



# DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN SYRIAN SOCIETY (I/II)

AWARENESS OF WOMEN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS



Discrimination against Women in Syrian Society (I/II): Awareness of Women Rights and Freedoms

August 2017

All rights reserved to The Day After (TDA) ©

The Day After (TDA) is a Syrian organization, works on supporting democratic transition in Syria. The work scope of TDA is focused on: the rule of law, security sector reform, electoral systems design and elections of the constituent assembly, constitutional design, economic reform and social policies.

The Day After – Istanbul – Turkey

Address: Cihangir, Palaska Sk NO: 5 D:3/ 34250 Beyoğlu-İstanbul, Turkey

Tel: +90 (212) 252 3812

Email: [info@tda-sy.org](mailto:info@tda-sy.org)

[www.tda-sy.org](http://www.tda-sy.org)

## Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	1
<b>Introduction</b> .....	5
<b>Terminology and Procedural Definitions</b> .....	7
<b>Sample and Methodology</b> .....	8
<b>Chapter One: Inequality between women and men</b> .....	11
Perception of inequality .....	11
Inequality at work .....	15
Inequality in Education .....	19
Summary of Chapter One.....	23
<b>Chapter Two: Perceptions of disparity in capabilities and capacities between men and women</b> .....	25
Beliefs in the scarcity of women capable of holding important positions .....	25
Preconceptions about professions that women are not able to perform. ....	29
Summary of Chapter Two .....	30
<b>Chapter Three: Women Leadership</b> .....	32
Electing a woman for a leadership position .....	32
Factors affecting the election process.....	40
Summary of Chapter Three .....	41
<b>Chapter Four: Rights and Freedoms in Legislation</b> .....	42
Equality before the law .....	43
Restricting Age of Marriage.....	47
Supporting Women's Associations .....	51
Inheritance Distribution.....	53
Freedom of Dress .....	58
Summary of Chapter Four.....	62
<b>Conclusion and Recommendations</b> .....	64
<b>The Questionnaire</b> .....	67

## Executive Summary

In order to assess awareness of women rights and liberties in Syrian society, The Day After (TDA) conducted a comprehensive survey in six Syrian governorates in areas under opposition and regime control in addition to refugee camps in Turkey. The survey was based on multistage stratified sample based on proportional allocation (men/women). The number of respondents was 2091 including 1120 men and 971 women in different Syrian governorates. Data were collected using a questionnaire and one-to-one interviews conducted by trained TDA researchers. This report presents the data analysis findings.

The research set out to try to identify the extent of awareness among respondents of inequality between men and women in Syrian society. The results were quite similar between men and women (around 60% each). The results analysis did not show any association between awareness of inequality and age, income, marital status or profession. A relationship was found, however, with other variables such as region, ethnicity and ideology among both men and women and a weak association with education among men. Upon delving into details of certain aspects of this inequality (education and work), however, the study revealed that most men are satisfied with this inequality in the field of work as 75% said they object to women work or have conditions thereon, while women were equally divided. In the field of education, on the other hand, most men said women must complete their education to the level they want (69.8%); there is a near-consensus among women (87.5%). Afterwards, the study was able to identify social and demographic categories in which rejection of women's education or work or putting conditions thereon are more widespread.

In the second part, the study sought to follow the perceptions of the disparities between capacities and capabilities, where the nature of the prevalence of the belief in the scarcity of women capable of holding important positions was determined. It seems that the professions historically associated with women, such as education and care are the positions which women can effectively hold, in their opinion (our question was about the principal of a certain school). However, the answers begin to vary gradually with leading positions requiring important decisions, where the study found that the majority of men (63.7%) doubted the ability of women to occupy important administrative or political positions, while only 19.5% of them did not. While the percentage of support dropped to half among women, they maintained the greatest percentage (49.1%) compared to the (35.9%) who opposed it. The study also revealed that the majority of men and women skeptical of women's capabilities believe that women are unable to hold a leadership position like the head of a local council, and it appears they are grouped together as being incapable of managing a high position like the presidency of a country.

The third chapter tackled in details the subject of women leadership. Results showed that half the Syrian society (women) are ready to accept the challenge and support women leadership in such positions as the head of a local council. The other half (men), however, are still not ready to do so as their personal attitude matched their expectations of their communities' response to women running for such positions: 37.5% of men said a woman may

win the local council elections in their region, and 36.7% said they might vote for her. The percentage was different among women: 58.1% believe that a woman may win but when the question was about personal attitude, the percentage increased to 68.2%. In tackling factors affecting the election of a woman candidate for local council chairpersonship, it turned out that academic proficiency or administrative experience were the most important factors among both men and women followed by her political and ideological position, while her attire and external appearance ranked third, her sect ranked fourth while the fact that she is a woman was the last priority for voters.

The fourth chapter focussed on identifying respondents' attitudes about some procedures related to combating discrimination against women such as the equality of men and women before the law, stipulating a minimum age for marriage to combat marriage of minors, equal distribution of inheritance, supporting women associations, and women's freedom to choose the way she is dressed. Results showed very considerable support among respondents to the proposal of supporting women associations concerned with defending women's rights (71.6% of men vs. 95.7% of women in our sample). The results also showed that there is a near-consensus among women (83.4%) on the importance of ensuing equality of men and women before the law, while the largest proportion of men agreed to such guarantees. A considerable percentage (31.0%), however, of men objected to such guarantees. Further, there is a near-consensus among women to support measures to combat marriage of minors (79.2%) while only about half of the men agreed and 30.0% disagreed. As for equal distribution of inheritance and the protection of personal freedom (women's dress in this case) about half women disagreed while the majority of men (67%) disagreed.

The research concludes with a set of remarks and recommendations for organizations, donors, politicians, intellectuals, local and government authorities to build on the findings of this research. These findings may help them set plans and programs to combat discrimination against women and such findings are important to prioritise efforts, hence organize, guide and manage such efforts as these findings show the categories or locations in which views and perceptions rejecting women's rights and liberties are more spread and which need to be prioritised to make the measures and decisions more effective and efficient. Below is a summary of the findings reflecting the distribution of those views and perceptions:

### **Women's work**

- Rejection and setting conditions on women's work increases in the women's sample among housewives, less educated, older, lower income, Arabs, widows and married women and those in camps in Turkey, opposition held-areas and non-besieged areas.
- Rejection of women's work and setting conditions on it increase in the men's sample among less educated and Islamist men. Furthermore, those who are responsible for more dependents. Rejection and setting conditions increase also among men whose income is less than 75 thousand SYP compared to those who have higher income, among Arabs compared to Kurds, and in opposition-held areas, non-besieged areas, Idlib, Homs and Aleppo.

### **Women's Education**

- The percentage of rejection and restriction of women's education in the women's sample increases among less educated, widow, married, Islamist, lower income women in Damascus governorate, opposition-held areas, regime-held and besieged areas.
- Rejection and restriction of women's education in the men's sample increase among less educated, unemployed, Islamists, in Damascus governorate, opposition-held areas, regime-held and non-besieged areas, and among Arabs and single men.

### **Women's capacity to occupy important positions**

- The conviction that women who are able to hold important administrative or political positions are scarce reached its highest levels in the women's sample among Arab women, married, widowed, the uneducated, those responsible for caring for a large number of individuals, housewives, the unemployed, islamists, low-income earners, and those living in Damascus suburbs, camps in Turkey and opposition-held areas.
- The conviction that women who are able to hold important administrative or political positions are scarce reached its highest levels in the men's sample among Arabs, married, the uneducated, islamists, young men (less than 25 years old), low-income earners, those living in Damascus suburbs, camps in Turkey, Idlib, opposition-held areas and besieged areas.

### **Women leadership**

- Refusing the presence of a woman in a leader position such as head of a local council, increases in the women's sample among the less educated, with large number of dependents, housewives, extreme political Islamists, over 46 years of age, those with low and high income, widows, married, Arabs, those in Damascus Suburbs, Idlib, camps in Turkey, in opposition and besieged areas.
- Refusing the presence of a woman in a leader position such as head of a local council increases in the men's sample among Arabs, those with lower income, less educated, with many dependents, unemployed, Islamists, young men, over 56 years of age, in Damascus Suburbs, Idlib, Homs, opposition and besieged areas.

### **Factors affecting election of women candidates for local council leadership**

- Women give more weight for gender than men in elections, as about 69.0% of them said that the candidate's being a woman was an important or very important issue, as opposed to 53.0% of men. Interestingly, a high percentage of women said it was very important, which reached approximately one third while it was no more than 12.8% among men. Moreover, women are more interested in the candidate's religious sect and her dress and appearance than men.

### **Attitude towards equality before law**

- The percentage of those rejecting equality before the law between men and women in the women's sample increases among Arabs, married women, widows, the less educated, those with a large number of dependents, housewives, far political Islam, and in refugee camps, Idlib, Damascus Suburbs and opposition areas.
- Rejection of equality between men and women before the law in the men's sample increases among Arabs, the less educated, Islamists, those older than 56, young men, those having the lowest income, those in Damascus Suburbs, in opposition and besieged areas.

#### **Position of supporting women associations**

- The rate of disagreement to supporting women's associations in the women's sample increases among women over 56 (11.8%) and in Damascus Suburbs (5.7%). However, it is still a low percentage as suggested by these rates.
- The rate of rejection of equal inheritance distribution in the men's sample increases among Arabs, single men, young men, less educated, , unemployed, Islamists, those of low income and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs and opposition areas.

#### **Attitude towards dress code freedom**

- The rate of rejection of freedom of dress in the women's sample increases among Arabs, married, widows, less educated, those with more dependents, housewives, Islamists and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs, opposition and besieged areas.
- The rate of rejection of freedom of dress in the men's sample increases among Arabs, single men, less educated, unemployed, Islamists, young men, those of low income and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Aleppo, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs, opposition and besieged areas.

#### **Attitude towards minor marriage**

- Rejection of laws preventing minor marriage in the women's sample increases among Arabs, housewives, unemployed, Islamists, those over 46, those having the lowest income, those in Damascus governorate, in regime areas and in besieged areas.
- Rejection of laws preventing minor marriage increases in the men's sample among Arabs, single men, less educated, those with fewer dependents, Islamists, young men, those having the lowest income, in Damascus governorate, in regime areas and in besieged areas.

#### **Attitude towards equal inheritance distribution**

- The rate of rejection to equal inheritance distribution in the women's sample increases among Arabs, married, widows, less educated, with a larger number of dependents, housewives, Islamists, with low income, and in camps in Turkey, Aleppo, Damascus and its Suburbs, and in opposition-held and besieged areas.
- The rate of rejection of equal inheritance distribution in the men's sample increases among Arabs, single men, young men, less educated, , unemployed, Islamists, those of low income and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs and opposition areas.

## Introduction

It is not hard to find studies which have tackled Syrian women. Unlike sectarianism, federalism and decentralization which were subjects of previous TDA surveys, the issue of women in Syria has been a subject available for research as it does not directly conflict with the interests of the ruling authority. It has even been one of the main issues utilized by the political regime existing before 2011 so as to reinforce its power as a regime claiming to be secular and caring for minorities without provoking conservative men. So while it signed the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and declared support for all Syrian women associations advocating gender equality, it combated any serious attempts or practical endeavours which may lead to the amendment of the personal status law which persecuted women and constituted a basis for all discrimination practiced against them<sup>1</sup>, and supported proselytizing religious movements seeking to reinforce perceptions of women completely incompatible with these approaches.<sup>2</sup>

In general, most studies about women before the Syrian revolution (March 2011) used to use a rights-based approach struggling to modify legal legislations which discriminate between men and women. This focus was also present in later studies which were conducted after the revolution but it came with two main new concerns: the first is concerned with the violations which have been and still are being committed against women during the Syrian war<sup>3</sup>, and the second is trying to shed light on women's role in family care-giving during war, political participation and peace building<sup>4</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> When it signed the said international convention (2003), the regime had reservations on paragraphs in articles 2, 9, 15, 16 and 29; i.e. in all provisions that may impact the personal status law. This means that at the time the regime was presenting itself as a defender of women rights in international arenas, through signing this convention, it was putting reservations on the articles that instil discrimination against women, such as the right of women married to a foreigner to pass her nationality to her kids. In the same year (2003), the governmentally supported "Syrian Commission for Family Affairs" appeared and conducted several researches and studies. Another one called "Mawred Institution" which was directly supported by Asmaa al-Assad also appeared. In less than one year, the "Social Initiative Association" was licensed, but raising issues of the personal status law through conducting a survey (which was banned from publishing) on the importance of changing the laws unjust towards women rights, was sufficient to ban the institution and revoke its license.

<sup>2</sup> It had good relations with the Qubaisis, although this relation became public only in 2006. The Qubaisis is a women Islamic Dawa'a group, named after its founder Muneera al-Qubaisi. It was popular amongst middle class Damascene families in Syria. Estimations put it at over 75 thousand women inside Syria and abroad who belong to this group. It has become influential with prominent visibility in public schools in Damascus, as well as running around 40% of private schools in the city and oversees a number of charity projects in Damascus (Ismael, Salam, *The Qubaisi Sisterhood*, Bark Center for Research and Studies, 2015).

<sup>3</sup> See for instance *Detention of Women in Syria: A Weapon of War and Terror*, Euro-Med Network for Human Rights, 2015. *Violence against Women: Bleeding Wound in the Syrian Conflict*, Euro-Med Network for Human Rights, 2013. *I Want a Safe Place: Refugee Women from Syria Uprooted and Unprotected In Lebanon*, Amnesty International, 2016. Al-Jaseem, Muhammad and al-Salman, Jomana, *Girls But!*, Centre for Civil Society and Democracy, 2016.

<sup>4</sup> See *Peacebuilding defines our future now: A study of women's peace activism in Syria*, Badael Institution, 2015. *We Are Still Here: Women on the Front Line of Syria's Conflict*, Human Rights Watch, 2014. And a study conducted by Care International on the role of women in providing care to families during war or displacement. Buecher, B. and Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala, J., *Women, Work & War: Syrian Women and the Struggle to Survive Five Years of Conflict*, Care International, 21 March 2016.



