,4%	21,5%	54,1%
26-35 years	27,6%	16,9%	55,5%
36-45 years	32,8%	18,5%	48,7%
46-55 years	42,7%	16,0%	41,3%
56 years and above	58,8%	17,6%	23,5%
Province			
Aleppo	13,6%	21,6%	64,8%
Damascus Rural Province	24,5%	10,4%	65,1%
The camps in Turkey	26,5%	16,3%	57,1%
Idlib	28,6%	21,6%	49,8%
Al-Hasakah	29,1%	31,9%	39,0%
Damascus	51,2%	4,7%	44,2%
Homs	61,8%	8,8%	29,4%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	66,7%	9,5%	23,8%
Areas under the control of the opposition	25,7%	17,1%	57,2%
Self-governance areas	27,7%	31,8%	40,5%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	25,8%	8,3%	65,9%
Non-besieged areas	25,7%	18,8%	55,4%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	30,1%	17,0%	52,9%
Kurdish	33,0%	32,1%	34,9%
Turkmen (in figures)	0	1	7
Sect			
Sunnis	27,4%	17,8%	54,9%
Christians (in figures)	9	0	1
Civil Status			
Single	34,1%	21,7%	44,2%
Married	27,6%	18,0%	54,5%
Widowed	37,6%	17,6%	44,7%
Divorced (in figures)	3	3	17

The Sample of Men

There is a relationship between attitudes towards violence against women being justified by assuming that the victims are uneducated and each of the variables summarized in detail in Table (21):

Ideology: Secularists agree with this justification more than Islamists.

Income: Those with a higher income are more supportive of this statement than those with a lower income.

Province: Homs and Aleppo are the provinces which hold most support for this justification, while the camps in Turkey and Idlib hold the least.

Region: Around half of the men in areas under the control of the Regime agree with this justification, while the percentage drops to around a third in areas under the control of the opposition and in Self-governance areas.

Respondents in besieged areas support this statement more than those in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Kurds oppose this justification more than Arabs.

Religion-Sect: Shiites are more likely to agree with this statement compared to Sunnis.

Civil Status: Single men oppose this justification more than married men.

Table 21. Attitudes towards the statement "Women exposed to spousal violence are uneducated" in the sample of men

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	36,6%	37,4%	26,0%
Secularist	54,3%	24,7%	21,1%
Center	36,2%	17,9%	45,8%
Islamist	31,3%	19,0%	49,7%
Extreme Islamist	27,2%	21,9%	50,9%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	34,1%	15,3%	50,7%
Between 25-75 thousand	35,0%	25,8%	39,1%
More than 75 thousand	42,5%	23,9%	33,6%
Province			
The camps in Turkey	23,0%	16,2%	60,8%
Idlib	26,3%	23,7%	50,0%
Damascus Rural Province	33,1%	10,5%	56,4%
Al-Hasakah	33,8%	41,9%	24,3%
Damascus	35,1%	7,8%	57,1%
Aleppo	42,9%	35,7%	21,4%
Homs	56,9%	12,9%	30,2%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	53,3%	16,9%	29,8%
Areas under the control of the opposition	33,3%	17,8%	49,0%

Self-governance areas	33,8%	41,1%	25,1%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	38,7%	8,5%	52,8%
Non-besieged areas	29,8%	23,6%	46,6%
Nationality-Ethnicity			
Arab	37,8%	18,8%	43,4%
Kurdish	36,3%	41,3%	66,7%
Sect			
Sunnis	33,9%	21,2%	44,9%
Shiites	41,9%	25,8%	32,3%
Alawites (in figures)	23	0	5
Civil Status			
Single	35,1%	22,8%	42,0%
Married	38,3%	22,5%	39,2%
Widowed (in figures)	5	0	4
Divorced (in figures)	2	0	11

Assuming that there are Logical Reasons for Violence Against Women

The Sample of Women

This study found a relationship between attitudes towards the justification of violence against women by laying responsibility on the victim and all of the following variables in the sample of women (Table 22):

Education: Agreement with this statement declines with the progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people are more supportive of this justification than others.

Profession: Housewives are the most supportive of this statement, while students and non-working women support it the least.

Ideology: Islamists are more supportive of this justification than Secularists.

Income: Respondents with a moderate income are the least supportive of this justification.

Province: The majority of women in the camps in Turkey (58.5%) agree with this justification along with the largest proportion of women in Idlib and Homs (42%), while in Aleppo, Al-Hasakah and Damascus Rural Province the greatest proportion oppose it.

Region: The majority of those in areas under the control of the Regime and self – governance areas oppose this justification (more than 70%), while the greatest proportion in areas under the control of the opposition (46.8%) agree with it.

Those in non-besieged opposition areas are more supportive of this justification than those in besieged areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurds oppose this statement (78.9%), while Arabs are divided between agreement and opposition.

Religion-Sect: There is a consensus among Christian respondents to oppose this justification, while Sunni respondents are divided.

Civil status: Married women support this statement more than single women.

Table 22. Attitudes towards the justification of "The existence of logical reasons for violence against women" in the sample of women

	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Education			
Illiterate	61,1%	8,3%	30,6%
Primary	57,2%	11,2%	31,6%
Intermediate	41,3%	10,5%	48,3%
High School	33,8%	12,2%	54,1%
University and above	29,0%	18,0%	53,0%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	33,0%	12,3%	54,7%
3-5 people	38,9%	14,5%	46,6%
6 people and above	51,1%	17,3%	31,7%
Profession			
Working	35,2%	13,2%	51,6%
Student	29,3%	20,3%	50,4%
Unemployed	29,6%	12,0%	58,3%
Housewife	45,5%	12,9%	41,6%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	8,1%	9,1%	82,8%
Secularist	12,5%	14,2%	73,3%
Center	39,1%	13,2%	47,7%
Islamist	48,6%	18,5%	32,9%
Extreme Islamist	57,6%	3,3%	39,1%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	34,3%	9,6%	56,1%
Between 25-75 thousand	34,9%	18,4%	46,7%
More than 75 thousand	33,3%	10,4%	56,3%
Province			
Al-Hasakah	8,5%	12,1%	79,4%
Homs	13,2%	13,2%	73,5%
Damascus	14,0%	2,3%	83,7%
Damascus Rural Province	31,1%	19,8%	49,1%
Idlib	42,0%	26,8%	31,2%
Aleppo	44,3%	8,0%	47,7%
The camps in Turkey	58,5%	6,1%	35,4%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	8,3%	10,7%	81,0%
Areas under the control of the opposition	46,8%	14,3%	38,8%
Self-governance areas	10,1%	13,5%	76,4%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged areas	31,8%	15,9%	52,3%
Non-besieged areas	50,0%	14,0%	36,0%
Nationality-Ethnicity			

Arab	42,5%	14,5%	43,0%
Kurdish	11,0%	10,1%	78,9%
Turkmen (in figures)	4	1	3
Religion-Sect			
Sunnis	43,7%	14,3%	42,0%
Christians (in figures)	0	1	9
Civil Status			
Single	26,7%	12,9%	60,4%
Married	41,8%	14,6%	43,7%
Widowed	37,6%	14,1%	48,2%
Divorced (in figures)	8	1	14

The Sample of Men

Table (23) summarizes the variables that are found to have a relationship with attitudes towards the justification of violence against women by laying responsibility on the victim:

Education: The proportion of support for this justification drops with the progress in education.