Undoubtedly, these issues are urgent and necessary and they all require more research and studies, but what these studies fail to account for in general, be it before or after the revolution, is studying the awareness of women's rights and liberties in Syrian society and the widespread perceptions thereof. This is an indispensable step as knowledge of such awareness and the distribution of perceptions rejecting these rights and how they are spread in various regions and social groups in Syria is an essential step to make effective policies and intervention programs whether by the current Syrian local authorities, the future government or civil society organizations concerned with women issues. Furthermore, this study enables researchers to build on data from the field rather than approaches based on comparison with the status of women in the West, be it the orientalist approach which transforms the problems of Syrian women into Arab-Islamic cultural traits persecuting women or the approach based on denying the problem altogether claiming that women in the West are not in a better status than in our country. Hence, we argue that studying the awareness of women's rights and liberties among Syrians through field qualitative and quantitative studies in different Syrian regions may help to free our approach from these two ideological perspectives, thus contributing to better theoretical knowledge of our issues and the concerns and dilemmas of our societies.

In short, the main question which guides our research is how Syrians think about women's rights and liberties. To understand this, we will not only compare findings by gender (men/women) but we will study the responses of men and women separately. For example, are responses of working women different from unemployed ones? Are responses of Kurdish women different from Arabs? More educated vs less educated? Which women reject women's work or put conditions thereon; among other questions. We will, therefore, look at the data taking into consideration a number of demographic and social variables in addition to gender<sup>5</sup>.

This study is divided into four chapters:

Chapter One studies awareness of inequality in status between men and women.

Chapter Two presents perceptions of difference in abilities between men and women in occupying important positions.

Chapter Three is dedicated to identify attitudes towards women leaders, their election and factors affecting election of women.

Chapter Four studies the extent of acceptance/rejection of measures combating discrimination against women.

---

<sup>5</sup> Some classifications related to identity (in this case it is: gender, denomination or ethnicity) may be used to exclude a certain group. This employment can be found, for example, abundantly in the European rightist narrative of Muslim women. Equality (gender), which is used heavily in such narrative, is employed with the purpose of excluding those who are religiously or ethnically different, such as the migrants, including migrant women. This problem drove some researchers to talk about the need for intersectionality approach when studying issues related to identity, calling for avoiding establishing organizations based on belonging to a certain group, rather on a basis that is cross-groups which can have several categorizations (e.g. Women against sectarianism). See: Christensen, A. D. (2009). *Belonging and Unbelonging from an Intersectional Perspective*. Gender, Technology and Development, 13(1), 21-41.

## Terminology and Procedural Definitions

Our sample does not involve any areas under control of the Islamic State organization (Daesh) in Syria. The sample covers the following areas which we believe are important to identify:

- Self-government areas: areas controlled by what is known as democratic self government. This authority was proposed initially by the Democratic Union Party headed by Saleh Muslem and, in 2014, the ‘ democratic self-government ‘ was declared as an autonomous authority based on decentralization principles. After Kurdish units and what is know as Democratic Syrian Council received support from the international coalition and the Russian Federation, self-government expanded greatly now comprising three districts: Aljazeera (Hasakeh), Efrin and Kobani.
- Regime-held areas: areas controlled by the regime or any of its allied foreign forces.
- Opposition-held areas: all areas under the control of any of the Syrian opposition forces.
- Beseiged areas: in our sample, these are opposition-held areas under seige by regime or its allies.

## Sample and Methodology

TDA carried out a field survey between 17 September and 22 November aiming at assessing awareness of women’s rights and liberties in Syrian society. Trained field researchers conducted 2091 face-to-face interviews using the questionnaire including 1120 men and 1971 women in different Syrian governorates.

Despite all of the difficulties faced during the data collection through fieldwork phase in conditions such as those currently experienced in Syria (a raging war and a continuous displacement of the population) The Day After was able to draw from a multistage stratified sample using proportional allocation (men/women). As for the analysis of data, statistical analysis was conducted: to reject or accept the null hypothesis H0 (there is no association or statistical significance between two or more variables), Chi-square test was applied, based on levels of significance less than or equal to 0.05. We also applied one type of Multivariate Analysis; which is Cluster Analysis.

<b>Stages of Sample Drawing*</b>	
<u>Stage One:</u>	<u>Stage Two</u>
<b>Total population in Syria: 18 215 868</b>	<b>Total male population in Syria: 9 214 866</b>
<i>Level of confidence: %95</i>	<i>Level of confidence: %95</i>
<i>Margin of error: %2.2</i>	<i>Margin of error: %3</i>
<i>Maximum heterogeneity: p=q</i>	<i>Maximum heterogeneity: p=q</i>
<i>Required sample size: 1985</i>	<i>Required sample size: 1067</i>
	<b>Total number of women in Syria: 9 001 002</b>
	<i>Level of confidence: %95</i>
	<i>Margin of error: %3.2</i>
	<i>Maximum heterogeneity: p=q</i>
	<i>Required sample size: 938</i>
<u>Stage Three</u>	
<p><i>A random cluster sample was drawn based on areas and governorates, taking religious and ethnic composition into consideration as illustrated in <b>table (1) and the map</b>. The sample does not include any areas under the Islamic State Organization “Daesh” control. In addition, the difficulty of working in regime-held areas and the inherent risks therein affected the size and nature of the sample. It is worth mentioning that in this stage we are dealing with indicative samples which help us to better understand the topic of our research by comparing various demographic and social categories. However, we can neither generalize the results for these areas nor for religious or ethnic categories.</i></p>	

\* These are approximate figures in 2015 as no accurate statistics are available (see <http://countrymeters.info/en/Syria>)


**Table (1): Sample Distribution**

<b>Governorate</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Hasakeh</b> (Syrian Democratic Forces-held area)	222	141	363
<b>Aleppo</b> (Mashhad district in the city of Aleppo, Azaz)	84	88	172
<b>Idlib</b> (al-Zawiya mountains, Kafruma, Mara al-Nu'man)	236	231	467
<b>Homs</b> (al-Waer district in the city of Homs, al-Rastan, districts in regime-held areas)	255	68	323
<b>Damascus</b> (Districts in regime-held area)	77	43	120
<b>Damascus suburbs</b> (Yalda, Babila, Beit Sahem, Douma, al-Tal, and towns in regime held areas)	172	106	278
<b>Camps in Turkey</b> (Islahiya, Kalas)	74	294	368
<b>Total</b>	1120	971	2091
<b>Area</b>			
Regime-held areas	225	84	309
Opposition-held areas	676	739	1415
Democratic self-government areas	219	148	367
<b>Total</b>	1120	971	2091
<b>Opposition-held areas</b>			
Besieged	282	132	414
Non-besieged	394	607	1001
<b>Total</b>	676	739	1415
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arab	921	828	1749
Kurd	160	109	269
Turkmen	4	8	12
Prefers not to answer	31	25	56
other	4	1	5
<b>Total</b>	1120	971	2091
<b>Religion-denomination*</b>			
Sunni	868	833	1701
Alawite	28	3	31
Shiite	31	2	33
Christian	5	10	15
Prefers not to answer	180	118	298
Other	8	5	13
<b>Total</b>	1120	971	2091

\*We withhold mention of details in areas controlled by democratic self-government or the regime in order to protect our field researchers.

\*\* Lower numbers or complete absence of some sects does not mean they were not present. A large percentage of them were most likely present but preferred not to answer the question. Our previous study (The Sectarian Question in Syria, TDA, February 2016) showed that the largest proportion of those refusing to answer the question about sectarian affiliation came from areas where a considerable presence of a certain minority exists (Suweida) or areas which are mixed religiously (Hasakeh and Homs). Nonetheless, we maintained the lower numbers because they are useful for comparison and in cases where the sample was less than 30, we mentioned the number rather than the percentage so as not to produce any misunderstanding from these smaller samples.

Map illustrating the distribution of the sample within Syrian territories and refugee camps in Turkey




## Chapter One: Inequality between women and men

### Perception of inequality

Most respondents are aware of the reality of inequality of status between men and women in Syrian society. Rates were almost identical between men and women, as 60% of them said that there were significant or very significant differences (figure1). We will try to identify the demographic and social background of those who do not see significant differences or those who do not see any differences at all, whose percentage was about 40% among both men and women.

**Figure1: How do you see the differences between the status of women and men in Syria now?**



### Women's sample

Analysis of findings shows that there is no association between awareness of inequality on one hand and age, level of education, income, marital status or profession on the other hand. The variables related to awareness of inequality were as follows (Table 2):

**Ethnicity:** there is a great difference between the answers of Arab and Kurdish women. Although most Arab women are aware of the existence of inequality, the percentage of those who said that there were no differences or that the differences were insignificant was 41.7%, while it was just 18.3 among Kurdish women.

**Ideology:** the percentage of those who deny the existence of differences or who consider it insignificant increases among Islamist women (almost half of them) compared to secular women (almost a quarter of them).

**Governorate, region:** the percentage of women who deny the existence of differences or consider them insignificant was at its lowest level in Hasakeh, while it increased to reach as

much as a quarter of the respondents in Homs, about one third in Idlib and Damascus, and 43.4% in Suburb Damascus, about half in Turkey camps and reached its peak in Aleppo (59.1%).

There is a near-consensus among women in the democratic self-government areas that there are significant differences between the status of men and women in Syria. The percentage of women who think otherwise was no more than 16.9%, while it increased to 32.1% among women in regime-held areas and to 43.7% among women in opposition-held areas. In the latter areas, the percentage decreased among women in besieged areas compared to other opposition-held areas.

**Table2: Awareness among women of inequality (between men and women) according to some demographic and social variables.**

	Significant differences	Insignificant differences	I don't know\ no answer	The number
<b>Ethnicity</b>				
Turkmen (by number)	5	3	0	8
Kurds	80,7%	18,3%	0,9%	109
Arabs	56,3%	41,7%	2,1%	828
<b>Ideology *</b>				
Far end of secularism	78,8%	20,2%	1,0%	99
Seculars	72,5%	26,7%	0,8%	120
Moderate	62,5%	35,2%	2,3%	304
Islamists	49,7%	48,0%	2,2%	356
Far end of political Islam	50,0%	48,9%	1,1%	92
<b>Region</b>				
Democratic self-government areas	82,4%	16,9%	0,7%	148
Regime-held areas	65,5%	32,1%	2,4%	84
Opposition-held areas	54,3%	43,7%	2,0%	739
<b>Within opposition areas</b>				
Besieged areas	59,1%	37,1%	3,8%	132
Non-besieged areas	53,3%	45,2%	1,5%	606
<b>Governorate</b>				
Hasakeh	83,0%	16,3%	0,7%	141
Homs	72,1%	25,0%	2,9%	68
Idlib	68,4%	31,2%	0,4%	231

Damascus	65,1%	32,6%	2,3%	43
Damascus Suburbs	52,8%	43,4%	3,8%	106
Camps in Turkey	45,9%	51,4%	2,7%	294
Aleppo	39,8%	59,1%	1,1%	88

\* We relied on the respondent's self-placement on a scale from 0-10 where zero is the secular extreme and 10 is the extreme of political Islam. We asked the respondents to determine the position closest to their perspective on this issue. We then recoded the data in the following way: 0 is extreme secularism; 1, 2, and 3 are secular; 4, 5, and 6, are moderate; 7, 8, and 9 are Islamist; and 10 is extreme political Islam.

## Men's sample

As with women, the analysis of findings does not show any association between awareness of inequality on one hand and age, income, marital status and profession on the other hand. But the only thing that was different from the case with women appears in education. The percentage of men who said that the differences are insignificant or nonexistent decreased from 46.5% among those who have primary school certificate to about one third of respondents who have post-primary education. But after studying the nature of this association it turned out to be weak. And with regard to other variables the findings were as follows (table 3):

Ethnicity: most Arab men (64.2%) said that there were significant differences between women and men status, while the percentage decreased to 45.6% among Kurds.

Ideology: Rates of awareness of gender inequality is almost the same among seculars and Islamist men in Syrian society, as the majority (more than 60%) said that the differences are significant. The only difference occurs when looking at those who are at the far end of secularism, as their answers were quite different from others; only about one third of them said that the differences were significant.

Governorate, region: In general, if we look at the findings per governorate, we find that men are divided between those who said that there were significant differences between men and women status and those who said the differences were insignificant or nonexistent. We find the greatest difference in Idlib and Homs as the vast majority of men said that there were significant differences.

This split in men's answers can be found in democratic self-government areas if we look at the findings according to the areas controlled by armed forces. The majority of men in the regime-held and opposition-held areas (more than 60%) said that there were significant differences between men and women status in Syria.

Undoubtedly, the awareness of inequality does not mean rejecting or accepting it. To identify attitude towards it, we asked questions related to discrimination against women in specific fields which are education and work. And this will be the subject of the following section.



**Table3 : Awareness of inequality (between men and women) among men according to some demographic and social variables.**

	significant differences	Insignificant differences	I don't know\ no answer	the number
<b>Education level</b>				
Illiterate (in number)	10	10	0	20
Primary education	48,0%	46,5%	5,5%	127
Preparatory education	65,7%	33,6%	0,7%	280
Secondary education	61,4%	36,9%	1,7%	363
University degree or higher	60,6%	38,5%	0,9%	330
<b>Ethnicity</b>				
Arab	64,2%	34,1%	1,7%	921
Kurd	45,6%	53,1%	1,3%	160
<b>Region</b>				
Self-government areas	45,2%	53,9%	0,9%	219
Regime-held areas	65,3%	34,2%	0,4%	225
Opposition-held areas	63,9%	33,9%	2,2%	676
<b>Governorate</b>				
Idlib	80,1%	19,1%	0,8%	236
Homs	73,7%	25,9%	0,4%	255
Damascus	53,2%	46,8%	0,0%	77
Damascus Suburbs	47,7%	48,8%	3,5%	172
Aleppo	47,6%	45,2%	7,1%	84
Camps in Turkey	47,3%	51,4%	1,4%	74
Hasakeh	46,4%	52,7%	0,9%	222
<b>Ideology</b>				
Far end of secularism	35,0%	64,2%	0,8%	123
secular	62,8%	35,9%	1,3%	223
moderate	63,8%	34,6%	1,6%	312
Islamist	63,2%	34,8%	2,0%	348
Far end of political Islam	<b>66,7%</b>	<b>31,6%</b>	<b>1,8%</b>	<b>114</b>


## Inequality at work

### Men and women

3.4% of women in our sample opposed women work and about half of them said that women “have the right to decide when, how and where to work”, while the percentage of men who gave the same last answer decreased to reach only a quarter of them (figure2).

Here, the attitudes of both men and women towards inequality become clearer. We noticed in the previous section that the percentage of those who said that there were significant differences between men and women status were quite similar (about 60%), but we can see here that the vast majority of men set conditions on women’s work or reject it (about three quarters of them), while women are divided. We can say that most men are aware of the inequality and the vast majority of them do not oppose it in the field of work.