Sustenance: The percentage of support increases among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people in comparison to those responsible for a smaller number.

Profession: Unemployed respondents are the most supportive of this justification, while students are the least supportive of it.

Ideology: Islamists are more supportive of this statement than Secularists.

Age: Young men are the most supportive of this justification.

Income: The proportion of support for this justification declines with the increase in income.

Province: There is a consensus of support among respondents in the camps in Turkey, echoed by the vast majority in Idlib and Aleppo and the majority in Damascus and Damascus Rural Province. The percentage of support drops to approximately 40% in Homs and Al-Hasakah.

Region: The vast majority of men in areas under the control of the opposition agree with this statement, along with around one-third in Self – governance areas and a quarter in areas under the control of the Regime.

Respondents in besieged areas are less supportive of this justification than those in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Arabs agree with this justification, while Kurds are divided.

Religion-Sect: Around half of the Shiite respondents decline to express a clear attitude, while the majority of Sunnis support this statement.

Civil status: Married men oppose this justification more than single men.

Table 23. Attitudes towards the justification of "The existence of logical reasons for violence against women" in the sample of men


	Agree	No clear attitude	Disagree
Education			
Illiterate (in figures)	9	4	7
Primary	74,8%	9,4%	15,7%
Intermediate	65,7%	18,9%	15,4%
High School	55,9%	20,1%	24,0%
University and above	47,0%	15,8%	37,3%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain			
Up to 2 people	52,6%	12,8%	34,6%
3-5 people	58,6%	16,6%	24,8%
6 people and above	60,4%	22,3%	17,3%
Profession			
Working	57,2%	18,1%	24,6%
Student	44,4%	15,9%	39,7%
Unemployed	71,9%	9,0%	19,1%
Ideology			
Extreme Secularist	36,6%	19,5%	43,9%
Secularist	21,1%	33,6%	45,3%
Center	61,9%	13,8%	24,4%
Islamist	78,1%	11,8%	10,1%
Extreme Islamist	78,1%	9,6%	12,3%
Age			
Up to 25 years	62,2%	13,8%	24,0%
26-35 years	59,2%	13,8%	27,0%
36-45 years	55,3%	17,9%	26,8%
46-55 years	50,6%	25,9%	23,6%
56 years and above	59,2%	25,0%	15,8%
Income (Syrian pound)			
Less than 25 thousand	67,7%	9,2%	23,1%
Between 25-75 thousand	58,9%	19,6%	21,5%
More than 75 thousand	48,6%	19,4%	32,0%
Province			
Al-Hasakah	36,0%	20,7%	43,2%
Homs	43,1%	29,4%	27,5%
Damascus Rural Province	55,2%	11,6%	33,1%
Damascus	57,1%	3,9%	39,0%
Aleppo	75,0%	13,1%	11,9%
Idlib	80,1%	16,1%	3,8%
The camps in Turkey	87,8%	1,4%	10,8%
Region			
Areas under the control of the Regime	28,9%	32,4%	38,7%
Areas under the control of the opposition	74,1%	11,4%	14,5%
Self-governance areas	36,5%	20,1%	43,4%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition			
Besieged	64,9%	9,9%	25,2%
Non-Besieged	81,7%	12,0%	6,3%

Nationality – Ethnicity			
Arab	62,5%	16,5%	21,0%
Kurdish	36,3%	21,9%	41,9%
Religion-Sect			
Sunnis	68,3%	12,8%	18,9%
Shiites	29,0%	51,6%	19,4%
Alawites (in figures)	2	7	19
Civil Status			
Single	52,2%	13,0%	34,8%
Married	59,6%	19,0%	21,4%
Widowed (in figures)	5	2	9
Divorced (in figures)	7	0	6

Chapter IV: "Honor Killings"

The Perception of the Prevalence of "Honor Killings"

Figure 17. Have you heard of any honor crime that took place in your area over the past year?



Only 15.5% said they had heard of an honor crime taking place in their area during the last year (Figure 17). The prevalence of honor killings by province and region is summarized in Table (24) as follows:

Around one-third of respondents in the city of Al-Hasakah say that they had heard of an honor crime taking place in their area over the past year. The percentage drops to a quarter in Damascus and Homs, to 11.1% in the camps in Turkey and to less than 8% in Damascus Rural Province, Aleppo, and Idlib.

Respondents in Self-governance areas reported the most on the occurrence of an honor crime in their area over the past year, followed by respondents in areas under the control of the regime (15.9%) and then by respondents in areas under the control of the opposition (11.6%).

The percentage of those who state that they had heard of the occurrence of an honor crime increases in besieged areas compared to non-besieged opposition areas.

Table 24. Have you heard of any honor crime that took place in your area over the past year? (in relation to social and demographic variables)

	Yes	No	I do not know	I prefer not to answer
Province				
Aleppo	4,7%	89,5%	5,2%	0,6%
Idlib	6,4%	74,7%	13,9%	4,9%
Damascus Rural Province	7,9%	69,8%	15,5%	6,8%
The camps in Turkey	11,1%	59,5%	28,8%	0,5%
Homs	24,5%	71,8%	2,8%	0,9%
Damascus	25,0%	71,7%	0,8%	2,5%
Al-Hasakah	31,7%	62,5%	5,5%	0,3%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	15,9%	79,3%	3,9%	1,0%
Areas under the control of the opposition	11,6%	69,5%	15,6%	3,3%
Self-governance areas	30,5%	63,5%	5,4%	0,5%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged areas	21,0%	62,8%	10,6%	5,6%
Non-besieged areas	7,8%	72,0%	17,8%	2,4%

Views on Punishment for the Perpetrator

The general attitude is biased towards addressing this type of crime like any other murder (Figure 18). However, women are much stricter on this issue than men, with around a third stating, in almost all cases (except in the event of an illicit relationship), that it must be dealt with like any other murder, compared to around a quarter of the number of men. It seems that the collective (men and women) sway substantially towards the commutation of sentence in the event of the discovery of an illicit relationship between the murderer and the victim (Table 25). We will discuss in detail each of the cases mentioned and focus on the support of dealing with this crime like any other murder; where this support increases and where it drops.