**Figure2: What do you think about women’s work?**



### Women’s sample

The analysis of the findings of the women’s sample shows association between attitude towards women’s work and the following variables (table 4):

**Profession:** the majority of housewives reject women’s work or set conditions thereon (63.2%), and this percentage drops to half unemployed women and to one third among students and working women.

**Education level:** the percentage of women who reject women’s work or set conditions thereon decreases from 70% among women who have primary education to one third of women who hold university degree or above.

**Ideology:** the percentage of women who reject women’s work or set conditions thereon increases among Islamists compared with seculars, as the percentage increased from 24.4% at the far end of secularism to 68.5% at the far end of political Islam.

**Age:** the rate of rejection or setting conditions on women’s work increases with age, although the differences are not significant among women in age categories under 45.

Monthly income: rejection and setting conditions increase among women who have low income (52.1%) compared to those who have middle or high income (about 40%).

Ethnicity: The proportion of women who reject or set conditions on women’s work was half Arab respondents, while it declined to one third among Kurds.

Religion-sect: About half of Sunni women set conditions on women’s work or reject it, while there was a near-consensus among Christian women that women have the right to decide freely whether to work or not. But it should be noted that the latter sample was too small.

Marital status: Single women were the most supporting group of women’s independence regarding their work. As the percentage of women who reject women’s work or set conditions thereon increases from one third of single women to nearly half of married, divorced or widow women.

Governorate: The proportion of rejection or setting conditions on women’s work varies depending on the governorate, as it was one third of respondents in Hasakeh and Homs and half of respondents in Damascus Suburbs, Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and camps in Turkey. About one third of women in democratic self-government areas and regime areas reject women’s work or restrict it, and this percentage reaches half women in opposition-held areas. In the latter areas, the percentage increases among women living in non-besieged areas compared to those living in besieged areas, although the percentage of those who said that the woman is the one who makes the decision was almost the same.

**Table4: Attitude towards women’s work in the women’s sample**

	Reject women’s work or set conditions thereon	Believe that it is up to women	No clear attitude	The number
<b>Profession</b>				
Student	33,8%	63,9%	2,3%	133
Working	35,5%	63,6%	0,9%	341
Unemployed	49,1%	47,2%	3,7%	108
Housewife	63,2%	36,0%	0,8%	389
<b>Education level</b>				
Illiterate (in number)	80,6%	19,4%	0,0%	36
Primary education	72,4%	27,0%	0,7%	152
Preparatory education	61,6%	37,8%	0,6%	172
Secondary education	47,3%	50,0%	2,7%	222
University degree or higher	35,8%	62,4%	1,8%	595
<b>Ideology</b>				
Far end of secularism	24,2%	75,8%	0,0%	99
Secular	34,2%	65,0%	0,8%	120
moderate center	47,4%	49,3%	3,3%	304
Islamist	54,2%	45,5%	0,3%	356
Far end of political Islam	68,5%	30,4%	1,1%	92
<b>Age</b>				
Up to 25 years old	43,9%	54,1%	2,0%	303
26-35 years old	45,9%	53,2%	0,9%	344
36-45 years old	47,4%	51,3%	1,3%	232

46-55 years old	70,7%	28,0%	1,3%	75
56 years old and older (in number)	11	6	0	17
<b>Monthly income (in SYP)</b>				
Less than 25 thousand	52,1%	45,4%	2,5%	280
25-75 thousand	41,2%	58,4%	0,4%	255
More than 75 thousand	40,6%	59,4%	0,0%	96
<b>Ethnicity</b>				
Kurds	31,2%	67,0%	1,8%	109
Arabs	51,0%	47,7%	1,3%	828
Turkmens(in number)	5	3	0	8
<b>Religion\sect</b>				
Sunnis	51,6%	46,9%	1,4%	833
Christians (in number)	2	8	0	10
<b>Marital status</b>				
Single	34,1%	64,1%	1,8%	217
Married	52,2%	47,4%	0,5%	646
Widow	52,9%	43,5%	3,5%	85
Divorced (in number)	9	11	3	23
<b>Region</b>				
Democratic self-government areas	31,1%	68,2%	0,7%	148
Regime-held areas	36,9%	63,1%	0,0%	84
Opposition-held areas	52,5%	45,9%	1,6%	739
<b>Within opposition areas</b>				
Besieged areas	46,2%	45,5%	8,3%	132
Non-besieged areas	53,8%	46,0%	0,2%	606
<b>Governorate</b>				
Homs	30,9%	69,1%	0,0%	68
Hasakeh	31,9%	67,4%	0,7%	141
Damascus Suburbs	47,2%	43,4%	9,4%	106
Aleppo	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	88
Idlib	50,6%	48,9%	0,4%	231
Damascus	51,2%	46,5%	2,3%	43
Camps in Turkey	56,5%	43,5%	0,0%	294

## Men's sample

The analysis of findings of the men's sample shows association between attitude towards women's work and the following variables (table 5):

**Educational level:** The percentage of men who said that it was up to women to decide increases with the increase of educational level. Most men who have primary or preparatory education rejected women's work or set conditions thereon, while this percentage declined among university graduates. Nonetheless, most men holding university degrees in our sample (57.3%) reject women's work or set conditions on it.

**Ideology:** All Islamists reject women's work or put restrictions on it, and most seculars also agree with them. More than one third of seculars said that it was up to women to decide, while this percentage was about 10% among Islamists.

**Age:** it is noticed that young people in our sample (younger than 25 years) were least inclined to consider that it was up to women to decide regarding their work, as only 18.5% of them said that she is the one who makes the decision while this percentage increases to about a quarter of men in other age groups.

**Income:** Men who are richer were more likely to consider that it is up to women to decide regarding their work. This percentage was 16.2% among low-income men and increased to 19.8% among middle-income men and reached its peak among high-income men (40.1%).

**Ethnicity:** Kurdish men were more likely than Arab men to consider that it was up to women to decide regarding their work. However, the vast majority of Arab men (76.2%) and most Kurdish men (63.1%) reject women’s work or set conditions thereon.

**Religion-sect:** The overwhelming majority of men (Sunnis and Shiites) reject women’s work or set condition thereon, while the largest proportion of Alawite men said that it was up to women to decide regarding their work.

**Governorate, region:** Men in opposition-held areas were least inclined to believe that it was up to women to decide regarding their work compared to men in regime areas or self-government areas, as this percentage increased from 17.0% to 28.0%, 36.5% respectively. The percentage of rejection or setting condition on women’s work declines among men in opposition besieged areas (72.0%) compared to non-besieged areas (81.4%).

There is a near-consensus among men in Idlib on rejecting or restricting women’s work (87.7%), and it is the same among the overwhelming majority in Homs and Aleppo (three quarters of respondents there). This percentage decreased to about two thirds of respondents in the following areas: Hasakeh, camps in Turkey, Damascus and its countryside.

**Provision:** Persons who are responsible for providing for a larger number of individuals are more likely to reject or set conditions on women’s work. As the percentage increased from 65.8% among men who are responsible for providing for two individuals to 81.4% among men who are responsible for providing for six individuals or more.

**Table5: Attitude towards women’s work in the men’s sample**

	Reject women’s work or set conditions thereon	Believe it is to women to decide	No clear attitude	The number
<b>Education level</b>				
Illiterate (in number)	15	5	0	20
Primary education	84,3%	10,2%	5,5%	127
Preparatory education	86,1%	11,4%	2,5%	280
Secondary education	74,9%	21,2%	3,9%	363
University degree or higher	57,3%	39,7%	3,0%	330
<b>Ideology</b>				
Far end of secularism	63,4%	35,8%	0,8%	123
Seculars	58,7%	40,8%	0,4%	223
Moderate center	71,8%	23,7%	4,5%	312
Islamists	85,9%	10,9%	3,2%	348
Far end of political Islam	80,7%	9,6%	9,6%	114
<b>Age</b>				
Up to 25 years old	75,2%	18,5%	6,3%	254
26-35 years old	69,7%	26,2%	4,1%	370
36-45 years old	74,0%	24,0%	2,0%	246
46-55 years old	77,0%	21,8%	1,1%	174
56 years old and older	77,6%	22,4%	0,0%	76

<b>Monthly income (in SYP)</b>				
Less than 25 thousand	76,0%	16,2%	7,9%	229
25-75 thousand	76,8%	19,8%	3,4%	414
More than 75 thousand	58,7%	40,1%	1,2%	247
<b>Ethnicity</b>				
Kurds	76,2%	19,8%	4,0%	921
Arabs	63,1%	36,3%	0,6%	160
<b>Religion\ sect</b>				
Sunnis	76,6%	19,0%	4,4%	868
Shiites	87,1%	12,9%	0,0%	31
Alawites (in number)	12	16	0	28
<b>Region</b>				
Regime-held areas	72,0%	28,0%	0,0%	225
Opposition-held areas	77,4%	17,0%	5,6%	676
Democratic self-government areas	63,5%	36,5%	0,0%	219
<b>Within opposition areas</b>				
Besieged areas	72,0%	17,7%	10,3%	282
Non-besieged areas	81,4%	16,2%	2,4%	382
<b>Governorate</b>				
Hasakeh	63,5%	36,5%	0,0%	222
Camps in Turkey	66,2%	33,8%	0,0%	74
Damascus Suburbs	66,9%	16,3%	16,9%	172
Damascus	68,8%	31,2%	0,0%	77
Aleppo	75,0%	22,6%	2,4%	84
Homs	76,9%	23,1%	0,0%	255
Idlib	87,7%	9,3%	3,0%	236
<b>Number of dependents</b>				
Up to two dependents	65,8%	28,9%	5,3%	266
3-5 dependents	72,8%	23,5%	3,7%	536
6 dependents or more	81,4%	17,3%	1,3%	318

It seems that discrimination against women at work appears mainly in the area of promotion to higher administrative ranks, as most women and men confirmed (more than 60% of them), followed by the chance of getting a job according to (40%) of men and women.

**Table6: Discrimination against women in work**


	Better than men		The same situation		Worse than men		I don't know\ no answer	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
The chance to get a job	18,9%	23,0%	37,3%	34,5%	42,8%	40,3%	1,1%	2,2%
Income	7,1%	8,8%	52,6%	45,2%	35,6%	42,3%	4,7%	3,7%
The chance to reach high administrative ranks	7,0%	10,3%	25,2%	19,3%	61,8%	63,6%	6,0%	6,7%
The chance of getting a job matching her university degree	15,2%	17,6%	50,2%	33,5%	30,3%	41,1%	4,3%	7,9%

## Inequality in Education


As it is shown in figure (3) there is almost unanimous agreement among women that it is up to women to decide regarding their education, so women have the right to complete their education to the level they want, according to 87.5% of women respondents. This percentage

declined to 69.8% among men. A quarter of both men and women said that the chance for women to obtain a university degree is worse than men in Syria (figure 4).

**Figure 3: Attitude towards women’s education**



**Figure 4: the chance for a woman to obtain a university degree**



### Women’s sample

The variables that correlated with the attitude toward women’s education among women are (as summarized in table 7):

**Education:** the higher the education level the lower the percentage of women education rejection or restriction.

**Profession:** Rejection and restriction of women’s education is notably higher among housewives compared to working, unemployed or student women.

**Ideology:** Rejection and setting conditions increase among Islamist women compared to seculars.

**Income:** Rejection or setting conditions significantly declines with the increase of the income.

**Governorate, region:** Damascus ranked first in rejecting and restricting women’s education (more than a quarter of women there), followed by Damascus Suburbs, Idlib and camps in Turkey, while the percentage decreases to less than 5% in Homs and Hasakeh.

This percentage is quite similar among women in regime and opposition areas (about 13%) while it decreases to 3.4% among women in self-government areas.

Besieged women reject or restrict women's education more than women in opposition non-besieged areas (the percentage is 15.2% among besieged women and 12.7% among non-besieged women).

Marital status: Widows are the group that rejects and restricts women's education most as the percentage reached 21.2% among them, while it declined to 12.4% among married women and 6.0% among single women.

**Table 7: Attitude towards women's education in women's sample**

	Reject or restrict women's education	The decision is women's	No clear attitude
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	19,4%	80,6%	0,0%
Primary education	19,1%	79,6%	1,3%
Preparatory education	16,3%	83,1%	0,6%
Secondary education	13,1%	85,1%	1,8%
University degree or higher	5,4%	94,6%	0,0%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	8,5%	91,5%	0,0%
Student	7,5%	90,2%	2,3%
Unemployed	8,3%	89,8%	1,9%
Housewife	17,0%	82,5%	0,5%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of Secularism	3,0%	96,0%	1,0%
Seculars	5,0%	94,2%	0,8%
Moderate center	12,2%	86,2%	1,6%
Islamists	14,6%	85,4%	0,0%
Far end of political Islam	17,4%	82,6%	0,0%
<b>Monthly income (in SYP)</b>			
Less than 25 thousand	16,8%	82,5%	0,7%
25-75 thousand	10,6%	88,2%	1,2%
More than 75 thousand	5,2%	94,8%	0,0%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Damascus	27,9%	72,1%	0,0%
Damascus Suburbs	17,0%	78,3%	4,7%
Idlib	15,6%	84,4%	0,0%
Camps in Turkey	12,6%	87,4%	0,0%
Aleppo	4,5%	95,5%	0,0%
Homs	2,9%	95,6%	1,5%
Hasakeh	3,5%	95,7%	0,7%
<b>Region</b>			
Regime-held areas	14,3%	84,5%	1,2%
Opposition-held areas	13,1%	86,2%	0,7%
Self-government areas	3,4%	95,9%	0,7%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged areas	15,2%	81,1%	3,8%
Non-besieged areas	12,7%	87,3%	0,0%
<b>Marital status</b>			
Single	6,0%	94,0%	0,0%
Married	12,4%	86,8%	0,8%
Widows	21,2%	76,5%	2,4%
Divorced (in number)	3	20	0



## Men's sample

Each of the following variables associate with the attitude of men toward women's education (table 8):

Education: The higher the education level, the lower the percentage of rejection or restriction. Rates varied significantly from divided attitudes among those who have primary education only to a kind of unanimous agreement among university degree holders (87.9%).

Profession: Unemployed men are the group that rejects and restricts women's education most, as the percentage reaches to more than one third of them, while it declined to a quarter of working men, while it was 12.7% among students.

Ideology: The percentage of those who reject or restrict women's education increases among Islamists compared to seculars.

Governorate, region: Most men in the capital city of Damascus reject or restrict women's education (64.9%), and the percentage declines to one third of men in Idlib, to one quarter of them in Aleppo and Damascus Suburbs and to 19% in Hasakeh, refugee camps in Turkey and Homs.

Men in regime-held areas are the group that rejects and restricts women's education most (32.6%) compared to men in opposition-held areas (26.6%) and in self-government areas (20.5%).

Men in non-besieged areas reject or restrict women's education more than men in besieged areas, as the percentage declines from 29.3% to 23.8%.

Sect, ethnicity: The percentage of those who reject or restrict women's education increase among Arab men (29.3%) compared to Kurds (15.0%).

More than a quarter of Shiites refuse to present a clear position regarding this subject while 30.0% of Sunnis said that they reject or restrict women's education.

Marital status: Single men reject or restrict women's education (30.4%) more than married men (24.7%).

**Table8: Attitude towards women's education in men's sample**

	Reject or set conditions	The decision is women's	No clear attitude
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	7	12	1
Primary education	46,5%	47,2%	6,3%
Preparatory education	41,4%	55,0%	3,6%
Secondary education	21,8%	73,3%	5,0%
University degree or higher	10,9%	87,9%	1,2%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	26,7%	69,2%	4,1%
Student	12,7%	85,7%	1,6%
Unemployed	34,8%	65,2%	0,0%

<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of Secularism	16,3%	79,7%	4,1%
Seculars	9,4%	88,3%	2,2%
Moderate center	20,8%	75,3%	3,8%
Islamists	44,8%	53,2%	2,0%
Far end of political Islam	30,7%	58,8%	10,5%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Homs	17,6%	76,5%	5,9%
Camps in Turkey	18,9%	81,1%	0,0%
Hasakeh	20,7%	77,0%	2,3%
Aleppo	23,8%	75,0%	1,2%
Damascus Suburbs	24,4%	73,8%	1,7%
Idlib	33,9%	58,9%	7,2%
Damascus	64,9%	35,1%	0,0%
<b>Region</b>			
Regime-held areas	32,0%	61,8%	6,2%
Opposition-held areas	26,6%	70,1%	3,3%
Self-government areas	20,5%	77,2%	2,3%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged areas	23,8%	74,8%	1,4%
Non-besieged areas	29,3%	66,0%	4,7%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	29,2%	66,8%	4,0%
Kurds	15,0%	82,5%	2,5%
<b>Religion\ Sect</b>			
Sunnis	30,0%	67,1%	3,0%
Shiites	22,6%	51,6%	25,8%
Alawites (in number)	3	25	0
<b>Marital status</b>			
Single	30,4%	65,9%	3,6%
Married	24,7%	71,8%	3,5%
Widower (in number)	1	6	2
Divorced (in number)	9	4	0

## Summary of Chapter One

- About 60% of men and the same percentage of women said that there are significant differences in status between men and women in Syria.
- Women who are more aware of gender inequality are: Kurd and secular women who live in Hasakeh, Homs and self-government areas.
- Men who are more aware of this inequality are Arabs and those who live in Idlib and Homs, but it seems that men's attitude towards inequality varies from women's attitude, as three-quarter of men reject or set conditions on women's work. While women themselves are divided.
- Rejection and setting conditions on women's work increases in the women's sample among housewives, less educated, older, lower income, Arabs, widows and married women and those in camps in Turkey, opposition held-areas and non-besieged areas.
- Rejection of women's work and setting conditions on it increase in the men's sample among less educated and Islamist men. Furthermore, those who are responsible for more dependents. Rejection and setting conditions increase also among men whose income is less than 75 thousand SYP compared to those who have higher income,

among Arabs compared to Kurds, and in opposition-held areas, non-besieged areas, Idlib, Homs and Aleppo.

- Women agree unanimously that women should pursue the education level they want (87.5%) and the overwhelming majority of men adopt the same position (69.8%).
- The percentage of rejection and restriction of women's education in the women's sample increases among less educated, widow, married, Islamist, lower income women in Damascus governorate, opposition-held areas, regime-held and besieged areas.
- Rejection and restriction of women's education in the men's sample increase among less educated, unemployed, Islamists, in Damascus governorate, opposition-held areas, regime-held and non-besieged areas, and among Arabs and single men.
- It seems that discrimination against women at work appears basically in the area of "promotion to higher administrative ranks", as most women and men confirmed (more than 60% of them), then "The chance of getting a job" according to (40%) of them.

## Chapter Two: Perceptions of disparity in capabilities and capacities between men and women


### Beliefs in the scarcity of women capable of holding important positions

Here, we will try to identify the perceptions of the differences in capabilities and capacities. For this purpose, we put forward the following statement: “Women who are able to work competently in important administrative or political positions are scarce.”


More than half of the respondents supported this (56.4%) and 27.8% opposed it (Figure 5). However, looking at the results based on gender, significant differences appear: The statement was supported by 63.7% and opposed by 19.5% of men. 49.1% of women supported and 35.9% opposed (Figure 6). As such, the majority of men and around half of the women believe that women capable of holding important administrative or political positions are scarce.

Afterwards we tried to identify the positions which a woman is capable/incapable of holding in the opinions of those who doubt the abilities of women. This is shown in detail in the following paragraph.

**Figure 5. The statement “Women who are able to work competently in important administrative or political positions are scarce.”**



**Figure 6. The statement “Women who are able to work competently in important administrative or political positions are scarce,” according to gender.**



## Women's sample

With respect to the statement “Women capable of holding important administrative or political positions are scarce”, the analysis of the women's sample shows the existence of a relationship between the support/rejection of this statement with each of the following variables (Table 9):

Education: The percentage of those supporting this statement drops with progress in education, falling from 74.3% among illiterates to 39.6%. Unlike women with non-university education, the greatest percentage of the university-educated rejected this statement (47.2%).

Dependency: The percentage of opposition to this statement increases when the number of individuals for whom they bear the responsibility of caring decreases: It increased from roughly a quarter (25.6%) in the case of six persons to 42.4% in the case of responsibility for the care of no more than two.

Occupation: Working women were themselves divided in terms of support and opposition to this statement, students tended to reject it (47.3%), while around half of the those unemployed supported it (47.6%), as well as the majority of housewives (59.4%).

Ideology: Secularists rejected this statement more than islamists; around half as opposed to a quarter.

Income: Women earning the most rejected this statement the most.

Governate: Less than a quarter of women in Damascus Suburbs and camps in Turkey opposed this statement, while most of the women in Homs and about half of them in Hasakeh opposed it.

Area: More than half of women in opposition-held areas supported this statement (54.1%), while the percentage receded to about a third in SDF areas (38.8%) and about a fourth in regime-held areas (23.1%).

Nation-Ethnicity: Kurdish women rejected this statement more than Arab women: 39.4% vs. 33.4%.

Religion-Sect: No Christian woman in the small sample agreed with this statement, while more than half of Sunni women agreed with it.

Civil status: The greatest percentage of single women rejected it (around half of them), while this percentage dropped to around a third among married women and widows.

**Table 9. “Women who are capable of holding an important administrative or political position are scarce,” in the women’s sample.**

	I disagree	Not sure	I agree
<b>Level of education</b>			
Illiterate	5,7%	20,0%	74,3%
Primary	21,8%	14,8%	63,4%
Preparatory	24,8%	18,8%	56,4%
Secondary	38,6%	14,4%	47,0%
University degree or higher	47,2%	13,1%	39,6%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	42,4%	10,6%	47,0%
From 3 to 5 persons	32,2%	19,0%	48,8%
Six persons and above	25,6%	17,3%	57,1%
<b>Profession</b>			
Employed	44,5%	12,4%	43,0%
Student	47,3%	16,0%	36,6%
Unemployed	37,1%	15,2%	47,6%
Housewife	23,9%	16,7%	59,4%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	55,6%	12,1%	32,3%
Secularist	54,3%	17,2%	28,4%
Center	39,2%	12,6%	48,1%
Islamist	25,8%	19,1%	55,1%
Far end of political Islam	17,6%	5,9%	76,5%
<b>Monthly income (in SYP)</b>			
Less than 25 thousand	35,6%	11,2%	53,2%
25-75 thousand	38,8%	14,0%	47,1%
thousand 75 than More	43,6%	10,6%	45,7%
<b>Governate</b>			
Damascus suburbs	20,2%	20,2%	59,6%
Camps in Turkey	22,3%	11,3%	66,3%
Idlib	38,1%	21,5%	40,4%
Aleppo	44,3%	4,5%	51,1%
Hasakeh	48,2%	14,9%	36,9%
Damascus	51,3%	7,7%	41,0%
Homs	63,6%	18,2%	18,2%
<b>Region</b>			
Women in regime-held areas	60,3%	16,7%	23,1%
Women in opposition-held areas	31,0%	14,9%	54,1%
Women in SDF areas	46,9%	14,3%	38,8%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	33,8%	15,6%	50,6%
Kurds	39,4%	12,8%	47,7%
Turkmens (in number)	3	0	5
<b>Religion\ Sect</b>			
Sunnis	32,0%	14,3%	53,6%
Christians (in number)	8	2	0
<b>Marital status</b>			
Single	48,8%	11,4%	39,8%
Married	31,3%	16,0%	52,7%
Widow	32,9%	17,1%	50,0%
Divorced (in number)	12	2	7

### Men's sample:

An analysis of the results of the men's sample with respect to this statement shows that there is a relationship between their support/rejection and the following variables (Table 10):

Education: The percentage of support for this statement declines among the university-educated compared with those with no university education, where it dropped from 74.4% among those having obtained a primary certificate to half among the university-educated (55.0%).

Ideology: The percentage of those rejecting this statement did not exceed 9% among islamists whereas it reached a third among secularists.

Age: Young men (up to 25 years old) supported this statement the most.

Income: The percentage of those rejecting this statement reached its peak among high-income earners (more than 75 thousand), being more than a third, and dropped to 7.5.% among those having incomes of less than 25 thousand.

Governate: There is practically a consensus of support for this statement in Damascus suburbs and camps in Turkey as well as the majority of men in Idlib and more than half of them in the remaining regions.

Region: The majority of men in opposition-held areas supported this view (76.0%), while this percentage declined to about half in SDF areas (54.1%) and around a third in regime-held areas (36.7%).

Nation-Ethnicity: Arabs supported this statement more than Kurds: 65.9% as opposed to 58.2% Religion.

Religion-sect: The majority of Sunni men agreed with this statement while the greatest percentage of men in the small Alawite sample opposed it.

Civil status: Single men rejected this statement more than married men.

**Table 10. "Women who are capable of holding an important administrative or political position are scarce," in the men's sample.**

	I disagree	Not sure	I agree
<b>Level of education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	1	4	10
Primary	10,5%	15,1%	74,4%
Preparatory	11,4%	21,4%	67,1%
Secondary	17,2%	15,9%	66,9%
University degree or higher	30,6%	14,3%	55,0%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	31,5%	17,6%	50,9%
Secularist	36,6%	31,4%	32,0%
Center	17,3%	11,9%	70,8%
Islamist	8,9%	12,5%	78,6%
Far end of islamism	6,5%	10,4%	83,1%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	13,9%	15,3%	70,8%

26-35 years old	21,4%	12,1%	66,5%
36-45 years old	20,5%	20,0%	59,5%
46-55 years old	23,1%	23,9%	53,0%
56 years and older	17,5%	19,3%	63,2%
<b>Income</b>			
Less than 25 thousand	7,5%	7,0%	85,6%
25-75 thousand	16,7%	19,4%	63,9%
More than 75 thousand	35,6%	17,1%	47,2%
<b>Governate</b>			
Idlib	10,0%	20,6%	69,4%
Damascus suburbs	10,1%	5,8%	84,1%
Camps in Turkey	16,4%	1,5%	82,1%
Homs	16,5%	29,1%	54,4%
Aleppo	23,2%	23,2%	53,6%
Hakaseh	29,3%	15,7%	55,1%
Damascus	46,8%	1,6%	51,6%
<b>Region</b>			
Men in regime-held areas	30,6%	32,8%	36,7%
Men in opposition-held areas	12,3%	11,7%	76,0%
Men in SDF areas	29,9%	16,0%	54,1%
<b>Opposition regions</b>			
Besieged areas	9,1%	4,3%	86,5%
Non-besieged areas	14,8%	17,0%	68,2%
<b>Nation-Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	16,4%	17,8%	65,9%
Kurds	27,4%	14,4%	58,2%
<b>Religion-Sect</b>			
Sunni	15,8%	12,6%	71,6%
Shi'a (in number)	2	11	8
Alawite (in number)	12	11	4
<b>Civil status</b>			
Single	21,1%	16,7%	62,1%
Married	18,3%	16,8%	64,8%
Divorced (in number)	6	0	4

## Preconceptions about professions that women are not able to perform.

This question was directed only to those who believed that women are less capable than men in performing some professions. Here we try to get a closer look at their perceptions. It is likely that professions which are historically associated with women and which are concerned with education and care, garnered support among those who doubt women's abilities, since we found that there is a kind of consensus that a women is able to hold the position of school principal the same as a man<sup>6</sup>. However, the responses begin to vary gradually with leadership positions which require making important decisions (Figure 7)


The extent of variation between the responses of men and women is noticeable here, as the greatest percentage of women who doubt women's abilities say that they are capable of being judges or ministers while the greatest percentage of men who doubt women's abilities say that they are not capable of holding these positions (Figure 7).

<sup>6</sup> Here we mean education or caring for others as professions associated with women such as teaching, nursing, caring for children, the elderly, etc.



The agreement shows up again in terms of leading positions, local councils or president of the country. It seems that the majority of men and women who doubt women’s capabilities believe that women are unable to hold the position of chair of a local council and are in accord that they are incapable of being president. (Figure 7)

**Figure 7. Jobs that women cannot occupy as efficiently as men**



## Summary of Chapter Two

- 63.7% of men agreed with the statement “Women who are able to work competently in important administrative or political positions are scarce”, while 19.5% opposed or strongly opposed. 49.1% of women supported it, while 35.9% opposed or strongly opposed.
- The conviction that women who are able to hold important administrative or political positions are scarce reached its highest levels in the women’s sample among Arab women, married, widowed, the uneducated, those responsible for caring for a large number of individuals, housewives, the unemployed, islamists, low-income earners, and those living in Damascus suburbs, camps in Turkey and opposition-held areas.
- The conviction that women who are able to hold important administrative or political positions are scarce reached its highest levels in the men’s sample among Arabs, married, the uneducated, islamists, young men (less than 25 years old), low-income earners, those living in Damascus suburbs, camps in Turkey, Idlib, opposition-held areas and besieged areas.