Figure 18. In Syria, the sentence against the perpetrator of an honor crime is commuted i.e. a crime committed by a family member against a woman claiming that she has done something that defiles "family honor". How should new Syrian laws deal with this type of crime?




Table 25. The way in which new laws should deal with honor crimes (by gender)

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Women				
The victim's choice to get married without the consent of her family	21,7	35,7	33,9	8,7
The victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect	32,2	22,9	34,0	10,9
The victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion	37,9	18,7	32,5	10,8
The discovery of an illicit relationship	56,1	15,3	20,5	8,0
Men				
The victim's choice to get married without the consent of her family	40,7	27,6	25,4	6,3
The victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect	44,0	20,4	27,3	8,3
The victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion	47,8	18,1	26,3	7,9
The discovery of an illicit relationship	68,3	12,5	14,3	4,9

The Sample of Women

The variables are as follows (Table 26):

Education: Those with high school certificates and university graduates are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to those with lower levels of education. A greater percentage of support is noticed among illiterates, but it must be kept in mind that this sample is relatively small (36 people).

Sustenance: The support to deal with the crime like any other murder increases among those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people (up to two), in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people.

Profession: Around one-third of students say that the crime should be dealt with like any other murder. The percentage drops to around a quarter among unemployed women, to 19.6% among female workers and to 13.6% among housewives.

Ideology: Secularist support is higher than Islamist support.

Age: Young people and women older than 56 years are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to other age groups.

Income: The proportion of support declines among those with a moderate income in comparison to those with a higher and lower income.

Province: The support to deal with such a crime like any other murder reaches around half in Aleppo, drops to around one-third in Al-Hasakah, Damascus and Damascus Rural Province, to 14.6% in the camps in Turkey and to 5.9% in Homs. It reaches its lowest level in Idlib, where only 1.3% show support.

Region: One-third of women in Self – governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The proportion drops in areas under the control of the Regime to 21.4% and to 17.3% in areas under the control of the opposition.

Respondents in besieged areas (28.8%) are more supportive of dealing with such a crime like any other murder than those in non-besieged opposition areas (14.9%).

Nationality-Ethnicity: 33% of Kurds and 17.1% of Arabs support dealing with the crime like any other murder.

Religion-Sect: Only one woman from the small Christian sample, consisting of ten women, supports dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with 18.1% of Sunni women.

Civil Status: Around one-third of single women support addressing the crime like any other murder, while the proportion drops to less than a quarter among married women and widows.

Table 26. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the crime is the discovery of an illicit relationship in the sample of women

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate	47,2%	16,7%	27,8%	8,3%
Primary	58,6%	20,4%	11,8%	9,2%
Intermediate	57,6%	17,4%	19,8%	5,2%
High School	50,9%	18,9%	23,0%	7,2%
University and above	58,4%	58,4%	22,1%	9,3%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	46,9%	17,9%	26,9%	8,3%
3-5 people	65,8%	11,1%	15,0%	8,0%
6 people and above	59,0%	18,7%	15,1%	7,2%
Profession				
Working	56,3%	15,2%	19,6%	8,8%
Student	36,8%	15,0%	36,8%	11,3%
Unemployed	49,1%	17,6%	27,8%	5,6%
Housewife	64,5%	14,9%	13,6%	6,9%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	28,3%	16,2%	46,5%	9,1%
Secularist	55,8%	15,8%	22,5%	5,8%
Center	43,4%	19,4%	27,0%	10,2%
Islamist	75,6%	9,3%	7,3%	7,9%
Extreme Islamist	53,3%	23,9%	19,6%	3,3%
Age				
Up to 25 years	46,5%	16,8%	28,1%	8,6%
26-35 years	56,7%	16,0%	18,0%	9,3%

36-45 years	66,8%	12,5%	15,1%	5,6%
46-55 years	58,7%	18,7%	16,0%	6,7%
56 years and above	58,8%	0,0%	29,4%	11,8%
Income (Syrian pound)				
Less than 25 thousand	45,0%	18,6%	25,4%	11,1%
Between 25-75 thousand	61,2%	16,9%	15,3%	6,7%
More than 75 thousand	51,0%	18,8%	26,0%	4,2%
Province				
Idlib	84,8%	3,9%	1,7%	9,5%
Homs	83,8%	10,3%	5,9%	0,0%
The camps in Turkey	68,0%	15,0%	14,6%	2,4%
Damascus Rural Province	21,7%	22,6%	33,0%	22,6%
Al-Hasakah	29,1%	22,0%	36,9%	12,1%
Damascus	27,9%	32,6%	37,2%	2,3%
Aleppo	18,2%	22,7%	51,1%	8,0%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	59,5%	17,9%	21,4%	1,2%
Areas under the control of the opposition	61,3%	13,5%	17,3%	7,8%
Self-governance areas	28,4%	23,0%	35,8%	12,8%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	31,1%	21,2%	28,8%	18,9%
Non-Besieged	67,8%	11,9%	14,9%	5,4%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	60,5%	14,5%	17,1%	7,9%
Kurdish	38,5%	19,3%	33,0%	9,2%
Turkmen (in figures)	2	2	4	0

Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	58,3%	15,6%	18,1%	7,9%
Christians (in figures)	8	1	1	0
Civil Status				
Single	34,6%	21,2%	32,7%	11,5%
Married	62,7%	14,6%	16,4%	6,3%
Widowed	58,8%	7,1%	21,2%	12,9%
Divorced (in figures)	15	3	4	1

The Sample of Men

Table (27) summarizes the variables as follows:

Education: The proportion of support for dealing with the crime like any other murder reaches 20.9% among university graduates and around 10% among those with other levels of education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of individuals (more than six) are less supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder.

Profession: The support reaches its peak among students (20.6%), followed by working respondents (16.9%), while it drops to less than 10% among the unemployed.

Ideology: The percentage of support among Secularists is higher than the percentage of support among Islamists.

Age: Respondents older than 46 years are less supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than those in other age groups.

Income: The proportion of support declines among those with a moderate income, in comparison to those with a higher and lower income.

Province: Around one-third of men in Aleppo and Damascus support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter in Al-Hasakah and Damascus Rural Province, while the percentage drops to less than 4% in Homs, Idlib and the camps in Turkey.

Region: Around one-quarter of respondents in Self-governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the support drops to around 12% in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition.

Respondents in besieged areas are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than respondents in non-besieged opposition areas.

Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while 14.1% of Sunnis do support it.

Nationality- Ethnicity Around a quarter of Kurds support dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to 11.8% of Arabs.

Civil Status: Single respondents are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder in comparison to married respondents.

Table 27. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the crime is the discovery of an illicit relationship in the sample of men

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate (in figures)	5	5	6	4
Primary	70,1%	11,8%	13,4%	4,7%
Intermediate	74,3%	10,4%	11,4%	3,9%
High School	74,9%	11,8%	9,9%	3,3%
University and above	57,9%	14,5%	20,9%	6,7%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	61,3%	15,0%	16,9%	6,8%
3-5 people	64,7%	14,0%	16,2%	5,0%
6 people and above	80,2%	7,9%	8,8%	3,1%
Profession				
Working	68,5%	12,6%	14,4%	4,5%
Student	55,6%	15,9%	20,6%	7,9%
Unemployed	76,4%	6,7%	9,0%	7,9%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	35,0%	25,2%	30,1%	9,8%
Secularist	64,1%	15,2%	17,0%	3,6%
Center	59,0%	17,3%	17,9%	5,8%
Islamist	85,6%	4,0%	5,7%	4,6%
Extreme Islamist	85,1%	6,1%	7,9%	0,9%
Age				

Up to 25 years	64,6%	11,0%	15,4%	9,1%
26-35 years	64,3%	15,1%	14,9%	5,7%
36-45 years	67,9%	11,4%	17,5%	3,3%
46-55 years	78,7%	11,5%	9,2%	0,6%
56 years and above	77,6%	10,5%	9,2%	2,6%
Income (Syrian pound)				
Less than 25 thousand	62,4%	14,8%	17,9%	4,8%
Between 25-75 thousand	71,0%	10,9%	14,3%	3,9%
More than 75 thousand	63,2%	15,4%	18,2%	3,2%
Province				
Idlib	91,9%	3,4%	1,7%	3,0%
The camps in Turkey	94,6%	2,7%	2,7%	0,0%
Homs	92,9%	3,1%	3,9%	0,0%
Al-Hasakah	36,0%	31,5%	23,0%	9,5%
Damascus Rural Province	54,1%	9,3%	23,3%	13,4%
Aleppo	42,9%	21,4%	31,0%	4,8%
Damascus	41,6%	23,4%	35,1%	0,0%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	78,7%	8,9%	12,4%	0,0%
Areas under the control of the opposition	75,4%	7,5%	12,1%	4,9%
Self-governance areas	35,6%	31,5%	22,8%	10,0%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	66,3%	8,9%	16,7%	8,2%
Non-Besieged	83,5%	6,3%	7,6%	2,6%
Nationality – Ethnicity				
Arab	75,6%	8,5%	11,8%	4,1%

Kurdish	37,5%	28,8%	24,4%	9,4%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	70,9%	10,7%	14,1%	4,4%
Shiites	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Alawites (in figures)	23	2	3	0
Civil Status				
Single	56,9%	14,1%	17,8%	11,2%
Married	72,3%	11,8%	13,0%	2,9%
Widowed (in figures)	8	1	0	0
Divorced (in figures)	6	3	4	0

In the Event of the Victim Choosing to Marry Without the Consent of her family

The Sample of Women

Table (28) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment if the motive for the murder is the victim's choice to get married without the consent of her family, in the sample of women:

Education: Respondents with high school certificates and university graduates are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder (around 40%).

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are less supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than those responsible for the sustenance a smaller number of people.

Profession: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder reaches its peak among students (around one-half), while it reaches its lowest among housewives (around 25%).

Ideology: Secularists are more supportive of dealing with this situation like any other crime than Islamists.

Income: Those with a lower income (45%) are more supportive, in comparison to those with a higher income.

Province: The majority of women in Aleppo, Al-Hasakah and Damascus wish to deal with the crime like any other murder (around 60%), while the percentage substantially drops in other areas, to around one-third in Damascus Rural Province and Homs, and to less than a quarter in Idlib and the refugee camps in Turkey.

Region: The majority of respondents in areas under Self - governance wish to deal with the crime like any other murder (57.4%), along with around one-third of those in areas under the control of the Regime and more than a quarter of those in areas under the control of the opposition.

Respondents in besieged areas (43.2%) are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than respondents in non-besieged opposition areas (25.9%).

Nationality-Ethnicity: Around half the Kurdish women support dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to 29.3% of Arab women.

Religion-Sect: Four out of ten Christian respondents from our sample wish to deal with the crime like any other murder, along with 30.9% of Sunni respondents.

Civil Status: Single women are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder (45.2%), while married women are the least supportive (29.6%).

Table 28. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married without the consent of the family, in the sample of women

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate	30,6%	33,3%	33,3%	2,8%
Primary	30,3%	45,4%	15,8%	8,6%
Intermediate	23,3%	41,3%	25,0%	10,5%
High School	18,0%	33,3%	41,4%	7,2%
University and above	19,0%	31,1%	40,6%	9,3%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	16,8%	33,6%	43,3%	6,3%
3-5 people	25,6%	35,5%	27,5%	11,4%
6 people and above	26,6%	43,2%	21,6%	8,6%
Profession				
Working	22,0%	34,6%	34,0%	9,4%
Student	11,3%	29,3%	49,6%	9,8%
Unemployed	14,8%	35,2%	43,5%	6,5%
Housewife	27,0%	39,1%	25,7%	8,2%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	4,0%	28,3%	62,6%	5,1%
Secularist	10,0%	34,2%	45,0%	10,8%
Center	15,5%	34,5%	43,8%	6,3%
Islamist	34,6%	36,8%	17,4%	11,2%
Extreme Islamist	27,2%	45,7%	19,6%	7,6%
Income (Syrian pound)				
Less than 25 thousand	16,1%	32,1%	45,0%	6,8%
Between 25-75 thousand	21,2%	43,5%	25,9%	9,4%
More than 75 thousand	27,1%	35,4%	29,2%	8,3%
Province				
The camps in Turkey	33,7%	47,6%	16,3%	2,4%
Idlib	30,3%	32,5%	23,4%	13,9%
Homs	16,2%	35,3%	32,4%	16,2%
Damascus Rural Province	8,5%	30,2%	36,8%	24,5%