- The majority of men and women doubting the abilities of women believed that women are incapable of holding the post of head of a local council and they appear to be in accord that they are incapable of being president of the country. It seems that confidence in women's ability lies in professions historically associated with women; those concerned with education and care (a school principal in our research). However, the responses begin to vary gradually with leading positions which require making important decisions.

## Chapter Three: Women Leadership

### Electing a woman for a leadership position

For a deeper understanding of the attitude towards women leadership, we asked a hypothetical question about the possibility of nominating a woman for the position of head of a local council in the respondent’s area. We repeated the question twice: first, we asked about the possible attitude of others “the community”, and the second time we asked about personal attitude: “and what about you...? Would you vote for her?” This way we will be able to understand the extent to which they subscribe to or reject prevailing perceptions in the community (as perceived by respondents themselves). Behavior is not only governed by what the individual believes, but also by their perceptions about what is desirable and undesirable in their community or the group to which they belong.

We will notice how the “I” is almost identical with the community in the men’s answers, as 37.5% of them say that it is possible for a woman to win if she runs for the local council’s elections in their area, and 36.7% that they may vote for her, while this percentage differs among women. 58.1% of women believe that she may win, but when the question becomes about the personal attitude the percentage increases to reach 68.2% (table 11).

So, we can say that men are more conforming to prevailing perceptions in their communities concerning the attitude about women leadership, while women rebel against the negative image of woman. In other words, it seems that half of the Syrian community (women) is ready to accept and support a woman leader in a position like the head of a local council, while the other half (men) is not yet ready for that.

**Table 11 The possibility of a woman winning the elections of local council chairpersonship**

	Yes, possible		No, not possible		I do not know/ No Answer	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<b>Could she win in your area?</b>	37.5%	58.1%	51.4%	32.6%	11.1%	9.3%
<b>What about you... would you vote for her?</b>	36.7%	68.2%	44.4%	19.3%	18.9%	12.6%

What we are going to do in following paragraphs is try to identify the social and demographic background of those refusing to elect a woman in case she runs for local council chairpersonship.

### Women’s sample

Figures from 8 to 18 show variables we found linked to attitude towards women reaching a leading position such as the head of a local council, and they are as follows:

Education: The lower the education the higher the rejection of the idea of a woman being in a leading position like the head of a local council.

Dependents: Rejection increases among women responsible a large number of dependents compared to those responsible for fewer dependents.

Profession: Housewives reject the idea most, while we find that unemployed are the most willing to welcome a woman in the position of the head of a local council.

Ideology: Islamists reject the idea more than seculars. However, it must be noted that the greatest difference appears in the answers of the far end of political Islam, while, generally, when comparing the answers of Islamists and seculars, the difference becomes less than 8%.

Age: Young women (less than 25 years) are more welcoming of the idea of a woman becoming head of a local council than older women, as rejection increases gradually from 17.2% among young women to reach 24.0% in age category between 46-55 years.


Income: Women with middle income (between 25 – 75 thousands in our sample) welcome the idea the most compared to those with a low or a high income, as the percentage increased from 17.6% to approximately a quarter (24.0%).

Marital status: Single women are more supportive of the idea compared to widows and married women, where rejection went up from 7.8% to 21.4% among married women, and to 34.1% among widows.


Ethnicity: Kurdish women are more willing to accept a woman as the head of a local council than Arab women, where rejection increases from 3.7% among Kurdish women to 22.0% among Arab women.

Governorate, area: Women in Damascus Suburbs rejected the idea most with more than a third disagreeing with it, while rejection dropped to about one fourth in Idlib and refugees camps in Turkey, next came Damascus (16.3%), then Aleppo (12.5%), then Homs (8.8%), and Hasakeh came at the end of the rejection list with a percentage of less than 3%. Women in self-government areas reject the possibility of a woman head of the local council least with a percentage of 4.1%, followed by women in regime-controlled areas with a percentage of (9.5%). Rejection increases to reach approximately one fourth (23.4%) in opposition-held areas. Women in besieged areas (33.3%) reject the idea more than women in other opposition areas (21.3%).


**Figure 8. Education and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 9. Number of dependents and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 10. Profession and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 11. Ideology and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 12. Age and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 13. Income and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 14. Marital status and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 15. Ethnicity and electing a woman in the women's sample**




**Figure 16. Governorate and electing a woman in the women's sample**



**Figure 17. Area and electing a woman in the women's sample**



**Figure 18. Within opposition areas, electing a woman in the women's sample**



### Men's sample

Figures from 19 to 28 in the men's sample show variables linked to attitude towards women leadership in the position of head of local council; they are as follows:

**Income:** Men with the lowest income (58.5%) reject the idea of a woman occupying the position of head of a local council most, and those with the highest income are the most supportive.

**Education:** The majority of the primary certificate holders refuse to elect a woman as head of the local council (68.5%), and so does the the largest proportion of the preparatory certificate

holders (52.9%) and the secondary (42.7%), while it is the contrary in college students and graduates as more than half of them said it was possible to elect a woman for such a position.

**Dependents:** Those responsible for many dependents (six or more) reject the idea of a woman as head of the local council (49.4%), while the percentage among those with fewer dependents (42%).

**Occupation:** The unemployed reject the idea most as the majority of them (57.3%) said it was impossible for a woman to be elected for such a position, while the percentage went down to 44.1% among working men, and it reached the lowest level among students (31.7%).


**Ideology:** Those of an Islamic background refuse a woman in the position of head of local council most compared to seculars. The the largest proportion of seculars said they might elect a woman and the rejection percentage among them was approximately one fourth, while it was vice versa among Islamists dismissing any possibility to elect a woman.

**Age:** Half young men and half men over 65 refuse to elect a woman for this position. The percentage declines to about 40% in age categories between 26 -55 years.

**Ethnicity:** Half Arab men refuse a woman head of the local council, and the percentage decreases to only 18.1% among Kurds.


**Governorate, area:** Most men in Damascus Suburbs said they will not elect a woman for the leadership of the local council (62.8%), and the percentage declined to approximately half in Idlib and Homs, and to about 40% in Damascus and Aleppo, to one fourth in camps in Turkey, while it reached its lowest level in Hasakeh (18.5%). Men in opposition areas reject it most (54.9%), second come men in the regime areas (37.3%), and then self-government areas (19.2%). Within opposition areas themselves: men in besieged areas (67.4%) refuse it more than those in non-besieged areas (46.3%).

**Figure 19. Income and electing a woman in the men’s sample**







**Figure 20. Education and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 21. Number of dependents and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 22. Profession and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 23. Ideology and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 24. Age and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 25. Ethnicity and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 26. Governorate and electing a woman in the men's sample**



**Figure 27. Area and electing a woman in the men's sample**




**Figure 28. Within opposition territories and electing a woman in the men's sample**



### Factors affecting the election process

We have learnt the attitude of respondents towards electing a woman for an important leadership position (head of local council), and now we will get to know the priorities respondents consider in the election process. As is clear in figure 29 the most important thing, for men and women respondents, when electing a woman candidate is her scientific qualification or administrative experience, second ranks her political position and ideology, third ranks her dress and appearance, fourth her religious sect, while her being a woman ranks last in electors' priorities.

**Figure. 29 Factors affecting electing a woman**



There are no significant differences between men and women regarding the candidate's political position or ideology, nor regarding her scientific qualifications or administrative experience, but differences appear in the following variables: being a woman, religious sect, dress and appearance. According to table 12 women care more for gender in election than men, as about 69% of them said that a candidate's being a woman was an important or very important issue, as opposed to 53.9% of men. Interestingly, a high percentage of women, almost one third, said it was very important, while among men it was no more than 12.8%, women are also more interested in the candidate's religious sect, and also her dress and appearance than men.

**Table 12. Influencing factors in the election process according to their importance among men and women**

	Very important		Important		Not important at all		I do not know / No answer	
	Woman	Man	Woman	Man	Woman	Man	Woman	Man
<b>Being a woman</b>	35.4%	12.8%	33.6%	41.1%	30.4%	45.1%	0.5%	1.0%
<b>Her religious sect</b>	35.2%	26.9%	33.9%	33.9%	30.2%	37.6%	0.8%	1.5%
<b>Dress and appearance</b>	30.1%	23.5%	40.4%	42.8%	28.6%	32.9%	0.9%	0.9%

### Summary of Chapter Three

- Half the Syrian community (women) is ready to accept a woman leader in the position of head of local council and to support her, while the other half (men) is still not ready for that, as 37.5% of men say it is possible for a woman to win in case she runs for local council elections in their area, and 36.7% say they may elect her. While the percentage differs among women, as 58.1% think she can win, and when the question is about personal attitude the percentage goes up to reach 68.2%.
- Refusing the presence of a woman in a leader position such as head of a local council increases in the women's sample among the less educated, with large number of dependents, housewives, extreme political Islamists, over 46 years of age, those with low and high income, widows, married, Arabs, those in Damascus Suburbs, Idlib, camps in Turkey, in opposition and besieged areas.
- Refusing the presence of a woman in a leader position such as head of a local council increases in the men's sample among Arabs, those with lower income, less educated, with many dependents, unemployed, Islamists, young men, over 56 years of age, in Damascus Suburbs, Idlib, Homs, opposition and besieged areas.
- The most important factor for male and female respondents when electing a woman candidate is her scientific qualification or administrative experience. Her political or ideological position ranks second; third ranks her appearance and dress; her religious sect ranks fourth, while her being a woman comes as the least priority of electors.
- Women give more weight for gender than men in elections, as about 69.0% of them said that the candidate's being a woman was an important or very important issue, as opposed to 53.0% of men. Interestingly, a high percentage of women said it was very important, which reached approximately one third while it was no more than 12.8% among men. Moreover, women are more interested in the candidate's religious sect and her dress and appearance than men.

## Chapter Four: Rights and Freedoms in Legislation

In the future, Syria will need a new constitution, policies and laws to address women's issues, so it would be beneficial to identify the population's understanding, attitudes and views on these issues. As shown in table (13) the overwhelming majority of respondents agree to support women's associations which are interested in advocating women's rights (71.6% of men and 95.7% of women in our sample). There is a near-consensus among women in our sample (83.4%) that the future constitution should guarantee equal rights for men and women; the largest percentage of men agreed to such a guarantee (48.6%). However, a significant percentage is against it (31.0%).

Women almost unanimously agreed to measures combating minor marriage (79.2%), However, men's attitude seems to be different as their percentage is lower by half. 30.0% of them said they are opposed to a legal limit to marriage age while 13.8% refused to express a clear position to this matter.

The situation is different when it comes to the equal distribution of inheritance and personal liberties (clothes in this case) where rejection is more dominant. About half the women and the majority of men (67%) reject such measures.

But how is rejection in the case of inheritance and clothes? Is it so strong that it cannot be changed?

It seems that influencing the attitude of Syrians towards the issue of inheritance distribution is more difficult than influencing their attitude towards freedom of dress; among men more than among women in both cases (table 14). The percentage of those who said they strongly oppose was between a quarter and a third, and was higher among men compared with women. However, creative approaches to courts and inheritance without pushing the application of readymade models might win the acceptance of the largest proportion.

In the following paragraphs, we will learn the social and demographic background of those who rejected each of the suggestion listed in table 13. If we understand them, we will be able to deal with them in a better way.

**Table 13: Suggested Measures to Combat Discrimination against Women**

	Agree		Disagree		No Clear Stand	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
The constitution should guarantee equal rights for men and women in all fields.	48,6%	83,4%	31,0%	9,2%	20,4%	7,4%
Marriage of women under 18 shouldn't be allowed.	55,3%	79,2%	30,4%	13,8%	14,3%	7,0%
The next government should support women's associations which advocate women.	71,6%	95,7%	11,2%	1,8%	17,2%	2,6%
Inheritance should be divided equally between men and women	20,6%	31,4%	66,9%	56,4%	12,5%	12,2%
Women have the right to wear whatever they want as part of their personal freedom.	19,6%	38,8%	67,5%	52,9%	12,9%	8,2%

Table 14. The rate of disagreement to equal inheritance and freedom of dress

	Strongly agree		agree		Not sure		disagree		Strongly disagree	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Inheritance should be divided equally between men and women	12,7%	5,1%	18,7%	15,5%	12,2%	12,5%	28,1%	30,4%	28,3%	36,5%
Women have the right to wear whatever they want as part of their personal freedom.	13,2%	3,6%	25,6%	16,1%	8,2%	12,9%	30,5%	38,2%	22,5%	29,3%

## Equality before the law

### Women's sample

The variables linked to attitude towards equality in the women's sample are shown in table 15 and are as follows:

Education: The percentage of women who reject the idea of equality before the law between women and men decreases with the advance in education. It decreased from about 16% among illiterates and those of primary education to 6% among secondary education or university degree holders.

Dependents: The percentage of women who reject the idea of equality before the law is more among women with a large number of dependents (more than six) compared to those with fewer dependents.

Profession: Housewives reject equality before the law most while the unemployed and students reject it least.

Ideology: Seculars reject the idea less than Islamists, but the great difference appears in the far end of political Islam among whom 34.8% say they oppose such equality.

Income: Zeal to the idea of equality before the law drops as we move from the lowest to the highest income categories. Nonetheless, there are no big differences in the rate of rejection.

Governorate, area: Refugee camps in Turkey topped the rejection list (15.0 %), followed by Idleb and Damascus Suburbs with about 11% while the percentage falls to 3% in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs to reach its lowest in Hasakeh (0.7%).

Women in opposition-held areas reject equality most (11.5%), followed by regime areas and self-government areas (2.4% and 1.4% respectively). There are no big differences between besieged and non-besieged opposition-held areas.

Ethnicity, sect: Arabs (10.5%) reject equality before the law between men and women more than Kurds (1.8%) while all Christians in the small sample agreed to idea of a constitution that guarantees equality between men and women.

Marital status: Single women are the least opposing compared to married and widowed women as the rate increases from about 5.0% to 11.0%.

**Table 15: Equality Before the Law in the Women's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate	72,2%	16,7%	11,1%
Primary education	76,3%	16,4%	7,2%
Preparatory education	82,0%	11,6%	6,4%
Secondary education	86,0%	5,4%	8,6%
University and above	86,4%	6,7%	6,9%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	86,1%	8,3%	5,6%
From 3 to 5	83,9%	9,1%	7,0%
6 and above	73,4%	12,2%	14,4%
<b>Profession</b>			
Unemployed	93,5%	3,7%	2,8%
Student	88,7%	3,8%	7,5%
Working	84,8%	9,7%	5,6%
Housewife	77,6%	12,1%	10,3%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	99,0%	1,0%	0,0%
Secular	90,0%	5,0%	5,0%
Moderate	86,5%	7,6%	5,9%
Islamist	79,5%	7,6%	12,9%
Far end of political Islam	63,0%	34,8%	2,2%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
More than 75,000	77,1%	12,5%	10,4%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	79,6%	11,0%	9,4%
Less than 25,000	82,1%	11,1%	6,8%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	98,6%	0,7%	0,7%
Damascus	95,3%	2,3%	2,3%
Aleppo	95,5%	3,4%	1,1%
Homs	86,8%	4,4%	8,8%
Idlib	75,8%	10,8%	13,4%
Damascus Suburbs	78,3%	11,3%	10,4%
Camps in Turkey	77,9%	15,0%	7,1%
<b>Area</b>			
Self-government areas	97,3%	1,4%	1,4%
Regime areas	89,3%	2,4%	8,3%
Opposition areas	80,0%	11,5%	8,5%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged areas	81,8%	10,6%	7,6%
Non-besieged areas	79,7%	11,7%	8,6%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	81,0%	10,5%	8,5%
Kurds	97,2%	1,8%	0,9%
Turkmen (in number)	7	0	1
<b>Religion, sect</b>			

Sunni	81,5%	10,7%	7,8%
Christians (in number)	10	0	0
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	92,6%	5,1%	2,3%
Married	81,3%	10,4%	8,4%
Widow	72,9%	11,8%	15,3%
Divorced (in number)	22	1	0

## Men's sample

Variables that are linked to attitude towards equality before the law in the men's sample are shown in table 16. They are as follows:

**Education:** Those who had only primary education (40%) rejected the idea most, while those with secondary education (29.2%) and university degrees (22.7%) rejected least.

**Dependents:** Men with a big number of dependents are less zealous towards equality between men and women compared to those with a smaller number of dependents. However, there are no big differences in rejection rates.

**Ideology:** Islamists, by far, rejected the idea more than seculars. The rate increases from about 13% among seculars to more than 40% among Islamists and it reaches half the respondents when it comes to the far end of political Islam.

**Age:** Men above 56 are the most opposing to equality followed by young men (up to 25 years old) at a rate of 33.5%. The rate decreases a little to reach 29% among the age categories between 26 and 55.

**Income:** The rate of opposition to equality increases among men of low income (less than 25000 in our sample) compared to those of middle (35000 to 75000) and high income (more than 75000). The rates were 36.7%, 31.2% and 26.7% respectively.

**Governorate, area:** Men in Damascus Suburbs are the most opposing to equality as the majority (58.4%) disagreed in contrast with other areas as the rate was about one third in Idlib, Damascus and Homs. It was even less among refugees in camps in Turkey where it was less than one quarter (21.6%), and it was at its lowest rate in Hasakeh at a percentage of 11.3%.

Men in opposition-held areas are the ones who reject equality most (37.3%) followed by regime areas (31.1%) and then the self-government areas (11.4%).

Men in besieged areas reject the idea more (42.2%) than those in non-besieged opposition areas (34.0%).

**Sect, ethnicity:** Arab men are, by far, more opposed to equality than Kurds. The rate was 35.4% among Arabs compared to 11.3 among Kurds.



Sunnis openly express their attitude towards equality. Their rate of support reached half the respondents while the rate of rejection was 35.8%. On the other hand, most Shiite respondents refused to express a clear stand (58.1%) while 38.7% said they were against it.

Marital status: single men are more zealous than married ones although the rate of rejection is the same on both sides (about 30%)

**Table 16: Equality Before the Law in the Men's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	9	5	6
Primary education	38,6%	41,7%	19,7%
Preparatory education	33,6%	38,6%	27,9%
Secondary education	50,7%	29,2%	20,1%
University and above	63,0%	22,7%	14,2%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	56,0%	28,9%	15,0%
From 3 to 5	48,7%	31,7%	19,6%
6 and above	42,1%	31,4%	26,4%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	75,6%	13,0%	11,4%
Secular	52,0%	12,6%	35,4%
Moderate center	57,7%	29,5%	12,8%
Islamist	34,8%	43,7%	21,6%
Far end of political Islam	29,8%	51,8%	18,4%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	51,2%	33,5%	15,4%
26-35 years old	53,2%	30,8%	15,9%
36-45 years old	50,4%	28,0%	21,5%
46-55 years old	37,9%	28,7%	33,3%
56 and above	35,5%	38,2%	26,3%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
Less than 25,000	53,7%	36,7%	9,6%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	44,0%	31,2%	24,9%
More than 75,000	53,4%	26,7%	19,8%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	77,0%	11,3%	11,7%
Camps in Turkey	56,8%	21,6%	21,6%
Homs	31,4%	33,7%	34,9%
Damascus	57,0%	33,7%	9,3%
Aleppo	44,0%	34,5%	21,4%
Idlib	36,9%	37,3%	25,8%
Damascus Suburbs	37,7%	58,4%	3,9%
<b>Area</b>			
Self-government areas	77,2%	11,4%	11,4%
Regime areas	28,0%	31,1%	40,9%
Opposition areas	46,2%	37,3%	16,6%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	51,4%	42,2%	6,4%
Non-besieged	42,4%	34,0%	23,6%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	41,7%	35,4%	22,9%
Kurds	80,0%	11,3%	8,8%
<b>Sect</b>			

Sunnis	47,5%	35,8%	16,7%
Shiite	3,2%	38,7%	58,1%
Alawites (in number)	14	3	11
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	52,5%	31,5%	15,9%
Married	47,6%	30,8%	21,7%
Widower (in number)	3	0	6
Divorced (in number)	5	7	1

## Restricting Age of Marriage

### Women's sample

The variables we found linked to the attitude towards restricting marriage age are shown in Table 17. They are as follows:

**Profession:** Rejection of laws preventing minor marriage (below 18) is higher among housewives (17.2%) and unemployed women (25.7%) compared to students (12.0%) and working women (10.0%).

**Ideology:** Rejection of a law preventing minor marriage is higher among Islamists compared to seculars as the percentage of rejection increases from less than 8% to reach 20.7% among those at the far political Islam.

**Age:** The percentage of rejection is remarkably higher among women over 45 as the percentage reached 20.0% among them and 19.4 among those who are over 56 while it was less than 14% among younger age categories.

**Income:** Women with low income (less than 25000 per month in our sample) are the most opposing to a law preventing minor marriage (20%) while the percentage of rejection decreases to 8.3% among those with higher income (more than 75,000).

**Governorate, area:** Women in Damascus are the most opposing as the rate reached about half, while women in other areas are more inclined to support such measures. The rate of rejection among women in camps in Turkey falls to 8.2% and in Hasakeh to 8.2% while it ranged between 13.0% and 19.0% in other areas (Aleppo, Damascus Suburbs, Homs and Idlib). Rejection reached its peak among women in regime areas (about one third), decreased in opposition areas (13.9%) and was at its lowest self-government areas (2.0%). Women in besieged areas are more opposing to such measures compared to other opposition areas.

**Sect, ethnicity:** No Kurdish woman (0.0%) opposed the suggested measures preventing minor marriage while 15.9% of Arab women disagreed.

By comparing the findings according to religion or sect, we can see that no Christian woman from our small sample has expressed rejection (0.0) as opposed to 15.0% of Sunnis.

**Table 17: Restricting marriage age in women's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	83,9%	10,0%	6,2%
Student	83,5%	12,0%	4,5%
Unemployed	75,9%	15,7%	8,3%
Housewife	74,6%	17,2%	8,2%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	93,9%	1,0%	5,1%
Secular	80,0%	7,5%	12,5%
Moderate center	75,0%	19,7%	5,3%
Islamist	78,9%	12,6%	8,4%
Far end of political Islam	77,2%	20,7%	2,2%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	81,5%	14,2%	4,3%
26-35 years old	82,6%	11,6%	5,8%
36-45 years old	74,1%	13,4%	12,5%
46-55 years old	73,3%	20,0%	6,7%
56 and above	64,7%	29,4%	5,9%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
Less than 25,000	75,7%	20,0%	4,3%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	79,2%	11,8%	9,0%
More than 75,000	83,3%	8,3%	8,3%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	97,2%	0,7%	2,1%
Camps in Turkey	89,5%	8,2%	2,4%
Aleppo	77,3%	13,6%	9,1%
Homs	58,8%	17,6%	23,5%
Damascus Suburbs	76,4%	17,9%	5,7%
Idlib	70,1%	19,0%	10,8%
Damascus	41,9%	51,2%	7,0%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	44,0%	33,3%	22,6%
Opposition areas	79,8%	13,9%	6,2%
Self-government areas	95,9%	2,0%	2,0%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	76,5%	18,9%	4,5%
Non-besieged	80,7%	12,9%	6,4%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	76,3%	15,9%	7,7%
Kurds	98,2%	0,0%	1,8%
Turkmen (in number)	5	2	1
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunnis	79,0%	15,0%	6,0%
Christians (in number)	8	0	2

### Men's sample

The variables that we found linked to attitude towards a regulation preventing minor marriage are listed in table18 and they are as follows:

Education: The higher the education level the lower the rate of objection to a regulation preventing minor marriage. It is highest among men with primary education (42.5%). It drops

to 37.5% among those with preparatory education, to 27.8% among those with secondary education and to 22.4% among university degree holders.

Dependents: The rate of rejection decreases among men with a moderate or big number of dependents (3 and above) compared to those with smaller numbers of dependents.

Ideology: Seculars reject such regulations less than Islamists. The percentage rises from 18% among seculars to about 45% at the far end of political Islam. However, it should be noted that a high percentage of seculars refused to express a clear position of this issue (29.6%).

Age: Young men (up to 25) are reject any measures preventing minor marriage most (36.6%). The percentage drops to less than 30% in next age categories.

Income: Men of low income reject such regulations most (36.6%) followed by those of middle income (30.9%) while rejection minimizes among men of high income (24.3%)

Governorate, area: We have noticed how women in camps in Turkey almost unanimously agreed to measures preventing minor marriage, and we have noted how rejection was minimal among them compared to other areas (except Hasakeh). However, men's attitude in refugee camps in Turkey seems to be different from that of women to a certain extent. They do not seem to be among the strongest supporters although most of them support it.

The rate of rejection to any decision preventing minor marriage is surprisingly very high in Damascus. The overwhelming majority of men in this governorate are against it (76.6%). The rate drops in Damascus Suburbs to 42.4% and in Homs, Idlib and camps in Turkey to about a third, among men Aleppo to (20.2%) and reaches lowers in Hasakeh at 7.2%.

Men in regime areas are reject such measures most (40.4%) followed by men in opposition areas (34.6%) and men in self-government areas (7.3%).

Men in besieged areas reject taking any measures to prevent minor marriage most (40.8%) compared to men in other opposition areas (28.8%).

Sect, ethnicity: the overwhelming majority of Shiite men refused to answer this question (77.4%) while Sunnis answered and said they rejected such procedures.

Kurdish men are, by far, reject the idea less than Arabs. The percentage rises from 8.1 among Kurds to 34.9% among Arabs.

Marital status: Single men are the most opposing to regulations preventing minor marriage (37.3%) compared to married ones (27.5%).

**Table 18: Defining marriage age in the men's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	10	7	3
Primary education	39,4%	42,5%	18,1%
Preparatory education	46,1%	37,5%	16,4%
Secondary education	56,2%	27,8%	16,0%
University and above	68,5%	22,4%	9,1%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	52,6%	36,5%	10,9%
From 3 to 5	57,8%	29,9%	12,3%
6 and above	53,1%	26,4%	20,4%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	80,5%	8,1%	11,4%
Secular	52,5%	17,9%	29,6%
Moderate	59,0%	29,8%	11,2%
Islamist	48,9%	42,0%	9,2%
Far end of political Islam	43,0%	45,6%	11,4%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	52,0%	36,6%	11,4%
26-35 years old	60,3%	29,2%	10,5%
36-45 years old	56,9%	30,1%	13,0%
46-55 years old	48,9%	25,3%	25,9%
56 and above	51,3%	28,9%	19,7%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
Less than 25,000	57,2%	36,2%	6,6%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	50,5%	30,9%	18,6%
More than 75,000	65,2%	24,3%	10,5%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	84,2%	7,2%	8,6%
Aleppo	65,5%	20,2%	14,3%
Homs	37,3%	30,2%	32,5%
Idlib	53,0%	31,8%	15,3%
Camps in Turkey	64,9%	32,4%	2,7%
Damascus Suburbs	53,5%	42,4%	4,1%
Damascus	22,1%	76,6%	1,3%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	23,1%	40,4%	36,4%
Opposition areas	56,7%	34,6%	8,7%
Self-government areas	84,0%	7,3%	8,7%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	56,0%	40,8%	3,2%
Non-besieged	57,9%	29,8%	12,3%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arab	49,3%	34,9%	15,9%
Kurd	83,1%	8,1%	8,8%
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunnis	56,3%	34,2%	9,4%
Shiite	0,0%	22,6%	77,4%
Alawites (in number)	11	7	10
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	52,2%	37,3%	10,5%
Married	57,2%	27,5%	15,3%
Widower (in number)	2	2	5
Divorced (in number)	3	10	0

## Supporting Women's Associations

### Women's sample

Variables linked to attitudes towards supporting women's associations in the women's sample are shown in table (19). They are as follows:

**Ideology:** In general, rejecting support for women's associations among women is almost null among both seculars and Islamists. However, the difference is at the far end of political Islam where the percentage reaches 8.7%.

**Age:** Women from all ages agree to supporting women's associations. The only difference is found among women over 56 where rejection increases to 11.8%. However, it is still a very low rate.

**Governorate, area:** There is a very low, almost insignificant, rejection rate in Homs (1.5%), camps in Turkey (3.4%), Damascus Suburbs (5.7%), while there is no rejection whatsoever in other areas (0.0%).