Damascus	9,3%	30,2%	58,1%	2,3%
Al-Hasakah	5,0%	32,6%	60,3%	2,1%
Aleppo	12,5%	19,3%	63,6%	4,5%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	10,7%	40,5%	35,7%	13,1%
Areas under the control of the opposition	26,4%	35,5%	29,0%	9,2%
Self-governance areas	4,7%	34,5%	57,4%	3,4%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	10,6%	26,5%	43,2%	19,7%
Non-Besieged	29,9%	37,3%	25,9%	6,9%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	24,5%	36,4%	29,3%	9,8%
Kurdish	6,4%	37,6%	53,2%	2,8%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	24,5%	36,4%	30,9%	8,3%
Christians (in figures)	0	4	4	2
Civil Status				
Single	12,9%	33,2%	45,2%	8,8%
Married	24,1%	38,4%	29,6%	7,9%
Widowed	24,7%	25,9%	36,5%	12,9%
Divorced (in figures)	6	5	9	3

The Sample of Men

Variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the murder is the victim's choice to get married without the consent of the family are summarized in Table (29) as follows:

Education: Support to deal with it like any other murder, increases with progress in education.

Sustenance: The support among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people drops in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people.

Profession: Students are the most supportive (39.7%), while the percentage of support declines to around one-quarter among the employed and unemployed respondents.

Ideology: Secularists are more supportive than Islamists.

Age: Support substantially drops among respondents older than 46 years.

Income: Those with a moderate income are less supportive than those in other income groups.

Province: Around half of the men in Damascus, and around one-third in Damascus Rural Province, Al-Hasakah and Aleppo support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The support dramatically drops in the remaining areas and reaches its lowest level in Idlib.

Region: More than one-third of men in Self - governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition and 19.1% in areas under the control of the regime.

Men in besieged areas (34.4%) are more supportive than those in non-besieged opposition areas (13.9%).

Nationality-Ethnicity: Kurds (40%) are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than Arabs (21.7%).

Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents agree to deal with the crime like any other murder, while around a quarter of Sunnis support it.

Civil Status: Single men (29%) are more supportive than married men (24%) while the least supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder are widows (11.1%).

Table 29. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive for the crime is the victim's choice to get married without the consent of the family, in the sample of men

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate (in figures)	3	7	7	3
Primary	45,7%	30,7%	16,5%	7,1%
Intermediate	52,9%	21,1%	20,7%	5,4%
High School	44,6%	28,7%	21,5%	5,2%
University and above	25,8%	30,3%	36,4%	7,6%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	33,1%	25,2%	33,8%	7,9%
3-5 people	36,6%	29,1%	27,6%	6,7%
6 people and above	54,1%	27,0%	14,5%	4,4%
Profession				
Working	40,9%	28,3%	24,7%	6,1%
Student	23,8%	27,0%	39,7%	9,5%
Unemployed	50,6%	21,3%	22,5%	5,6%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	10,6%	42,3%	43,1%	4,1%
Secularist	31,8%	32,7%	27,8%	7,6%
Center	33,7%	29,8%	30,1%	6,4%
Islamist	58,3%	20,1%	15,2%	6,3%
Extreme Islamist	56,1%	18,4%	19,3%	6,1%
Age				
Up to 25 years	40,9%	21,7%	29,1%	8,3%
26-35 years	35,7%	27,3%	28,4%	8,6%
36-45 years	37,8%	30,1%	27,6%	4,5%
46-55 years	50,0%	35,1%	12,1%	2,9%

56 years and above	52,6%	23,7%	21,1%	2,6%
Income (Syrian pound)				
Less than 25 thousand	33,6%	29,3%	31,9%	5,2%
Between 25-75 thousand	44,4%	26,3%	22,2%	7,0%
More than 75 thousand	37,7%	27,5%	29,6%	5,3%
Province				
Idlib	58,9%	25,0%	8,5%	7,6%
The camps in Turkey	62,2%	24,3%	13,5%	0,0%
Homs	56,5%	23,5%	16,1%	3,9%
Aleppo	35,7%	26,2%	32,1%	6,0%
Al-Hasakah	16,2%	41,9%	37,4%	4,5%
Damascus Rural Province	26,2%	19,2%	38,4%	16,3%
Damascus	20,8%	31,2%	48,1%	0,0%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	43,6%	32,4%	19,1%	4,9%
Areas under the control of the opposition	47,9%	21,2%	23,4%	7,5%
Self-governance areas	15,5%	42,5%	37,9%	4,1%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	39,0%	16,7%	34,4%	9,9%
Non-Besieged	55,5%	24,9%	13,9%	5,8%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	46,5%	24,8%	21,7%	7,1%
Kurdish	14,4%	41,9%	40,0%	3,8%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	43,9%	25,2%	24,8%	6,1%
Shiites	71,0%	25,8%	0,0%	3,2%
Alawites (in figures)	7	11	5	6
Civil Status				
Single	35,1%	25,0%	29,0%	10,9%
Married	42,8%	28,2%	24,0%	5,0%
Widowed	55,6%	33,3%	11,1%	0,0%
Divorced (in figures)	2	5	6	0

The Sample of Women

Variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the murder is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion are summarized in Table (30) as follows:

Education: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder increases with progress in education.

Sustenance: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder drops among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people.

Profession: Almost half of the students support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the percentage of support declines to around one-third among working women and the unemployed and to a quarter among housewives.

Ideology: Secularists tend to support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while Islamists oppose it.

Province: There is a consensus in Al-Hasakah to deal with the crime like any other murder, along with the majority of those in Aleppo. This proportion drops to around 40% in Homs and Damascus, to around a quarter in Damascus Rural Province, and reaches its lowest levels in Idlib and the camps in Turkey.

Region: There is a consensus of support among women in Self-governance areas. The proportion dramatically drops to reach around one-third in areas under the control of the Regime and around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition.

Women in besieged areas (36.4%) support dealing with the crime like any other murder more than women in non-besieged opposition areas (19.5%).

Nationality-Ethnicity: The vast majority of Kurds show support compared to a quarter of Arabs.

Religion-Sect: Four out of ten Christian women support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter of Sunni women.

Civil Status: Around half of single women and more than a quarter of married women support dealing with the crime like any other murder.

Table 29. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion in the sample of women

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate	72,2%	5,6%	19,4%	2,8%
Primary	59,2%	13,2%	19,7%	7,9%
Intermediate	45,9%	16,9%	25,0%	12,2%
High School	32,4%	23,4%	34,7%	9,5%
University and above	26,0%	20,3%	40,9%	12,9%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	29,1%	18,8%	43,0%	9,0%
3-5 people	42,0%	18,1%	26,2%	13,7%
6 people and above	54,7%	20,1%	16,5%	8,6%
Profession				
Working	36,7%	17,9%	34,0%	11,4%
Student	19,5%	18,0%	49,6%	12,8%
Unemployed	32,4%	25,0%	35,2%	7,4%
Housewife	46,8%	18,0%	24,7%	10,5%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	2,0%	9,1%	83,8%	5,1%
Secularist	17,5%	20,0%	51,7%	10,8%
Center	27,0%	25,0%	37,2%	10,9%
Islamist	57,0%	17,1%	12,6%	13,2%
Extreme Islamist	65,2%	13,0%	14,1%	7,6%
Province				
The camps in Turkey	75,5%	12,2%	10,2%	2,0%
Idlib	38,5%	27,7%	13,4%	20,3%
Damascus Rural Province	13,2%	32,1%	28,3%	26,4%
Damascus	34,9%	20,9%	41,9%	2,3%
Homs	14,7%	20,6%	45,6%	19,1%
Aleppo	15,9%	12,5%	67,0%	4,5%
Al-Hasakah	2,8%	9,9%	83,0%	4,3%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	21,4%	26,2%	36,9%	15,5%
Areas under the control of the opposition	46,7%	19,4%	22,5%	11,5%

Self-governance areas	3,4%	11,5%	80,4%	4,7%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	15,2%	26,5%	36,4%	22,0%
Non-Besieged	53,5%	17,8%	19,5%	9,2%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	43,2%	20,2%	24,5%	12,1%
Kurdish	4,6%	11,9%	78,9%	4,6%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	43,3%	19,8%	26,3%	10,6%
Christians (in figures)	1	3	4	2
Civil Status				
Single	23,5%	18,9%	47,0%	10,6%
Married	43,3%	18,1%	28,8%	9,8%
Widowed	32,9%	22,4%	24,7%	20,0%
Divorced (in figures)	9	5	7	2

The Sample of Men

Variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the murder is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion are summarized in Table (31) as follows:

Education: The support to deal with the crime like any other murder increases with the progress in education.

Sustenance: The support among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (more than six) drops in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people.

Ideology: Secularists are more supportive than Islamists.

Province: The majority of respondents in Al-Hasakah support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the percentage drops to around one-third in Damascus and Aleppo, and to around a quarter in Damascus Rural Province. It reaches its lowest levels in Idlib and the refugee camps in Turkey.

Region: The majority of men (64.4%) in Self – governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The support declines to 24.4% in areas under the control of the regime and to 14.5% in areas under the control of the opposition.

Men in besieged areas (22.7%) support dealing with the crime like any other murder more than men in non-besieged opposition areas (7.6%).

Income: The support increases among those with a higher income in comparison to those with a lower income.

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurdish respondents support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while only 18% of Arabs say they support it.

Religion-Sect: 20.6% of Sunnis support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with 9.7% of Shiites.

Table 31. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion, in the sample of men

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate (in figures)	3	4	10	3
Primary	50,4%	23,6%	16,5%	9,4%
Intermediate	57,1%	18,6%	17,9%	6,4%
High School	6,4%	19,0%	26,7%	6,9%
University and above	41,2%	14,5%	35,2%	9,1%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	44,0%	15,8%	31,2%	9,0%
3-5 people	47,2%	16,6%	28,9%	7,3%
6 people and above	51,9%	22,6%	17,6%	7,9%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	7,3%	16,3%	68,3%	8,1%
Secularist	17,0%	34,5%	39,0%	9,4%
Center	47,1%	21,2%	25,6%	6,1%
Islamist	75,3%	7,8%	8,6%	8,3%
Extreme Islamist	69,3%	11,4%	11,4%	7,9%
Province				
The camps in Turkey	94,6%	4,1%	1,4%	0,0%
Idlib	76,3%	9,7%	2,5%	11,4%
Homs	49,4%	25,1%	18,8%	6,7%
Damascus Rural Province	44,2%	12,8%	24,4%	18,6%
Aleppo	34,5%	28,6%	31,0%	6,0%
Damascus	41,6%	19,5%	39,0%	0,0%
Al-Hasakah	9,9%	23,4%	63,5%	3,2%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	34,2%	33,8%	24,4%	7,6%
Areas under the control of the opposition	64,6%	11,4%	14,5%	9,5%
Self-governance areas	9,6%	22,8%	64,4%	3,2%

Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	55,3%	10,3%	22,7%	11,7%
Non-Besieged	72,8%	11,8%	7,6%	7,9%
Income (Syrian pound)				
Less than 25 thousand	53,7%	16,2%	21,0%	9,2%
Between 25-75 thousand	50,5%	17,6%	24,4%	7,5%
More than 75 thousand	39,3%	21,9%	32,8%	6,1%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	56,1%	17,2%	18,0%	8,7%
Kurdish	8,1%	24,4%	63,8%	3,8%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	57,6%	14,7%	20,6%	7,0%
Shiites	45,2%	41,9%	9,7%	3,2%
Alawites (in figures)	4	12	7	5

In the event of the Victim Choosing to Marry a Man from Another Sect

The Sample of Women

Table (32) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment if the motive for the murder is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect:

Education: Those with high school certificates and university graduates are the most supportive of dealing with such a crime like any other murder.

Sustenance: Those who are responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people (up to two) are the most supportive of dealing with such a crime like any other murder, while the least supportive are those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six and above).

Profession: Students are the most supportive (45.9%), followed by working women and the unemployed, while housewives are the least supportive (26.7%).

Ideology: The majority of Secularists support dealing with such a crime like any other murder, while the majority of Islamists oppose it.

Province: There is a consensus of support for dealing with the crime like any other murder among respondents in Al-Hasakah, along with the majority of respondents in Aleppo and 40% of respondents in Damascus and Homs. The support reaches its lowest level in Idlib and the camps in Turkey, where the percentage of support does not exceed 9% from the women refugees in these camps.

Region: There is a consensus among women in Self - governance areas to support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the percentage of support drops to one-third in areas under the control of the regime and to around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition.

Women in besieged areas are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than women in non-besieged opposition areas.

Nationality-Ethnicity: Only around a quarter of Arab respondents support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while there is a near-consensus among Kurds on dealing with the crime like any other murder.