Table 19: Supporting women's Associations – women's sample

	Agree	Disagree	No clear stand
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	99,0%	0,0%	1,0%
Secular	97,5%	2,5%	0,0%
Moderate center	96,7%	1,3%	2,0%
Islamist	94,9%	0,6%	4,5%
Far end of political Islam	89,1%	8,7%	4,5%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	96,7%	2,3%	1,0%
26-35 years old	95,3%	1,5%	3,2%
36-45 years old	97,0%	0,9%	2,2%
46-55 years old	92,0%	1,3%	6,7%
56 and above	82,4%	11,8%	6,7%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	99,3%	0,0%	0,7%
Aleppo	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Idlib	96,5%	0,0%	3,5%
Damascus	90,7%	0,0%	9,3%
Homs	98,5%	1,5%	0,0%
Camps in Turkey	94,2%	3,4%	2,4%
Damascus Suburbs	89,6%	5,7%	4,7%

### Men's sample

The variables we found linked to attitude towards supporting women's associations are shown in Table 20 and are as follows:

**Education:** Those with only primary education reject measures supporting women's associations most (19.7%). The rate decreases the higher the educational level to reach its lowest at the university level education (5.8%).

Dependents: Those providing for a large number (more than 6) are the least opposing to measures supporting women's associations.

Profession: The unemployed reject women's associations support most, followed by those who have jobs while rejection reached a very low rate among students (3.2%).

Ideology: Seculars are less opposing to such measures than Islamists. The rate increases from less than 5.0% among seculars to reach about one quarter at the far end of political Islam.

Age: The rate of rejection of measures supporting women's associations decreases among older ages. Its highest level was among young men (up to 25) at a rate of 14.2% while the lowest level was among men of 56 and above (5.3%).

Income: Low income men are more opposing than those with higher income; the rate decreases from 14.4 to about 9%.

Governorate, area: Once again, Damascus tops the list of rejection. After it came first in rejecting restricting marriage age, it came first also in rejecting measures supporting women's associations with a big difference from other areas (37.7%). The percentage decreases in other areas to reach its lowest among men in camps in Turkey (5.4%) and Hasakeh (2.7%).

Rejection rates are similar in opposition and regime areas (13.0-14.0%), but they are much lower in SDA areas (2.3%)

Besieged men are more opposing to women's associations' support (18.4%) than the non-besieged in opposition areas (8.9%).

Sect, Ethnicity: Most Shiite men preferred not to give a clear stand towards this measure (51.6%) while 31.6% disagreed.

Arab men are more opposing than Kurds to measures supporting women's associations. The rate decreased from 13.1% among Arabs to 2.5% among Kurds.

Marital Status: Single men are more opposing than married ones to measures supporting women's associations 14.1% vs 9.9%.

**Table 20: Supporting women's associations in men's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	14	2	4
Primary education	60,6%	19,7%	19,7%
Preparatory education	61,4%	13,2%	25,4%
Secondary education	69,4%	11,6%	19,0%
University and above	87,0%	5,8%	7,3%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	75,9%	17,3%	6,8%
From 3 to 5	72,9%	10,3%	16,8%
6 and above	65,7%	7,5%	26,7%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	70,4%	11,0%	18,6%
Student	88,9%	3,2%	7,9%
Unemployed	71,9%	19,1%	9,0%
<b>Ideology</b>			

Far end of secularism	85,4%	4,1%	10,6%
Secular	78,5%	2,7%	18,8%
Moderate	71,2%	10,9%	17,9%
Islamist	63,8%	15,2%	21,0%
Far end of political Islam	68,4%	23,7%	7,9%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	74,8%	14,2%	11,0%
26-35 years old	75,1%	11,4%	13,5%
36-45 years old	73,6%	11,0%	15,4%
46-55 years old	61,5%	9,2%	29,3%
56 and above	60,5%	5,3%	34,2%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
Less than 25,000	81,2%	14,4%	4,4%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	65,5%	9,4%	25,1%
More than 75,000	70,0%	9,7%	20,2%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	82,4%	2,7%	14,9%
Camps in Turkey	90,5%	5,4%	4,1%
Idlib	71,2%	6,4%	22,5%
Homs	65,1%	10,6%	24,3%
Damascus Suburbs	74,4%	16,9%	8,7%
Aleppo	54,8%	17,9%	27,4%
Damascus	57,1%	37,7%	5,2%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	58,2%	14,2%	27,6%
Opposition areas	72,3%	13,0%	14,6%
Self-government areas	83,1%	2,3%	14,6%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	74,1%	18,4%	7,4%
Non-besieged	72,0%	8,9%	19,1%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arab	68,5%	13,1%	18,3%
Kurd	83,1%	2,5%	14,4%
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunnis	70,7%	13,6%	15,7%
Shiite	41,9%	6,5%	51,6%
Alawites (in number)	25	2	1
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	74,6%	14,1%	11,2%
Married	70,8%	9,9%	19,3%
Widower (in number)	6	0	3
Divorced (in number)	8	5	0

## Inheritance Distribution

### Women's sample

The variables linked to Inheritance distribution in the women's sample are shown in table 21 and are as follows:

**Education:** The most educated are more supporting to equal distribution of inheritance than those of lower education. Yet, the the largest proportion rejects the idea.



Dependents: Those with more dependents are the most opposing to equal inheritance distribution.

Profession: Housewives reject equal inheritance distribution most (64.3%) and the percentage drops to half among working women, students or unemployed women.

Ideology: A big difference appears between secular and Islamist women. Most secular women support equal inheritance distribution while most Islamists reject the idea. Nevertheless, more than a quarter of the seculars expressed rejection.

Income: Women of low income reject equal inheritance distribution most (56.1%) while the rate drops to about half among those of higher income.

Governorate, area: There is a near-consensus among women in camps in Turkey and Damascus Suburbs on rejecting equality and so do most women in Damascus and Aleppo and half of those in Idlib. However, we should note that one third of the respondents in Idlib preferred not to state a clear stand about this matter. The big difference was in Homs and Hasakeh where most women said they supported equal inheritance distribution.

Women in opposition areas reject this equality most, by far. Their rejection rate reached 69.7% while it was 25.0% in the regime's areas and 8.1% in self-government areas.

Besieged women reject the idea more than those in non-besieged opposition areas.

Sect, ethnicity: We can see that there is very significant difference between Arab and Kurdish women in attitude towards equal inheritance distribution. Most Arabs refuse it (64.7%) while there is a near-consensus among Kurds regarding its support (87.2%).

All Christians in our small sample support equal inheritance distribution while 64.7% of Sunni women in our sample reject it.

Marital Status: Although the largest proportion of single women support such equality, rejection rate among them reached 40.6%, and it rose to more than 60% among married women and widows.

**Table 21: Inheritance Distribution in the Women's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	19,4%	63,9%	16,7%
Primary education	25,0%	70,4%	4,6%
Preparatory education	29,7%	65,1%	5,2%
Secondary education	31,5%	56,3%	12,2%
University and above	35,7%	46,5%	17,7%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	37,4%	51,3%	11,2%
From 3 to 5	28,8%	57,0%	14,2%
6 and above	19,4%	71,2%	9,4%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	34,9%	50,7%	14,4%
Student	33,1%	49,6%	17,3%

Unemployed	34,3%	54,6%	11,1%
Housewife	27,0%	64,3%	8,7%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	87,9%	5,1%	7,1%
Secular	61,7%	27,5%	10,8%
Moderate center	23,7%	64,1%	12,2%
Islamist	13,8%	70,2%	16,0%
Far end of political Islam	25,0%	70,7%	4,3%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
Less than 25,000	35,7%	56,1%	8,2%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	31,8%	51,0%	17,3%
More than 75,000	37,5%	49,0%	13,5%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	84,4%	5,0%	10,6%
Homs	60,3%	30,9%	8,8%
Idlib	16,0%	51,9%	32,0%
Damascus	41,9%	55,8%	2,3%
Aleppo	23,9%	61,4%	14,8%
Camps in Turkey	18,4%	80,3%	1,4%
Damascus Suburbs	14,2%	81,1%	4,7%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	70,2%	25,0%	4,8%
Opposition areas	16,9%	69,7%	13,4%
Self-government areas	81,8%	8,1%	10,1%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	12,1%	81,8%	6,1%
Non-besieged	18,0%	67,0%	15,0%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	22,5%	64,7%	12,8%
Kurds	87,2%	6,4%	6,4%
Turkmen (in number)	5	3	0
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunni	22,7%	64,7%	12,6%
Christian (in number)	10	0	0
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	48,4%	40,6%	11,1%
Married	26,6%	60,2%	13,2%
Widow	27,1%	65,9%	7,1%
Divorced (in number)	5	15	3

### Men's sample

Attitudes towards the inheritance issue among men are linked to all variables shown in table 22 as follows:

Education: Rejection of equal inheritance distribution decreases as we move from lower to higher education levels. Illiterates and those with primary education reject the idea most (75.0%) while those who have a university degree reject the idea least (61.5%). However, as you can see from these very high rates, only a little percentage, even among university students, said they support such equality (27.6%) which is the highest rate of support among men.

Dependents: Zeal about equal inheritance distribution decreases among men with a large number of dependents (six and above) compared to those with fewer dependents. The rate falls from 22.9% among those with up to 2 dependents to 17.0% among those with 6+ people.

Profession: There is a near-consensus among the unemployed on rejecting such equality (83.1%) followed by the majority of working people (66.4%) while the percentage falls to about 54.0% among students.

Ideology: the largest proportion of seculars are inclined to support equal inheritance distribution, while there is a near-consensus among Islamist on rejecting such distribution, but we should note that about a quarter of seculars refused to express a clear stand.

Age: Young men (up to 25) and men over 56 years old are less excited about equal inheritance distribution.

Income: Rejection decreases the higher the income. It was 78.2% among low income men (less than 25000); it decreased to 67.1 among middle income men in our sample (25000 to 75000) and reached its lowest level (56.7%) among those with highest income (more than 75000).

Governorate, area: There is a near-consensus among men (about 90%) in Damascus, the capital, and refugees in camps in Turkey on rejecting this equality, and so does the overwhelming majority of men in Idlib, Damascus Suburbs and Aleppo (over 75%). In Homs, the percentage falls back to about 40%, but it should be noted that support rate is not very much different from other areas; but the difference appeared because many of the respondents refused to express a clear stand. The only difference is in Hasakeh where the biggest percentage (46.6%) was inclined to support such equality, but still more than one third of men in this governorate were against it.

There is a near-consensus among men in opposition areas on rejecting the idea (86.5%) while the rejection decreases to about 37.0% in both self-government and regime areas. However, we should note that in those last two areas a significant percentage (up to 30%) refused to show a clear stand of this issue.

Sect, ethnicity: The overwhelming majority of Arabs rejected equal inheritance distribution (73.4%) and so did more than third the Kurds (37.5%).

Most Shiites refused to show a clear stand from this (65.4%) while there is a near-consensus among Sunnis on rejecting it (79.8%).

Marital Status: Single men (70.7%) rejected the idea more than married ones (65.6%).

**Table22: Inheritance Distribution in the Men's Sample.**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	3	15	2
Primary education	16,5%	74,8%	8,7%
Preparatory education	13,6%	72,5%	13,9%
Secondary education	21,5%	64,2%	14,3%
University and above	27,6%	61,5%	10,9%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	22,9%	69,5%	7,5%
From 3 to 5	21,6%	67,2%	11,2%
6 and above	17,0%	64,2%	18,9%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	20,0%	66,4%	13,7%
Student	34,9%	54,0%	11,1%
Unemployed	15,7%	83,1%	1,1%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	56,1%	30,1%	13,8%
Secular	45,7%	27,4%	26,9%
Moderate	11,5%	76,6%	11,9%
Islamist	4,9%	89,1%	6,0%
Far end of political Islam	6,1%	89,5%	4,4%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	17,7%	76,0%	6,3%
26-35 years old	20,0%	71,6%	8,4%
36-45 years old	21,5%	63,8%	14,6%
46-55 years old	27,0%	49,4%	23,6%
56 and above	15,8%	63,2%	21,1%
<b>Income</b>			
Less than 25,000	16,2%	78,2%	5,7%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	16,7%	67,1%	16,2%
More than 75,000	30,4%	56,7%	13,0%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	46,4%	36,5%	17,1%
Homs	28,2%	43,5%	28,2%
Aleppo	17,9%	76,2%	6,0%
Damascus Suburbs	14,5%	82,0%	3,5%
Idlib	3,4%	89,0%	7,6%
Damascus	6,5%	92,2%	1,3%
Camps in Turkey	4,1%	95,9%	0,0%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	32,0%	37,3%	30,7%
Opposition areas	8,6%	86,5%	4,9%
Self-government areas	46,1%	36,5%	17,4%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	14,5%	73,4%	12,1%
Kurds	49,4%	37,5%	13,1%
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunni	12,3%	79,8%	7,8%
Shiite	19,4%	16,1%	64,5%
Alawite (in number)	19	6	3
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	22,1%	70,7%	7,2%
Married	20,4%	65,6%	14,0%
Widower (in number)	1	3	5

Divorced (in number)	1	12	0
----------------------	---	----	---

## Freedom of Dress

### Women's sample

All variables listed in Table (23) are linked to attitude towards freedom of dress in the women's sample. They are as follows:

Education: Rejecting the freedom of dress decreases with the advancement in education. The biggest percentage of rejection is found among the illiterate and those with primary education (about 67%). It decreases to reach 42.7% among university degree holders as the largest proportion of them agree that women have the right to decide how to dress.

Dependents: Women with a big number of dependents rejected women's freedom of dress most.

Profession: Most housewives reject freedom of dress (63.2%), while the percentage drops to 47% among both working and unemployed women. It decreases to 42.1% among students.

Ideology: Freedom of dress is supported by the overwhelming majority of seculars and rejected by the overwhelming majority of Islamists.

Governorate, area: there is a near-consensus among women in camps in Turkey on rejecting (79.6%) and so do most women in Idlib, Damascus and Damascus Suburbs (about 60%), but the results are reversed in Homs and Aleppo in favor of support, while women in Hasakeh all agree to it with no more than 5.0% rejection rate.

Women in opposition areas reject the idea most (64.4%), followed by women in regime areas (31.0%) and then in self-government areas (8.1%).

Women in besieged areas are less supportive than those in other opposition-held areas.

Sect, ethnicity: Most Arabs (60.6%) reject it while Kurds almost unanimously agree to it (80.7%).

All women in the small Christian sample agreed and most Sunnis disagreed (60.9%).