Religion-Sect: Four out of ten Christian women support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter of Sunni women.

Civil Status: Single women are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder (44.7%) in comparison to those who are married or widowed (around 30%).

Table 32. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect, in the sample of women

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate	58,3%	13,9%	25,0%	2,8%
Primary	55,3%	18,4%	17,8%	8,6%
Intermediate	40,7%	19,8%	27,3%	12,2%
High School	25,2%	26,6%	39,2%	9,0%
University and above	21,1%	24,7%	41,1%	13,1%
No. of individuals who she has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	25,6%	21,7%	43,7%	9,0%
3-5 people	34,5%	22,5%	29,5%	13,5%
6 people and above	47,5%	27,3%	15,1%	10,1%
Profession				
Working	32,0%	20,8%	36,4%	10,9%
Student	16,5%	23,3%	45,9%	14,3%
Unemployed	27,8%	26,9%	38,0%	7,4%
Housewife	39,1%	23,4%	26,7%	10,8%
Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	3,0%	8,1%	84,8%	4,0%
Secularist	5,0%	27,5%	55,0%	12,5%
Center	20,1%	30,6%	38,8%	10,5%
Islamist	50,6%	21,1%	14,3%	14,0%
Extreme Islamist	68,5%	14,1%	12,0%	5,4%

Province				
The camps in Turkey	70,4%	18,4%	8,8%	2,4%
Idlib	26,0%	34,2%	19,9%	19,9%
Damascus Rural Province	11,3%	27,4%	33,0%	28,3%
Damascus	25,6%	30,2%	41,9%	2,3%
Homs	8,8%	29,4%	45,6%	16,2%
Aleppo	14,8%	15,9%	62,5%	6,8%
Al-Hasakah	2,8%	9,2%	84,4%	3,5%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	14,3%	35,7%	36,9%	13,1%
Areas under the control of the opposition	40,1%	24,0%	24,2%	11,8%
Self-governance areas	3,4%	10,1%	81,1%	5,4%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	12,9%	24,2%	40,2%	22,7%
Non-Besieged	45,9%	23,9%	20,8%	9,4%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	36,8%	24,9%	25,8%	12,4%
Kurdish	4,6%	12,8%	79,8%	2,8%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	37,2%	23,9%	27,9%	11,0%
Christians (in figures)	0	4	4	2
Civil Status				
Single	21,2%	23,5%	44,7%	10,6%
Married	36,4%	22,4%	31,0%	10,2%
Widowed	30,6%	23,5%	29,4%	16,5%
Divorced (in figures)	6	6	8	3

The Sample of Men

Table (33) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment if the motive for the murder is the victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect:

Education: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder increases with the progress in education.

Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people are the most supportive.

Profession: Students are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder.

Ideology: Secularists are more supportive than Islamists.

Age: The most supportive are those older than 56 years old (around one-third), while the proportion among younger age groups is around a quarter.

Province: The majority of respondents in Al-Hasakah support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The percentage substantially drops in other areas, to a third in Aleppo, Damascus and Damascus Rural Province, while it reaches its lowest in Idlib and the refugee camps in Turkey, where support does not exceed 5%.

Region: The majority of support comes from men in Self – governance areas (more than 60%), along with around a quarter in areas under the control of the regime and 16.6% in areas under the control of the opposition.

Men in besieged areas (25.2%) are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder in comparison to those in non-besieged opposition areas (8.9%).

Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurds (over 60%) support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while only 19.3% of Arabs are supportive.

Religion-Sect: 21.9% of Sunnis support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while only 3.2% of Shiites are supportive.

Civil Status: Single respondents are more supportive (around one-third) than those who are married (around one-quarter).

Table 33. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect, in the sample of men

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know/ no answer
Education				
Illiterate (in figures)	1	5	11	3
Primary	47,2%	25,2%	17,3%	10,2%
Intermediate	53,6%	17,9%	19,3%	9,3%
High School	45,5%	22,3%	27,0%	5,2%
University and above	35,5%	18,2%	36,7%	9,7%
No. of individuals who he has to sustain				
Up to 2 people	44,7%	14,3%	32,7%	8,3%
3-5 people	43,7%	18,5%	29,3%	8,6%
6 people and above	44,0%	28,6%	19,5%	7,9%
Profession				
Working	43,7%	21,0%	27,1%	8,2%
Student	27,0%	22,2%	41,3%	9,5%
Unemployed	59,6%	11,2%	20,2%	9,0%

Ideology				
Extreme Secularist	4,1%	14,6%	70,7%	10,6%
Secularist	12,6%	38,6%	38,1%	10,8%
Center	42,6%	23,7%	26,9%	6,7%
Islamist	71,6%	11,2%	8,6%	8,6%
Extreme Islamist	68,4%	9,6%	17,5%	4,4%
Age				
Up to 25 years	50,0%	13,0%	26,8%	10,2%
26-35 years	44,1%	18,6%	27,6%	9,7%
36-45 years	41,1%	24,0%	27,6%	7,3%
46-55 years	39,1%	29,3%	24,7%	6,9%
56 years and above	44,7%	21,1%	32,9%	1,3%
Province				
The camps in Turkey	87,8%	8,1%	4,1%	0,0%
Idlib	72,0%	13,1%	4,2%	10,6%
Homs	47,5%	29,4%	16,5%	6,7%
Aleppo	38,1%	27,4%	29,8%	4,8%
Damascus Rural Province	36,6%	12,2%	33,1%	18,0%
Damascus	35,1%	27,3%	37,7%	0,0%
Al-Hasakah	6,8%	23,0%	63,1%	7,2%
Region				
Areas under the control of the Regime	25,3%	42,7%	24,0%	8,0%
Areas under the control of the opposition	62,1%	12,6%	16,6%	8,7%
Self-governance areas	7,3%	21,5%	63,9%	7,3%
Included within areas under the control of the opposition				
Besieged	55,3%	8,9%	25,2%	10,6%
Non-Besieged	68,6%	15,2%	8,9%	7,3%
Nationality-Ethnicity				
Arab	51,7%	20,5%	19,3%	8,5%
Kurdish	7,5%	21,3%	63,8%	7,5%
Religion-Sect				
Sunnis	54,3%	16,8%	21,9%	7,0%
Shiites	32,3%	58,1%	3,2%	6,5%
Alawites (in figures)	2	12	8	6
Civil Status				

Single	41,3%	13,8%	33,3%	11,6%
Married	44,9%	22,3%	25,5%	7,3%
Widowed (in figures)	5	2	1	1
Divorced (in figures)	5	5	3	0

To summarize these results we have used Cluster Analysis, which was also used earlier in this study. The groups are as follows:


The first group rejects treating it like any other murder in all cases.

The second group would treat it as murder in some cases.

The third group would treat it like any other murder in all cases.

Figure 19 shows that most men (59.8%) reject treating it like any other murder, while the women are divided amongst themselves between complete rejection (around half) and those who would treat it like any other murder in some cases (about one quarter) and in all cases (also one quarter).

Figure 19. The way the law should respond to what is known as honor crimes (by gender)



Recommendations

The results of this study clearly indicate that there is a need to exert all efforts and employ all possibilities to make real changes in the perceptions of domestic violence against women in Syria, especially among men, as they seem less aware of its danger. It would be useful to use the results of this study in order to determine the demographic and social groups which need to be addressed when developing plans and programs to achieve each of the following recommendations, which we consider necessary to achieve progress in fighting this type of violence:

- First: Taking preventive actions that contribute to preventing violence against women. It is necessary to continue to raise awareness in all ways possible and organize new events.
- Second: Changing current Constitutional Articles related to honor crimes, which tolerate the killer, is necessary. However, this must be accompanied by tremendous efforts to fight the prevalent perceptions of honor crimes in a society which tends to tolerate the murderer, especially when the murderer's motive is the discovery of an illicit relationship.
- Third: Supporting women exposed to domestic violence by working on the formation of organizations at a local level, where women can go in the case of exposure to violence. A great proportion of women say that the absence of such an authority is one of the main reasons why women remain silent about violence occurring against them.
- Fourth: Giving great importance to the issue of minors involved in domestic violence, as the results show that a considerable proportion of these assaults take place in the presence of minors and in many cases they themselves are exposed to the assault.
- Fifth: Future authorities must ensure that women have access to all facilities that allow her to proceed with legal procedures against the aggressor, through the provision of legal support in all stages of the procedure from specialized lawyers.
- Sixth: Following up on the problem by continuing to collect quantitative data concerning the issues that this study was not able to address, especially among groups that have emerged as being more exposed to violence, or more likely to justify it. The comparison of results should take place on a regular basis to trace the development of the problem and to track the efficiency and effectiveness of the actions taken.
- Seventh: Searching for practical ways to increase the participation of women's associations in the decisions made at both national and local levels regarding fighting discrimination against women.

Questionnaire

1- To what extent, in your opinion, is spousal violence against women prevalent in your area?

- Widely prevalent
- Prevalent to some extent
- Not prevalent.
- Rarely occurs
- I do not know
- No answer

2- Have you ever been personally exposed to or witnessed cases of domestic violence?

- Yes, personally
- I witnessed such violence to one of my family members
- Yes, personally, and also witnessed such violence to one of my family members
- I have neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation ([go to question 5](#))
- I prefer not to answer ([go to question 5](#))

3- Who was the main aggressor in the most recent incident you were exposed to/witnessed?

- Partner
- Brothers
- Relatives
- A parent
- Friends
- Other
- I prefer not to answer

4- Did you report this incident to any authority?

- Yes
- No
- I prefer not to answer

5- What are the three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member? (Choose up to three options)

- For the children
- Fear of the consequences of the complaint
- The shame and desire not to let other people know
- The absence of income to support herself
- The absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them
- She considers it normal
- She believes her husband is right
- Islamic law allows it in some cases
- The high cost of litigation
- Other
- I do not know
- No answer

6- How should the law deal with a man who commits any of the following acts against his wife?

	The perpetrator must be punished	Case by case	The perpetrator must not be punished	I do not know / no answer
Physical abuse				
Verbal abuse				
Verbal threats				
Detention (inside the home)				

7- Which attitude do you have towards the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Islamic law allows the beating of wives in some cases					
The violence against wives in Syria is sparse in comparison to neighboring Arab countries					
Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated					
The existence of logical reasons for violence against women					

8- Do you know a woman who has been assaulted by one of the members of her family?

- Yes
- No (go to question 12)
- No answer (go to question 12)

9- Do you know whether the age of the victim is more or less than 18 years?

- More than 18 years
- Less than 18 years
- I do not know

- No answer

10- Do you know if there were any minors (younger than 18 years) with the victim? Sons, brothers or relatives?

- Yes
- No
- I do not know

11- Were they also exposed to violence in the incident?

- Yes
- No
- I do not know

12- In Syria, the sentence against the perpetrator of what is known as an honor crime is commuted i.e. a crime committed by a family member against a woman claiming that she has done something that defiles "family honor". How should new Syrian laws deal with this type of crime?

	Commutation of sentence	Case by case	Like any other murder	I do not know / no answer
The victim's choice to get married to a man from another religion				
The victim's choice to get married to a man from another sect				
The victim's choice to get married without the consent of her family				
The discovery of an illicit relationship				

13- Have you heard of any honor crime that took place in your area over the past year?

- Yes
- No

14- Sex

- Male
- Female

15- Age

(.....)

16- Current occupation

- Farmer
- Government employee
- Employee in a private company/organization
- Combatant
- Self-employed
- Student
- Mid-level manager
- High level manager
- Unemployed
- Housewife
- Other

17- Education

- Illiterate
- Primary
- Intermediate
- High school
- University
- Postgraduate

18- Nationality – Ethnicity

- Arab
- Kurdish
- Armenian
- Assyrian
- Turkmen
- Circassian
- I prefer not to answer
- Other

19- Monthly income (Syrian pound)

- Less than 25 thousand
- Between 25-75 thousand
- More than 75 thousand
- I prefer not to answer

20- No. of individuals who you have to sustain

(.....)

21- Religion – Sect

- Sunni
- Shiite
- Alawite
- Ismaili
- Druze
- Azidi
- Christian
- Murshidi
- I prefer not to answer

22- Current region

- Al-Hasakah province
- Deir Al-Zour province
- Raqqa province
- Aleppo province
- Idlib province
- Lattakia province
- Tartous province
- Homs province
- Damascus province
- Rural Damascus province
- As-Suwayda province
- Quneitra province
- Hama province
- Daraa province
- The camps in Turkey
- The camps in Lebanon
- The camps in Syria

23- When talking about politics and the shape of the next state in Syria, there are two main political trends: Secularists who want to separate religion from the state and groups of Islamists (political Islam) who want to establish a religious state. The following is a set of numbers from 0 to 10, where 0 signifies Extreme Secularist and 10 is Extreme Islamist. Where would you place yourself?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