Marital Status: most single women agreed (56.7%) while most married women disagreed (56.8%). Also 62.4 of widows disagreed.

**Table 23: Freedom of Dress in Women's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate	22,2%	66,7%	11,1%
Primary education	21,7%	68,4%	9,9%
Preparatory education	33,7%	62,2%	4,1%
Secondary education	38,7%	50,9%	10,4%
University and above	49,4%	42,7%	8,0%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	44,6%	48,0%	7,4%
From 3 to 5	38,1%	53,9%	8,0%
6 and above	22,3%	66,2%	11,5%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	44,9%	47,5%	7,6%
Student	48,1%	42,1%	9,8%
Unemployed	51,9%	46,3%	1,9%
Housewife	26,7%	63,2%	10,0%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	88,9%	3,0%	8,1%
Secular	69,2%	23,3%	7,5%
Moderate	36,5%	53,6%	9,9%
Islamist	23,6%	68,8%	7,6%
Far end of political Islam	12,0%	81,5%	6,5%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Hasakeh	83,0%	5,0%	12,1%
Aleppo	79,5%	14,8%	5,7%
Homs	60,3%	30,9%	8,8%
Idlib	24,7%	62,3%	13,0%
Damascus Suburbs	20,8%	63,2%	16,0%
Damascus	27,9%	65,1%	7,0%
Camps in Turkey	19,7%	79,6%	0,7%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	60,7%	31,0%	8,3%
Opposition areas	28,1%	64,4%	7,4%
Self-government areas	79,7%	8,1%	12,2%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	18,2%	66,7%	15,2%
Non-besieged	30,4%	63,9%	5,8%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	31,2%	60,6%	8,2%
Kurds	80,7%	9,2%	10,1%
Turkmen (in number)	6	2	0
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunni	30,9%	60,9%	8,3%
Christian (in number)	10	0	0
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Single	56,7%	36,4%	6,9%
Married	34,5%	56,8%	8,7%
Widow (in number)	27,1%	62,4%	10,6%
Divorced (in number)	8	15	0

## Men's sample

The variables linked to attitude towards freedom of dress in the men's sample are detailed in table 24 as follows:

Education: Rejection of freedom of dress decreases remarkably with advancement in education. It drops from 85.0% among those with primary education to 56.4% among those with university education.

Dependents: Those with fewer dependents are more supportive of freedom of dress than those with more dependents.

Profession: The unemployed almost unanimously reject freedom of dress (85.4%), the percentage drops among working men to 66.9% and reaches the lowest level among students (54.0%).

Ideology: All Islamists agree on rejection, while seculars are divided between agreement, rejection and no clear stand.

Age: Young men (up to 25) reject the idea most. The rate decreases the older the age, but it increases again with men over 56.

Income: Lower income men reject women's freedom of dress most as the percentage decreases from 82.1% among low income men (less than 25000) to 67.6% (25000 to 75000) to 53.4% among those with higher income (more than 75000).

Governorate, area: There is a near-consensus among men in Idlib, Damascus Suburbs and camps in Turkey on rejecting the idea (more than 80.0%) and most men in both Damascus and Aleppo (about 70.0%), while rejection decreases to less than half in both Homs and Hasakeh. Men in opposition area almost unanimously disagree (84.9%), but the rate falls to less than half in self-government areas. As for regime areas, although rejection drops to about one third, it should be noted that one third of men in these areas preferred not to show a clear stand on this matter.

Men in besieged areas reject the idea than men in other opposition areas as the rate decreases from 87.9% to 83.2%.

Sect, ethnicity: Most Arab men rejected the idea (71.9%) and so did about half Kurds (50.0%) Most Shiite men refused to take a clear stand (67.7%) whereas the overwhelming majority of Sunnis disagreed (80.0%).

Marital Status: Single men reject women's freedom of dress more (71.4%) than married ones (66.3%). However, that does not mean there is a big difference in the support rates as 14.1% of married men preferred not to take a clear stand and so did 8.3% of single men.

**Table 24: Freedom of Dress in the Men's sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No Clear Stand
<b>Education</b>			
Illiterate (in number)	6	13	1
Primary education	7,1%	85,0%	7,9%
Preparatory education	8,9%	78,2%	12,9%
Secondary education	19,3%	63,4%	17,4%
University and above	33,3%	56,4%	10,3%
<b>Number of dependents</b>			
Up to two persons	22,2%	69,5%	8,3%
From 3 to 5	20,1%	67,0%	12,9%
6 and above	16,7%	66,7%	16,7%
<b>Profession</b>			
Working	19,6%	66,9%	13,6%
Student	34,9%	54,0%	11,1%
Unemployed	7,9%	85,4%	6,7%
<b>Ideology</b>			
Far end of secularism	45,5%	43,1%	11,4%
Secular	39,9%	28,3%	31,8%
Moderate	15,7%	71,5%	12,8%
Islamist	6,0%	89,7%	4,3%
Far end of political Islam	4,4%	92,1%	3,5%
<b>Age</b>			
Up to 25 years old	15,7%	78,0%	6,3%
26-35 years old	18,6%	71,9%	9,5%
36-45 years old	21,5%	62,6%	15,9%
46-55 years old	25,3%	51,1%	23,6%
56 and above	18,4%	64,5%	17,1%
<b>Monthly Income (SYP)</b>			
Less than 25,000	13,1%	82,1%	4,8%
Between 25,000 and 75,000	16,4%	67,6%	15,9%
More than 75,000	33,6%	53,4%	13,0%
<b>Governorate</b>			
Homs	23,9%	46,3%	29,8%
Hasakeh	38,7%	49,5%	11,7%
Aleppo	15,5%	69,0%	15,5%
Damascus	23,4%	72,7%	3,9%
Idlib	8,1%	85,2%	6,8%
Damascus Suburbs	8,7%	85,5%	5,8%
Camps in Turkey	10,8%	89,2%	0,0%
<b>Area</b>			
Regime areas	32,9%	32,4%	34,7%
Opposition areas	9,2%	84,9%	5,9%
Self-government areas	38,4%	49,8%	11,9%
<b>Within opposition areas</b>			
Besieged	8,2%	87,9%	3,9%
Non-besieged	9,9%	83,2%	6,8%
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Arabs	15,2%	71,9%	12,9%
Kurds	38,1%	50,0%	11,9%
<b>Sect</b>			
Sunni	12,7%	80,0%	7,4%
Shiite	6,5%	25,8%	67,7%
Alawite (in number)	19	3	6
<b>Marital Status</b>			




Single	20,3%	71,4%	8,3%
Married	19,6%	66,3%	14,1%
Widower (in number)	1	3	5
Divorced (in number)	2	11	0

To sum up the findings in this last chapter, we have conducted a cluster analysis once again based on three groups:

- The first supports all suggested measures to combat discrimination against women.
- The second has a neutral stand, supports some measures and rejects others.
- The thirds rejects most or all measures.

Figure 30 shows that only about one quarter of men supported all suggested measures while 40.5% of women supported them. More than one third of men opposed most of the measures we suggested to combat discrimination against women while this was shared by 17.2% of women only. So, generally speaking, women are willing to overcome many aspects of discrimination against them and so is the majority of men.

**Figure 30: Attitude towards the suggested measures to combat discrimination against women**



## Summary of Chapter Four

- Respondents supported by an overwhelming majority supporting women associations that advocate women's rights (71.6% of men and 95.7% of women). There is a near-consensus among Syrian women (83.4%) in our sample that it is essential for the next constitution to involve equal rights for men and women, while the the largest proportion of men agree to such guarantee (48:6%) although a significant percentage of them disagrees (31.0%).
- There is a near-consensus among women on the measure of combating minor marriage (79.2%), but men's attitude seems different as the percentage decreases to about half and 30.4% of them said they were against defining a legal marriage age and 14.3% refused to state a clear stand towards this matter.
- As for equal inheritance distribution and personal freedom (women's clothes in this case), about half women rejected these ideas as well as most men (about 67%).
- It seems that influencing the attitude of Syrians who reject the idea of equal inheritance distribution is more difficult than influencing their attitude towards freedom of dress, among men more than among women in both cases. However, creative approaches to courts and inheritance, that do not impose readymade models, might enjoy the approval of the the largest proportion.
- The percentage of those rejecting equality before the law between men and women in the women's sample increases among Arabs, married women, widows, the less

educated, those with a large number of dependents, housewives, far political Islam, and in refugee camps, Idlib, Damascus Suburbs and opposition areas.

- Rejection of equality between men and women before the law in the men's sample increases among Arabs, the less educated, Islamists, those older than 56, young men, those having the lowest income, those in Damascus Suburbs, in opposition and besieged areas.
- Rejection of laws preventing minor marriage in the women's sample increases among Arabs, housewives, unemployed, Islamists, those over 46, those having the lowest income, those in Damascus governorate, in regime areas and in besieged areas.
- Rejection of laws preventing minor marriage increases in the men's sample among Arabs, single men, less educated, those with fewer dependents, Islamists, young men, those having the lowest income, in Damascus governorate, in regime areas and in besieged areas.
- The rate of disagreement to supporting women's associations in the women's sample increases among women over 56 (11.8%) and in Damascus Suburbs (5.7%). However, it is still a low percentage as suggested by these rates.
- The rate of disagreement to supporting women's associations in the men's sample increases among Arabs, single men, less educated, those with more dependents, unemployed, Islamists, young men, those having the lowest income, in Damascus governorate, in opposition areas and in besieged areas.
- The rate of rejection to equal inheritance distribution in the women's sample increases among Arabs, married, widows, less educated, with a larger number of dependents, housewives, Islamists, with low income, and in camps in Turkey, Aleppo, Damascus and its Suburbs, and in opposition-held and besieged areas.
- The rate of rejection of equal inheritance distribution in the men's sample increases among Arabs, single men, young men, less educated, , unemployed, Islamists, those of low income and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs and opposition areas.
- The rate of rejection of freedom of dress in the women's sample increases among Arabs, married, widows, less educated, those with more dependents, housewives, Islamists and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs, opposition and besieged areas.
- The rate of rejection of freedom of dress in the men's sample increases among Arabs, single men, less educated, unemployed, Islamists, young men, those of low income and those in camps in Turkey, Idlib, Aleppo, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs, opposition and besieged areas.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The findings of this study bear some bad news such as the fact that the overwhelming majority of men reject women's work or put conditions thereon and a relatively large percentage of men (around a third) reject measures that would prevent discrimination against women such as equality of men and women before the law or defining marriage age so as to address minor marriage. In addition, there is widespread belief, among both men and women, that women capable of occupying important positions are scarce. There is a lot of good news, nonetheless. These findings show that most Syrian women are aware of the inequality practiced against them and seek to resist and overcome it. Unlike men, there is a near-consensus among women on supporting the equality between men and women before the law (83.4%) and to measures to address minor marriage (79.2%) and they are willing to support women to reach important leadership positions such as heading a local council even if the majority of their community rejects that. Most importantly was the widespread support of the proposal of supporting women associations defending women's rights reaching almost unanimous agreement among women (95.7%). This last measure was supported by most men too (71.6%).

Based on the findings of this survey, the following recommendations may be drawn:

- To international and local organizations and entities concerned with combating discrimination against women:

First: This survey has provided some rich data which can be considered and utilized in various practical ways to develop intervention plans and programs, campaigns or workshops.

Second: Special attention must be given to the issue of perceptions of women capabilities and competence. They must be addressed by all possible means through campaigns, courses and workshops in addition to shedding light on them in media.<sup>7</sup> Focus should be on social categories and areas where skepticism about women's abilities is widespread as has been well shown in this study.

Third: Equality between men and women must not be approached only as a matter of numbers so that the number of women in institutions, negotiation delegations, parties.. etc is increased. As these data has shown, the subject is related to perceptions linked to

---

<sup>7</sup> Recently, a useful study in this regard was published by the Syrian Female Journalists Network. In its search of presumptions as manifested in media outlets which were established after the Syrian revolution in 2011, it found that "In many cases there is a lack of conviction in women's capacity, a conviction that women are followers of men, and a belief that women victims or casualties are a good tool to raise sympathy." (*Women in Emerging Syrian Media: A Critical Discourse Analysis*, the Syrian Female Journalists Network, Netherlands 2016:46). When compared to some of the results we found in our study, we can say that what is happening is reinforcing the widespread belief of man's superiority over woman in terms of capabilities and abilities. We noted that the majority of men (63.7%) and about half of women (49.1%) believe this. However, for media outlets that were established after such a revolution, they are expected to encounter this instead of reinforcing it. This study may help in drawing a different media policy, as it contains data that allow to define many aspects that need to be addressed, based on the different social categories or the geographical scope (for local radio stations for example).

individual conditions and living standards.<sup>8</sup> Seeking to improve these conditions may contribute to true leaps in combating discrimination against women. Therefore, the struggle of Syrian men and women for a democratic transition must not be separated from the struggle to overcome this discrimination.

- To donors and local, current and future governmental authorities:

First: The significant support for the proposal of supporting Syrian women associations must be utilized and employed to contribute to a genuine shift. Supporting existing associations and helping increase their number and create networks on local or national levels would not only be fair for women but would also contribute to changing those negative perceptions about her work or other issues as detailed in this study. However, at the same time, it is essential to monitor and control the work of these associations through regular performance assessment so as to develop new tools to help them reach their goals.

Second: Future authorities must give special attention to educational curricula so as to make them more effective in spreading awareness about discrimination against women in order to combat it. As we have seen, education was interrelated with a number of variables but it was not actively present in promoting awareness of inequality between men and women in Syria. For example, even when education was present in the case of men, it had weak relationship with this awareness. This poses questions about the education system in Syria and its role in maintaining the *status quo* especially in female education as female-only schools are spread in many areas in Syria. More research must be encouraged to understand how school can play a bigger role in overcoming discrimination against women, especially that the status of education is currently disastrous and chaotic especially among IDPs and refugees.

- To Syrian intellectuals, activists and researchers:

First: There are many aspects that need to be further researched and determined. It was not possible to carry out a long comprehensive questionnaire through regular home visits. We were forced to make the questionnaire draft shorter to manage conducting interviews in various areas. The issue of personal liberties and the awareness and perception of Syrians about them require more research. We have only addressed partial aspects. Needless to say, regular surveys would help us understand the evolution of the problem so as to better address it. Regular collection of quantitative data is also an urgent and important issue.

Second: This study suggests, like our previous studies about Syrians' opinions and attitudes towards international agreements<sup>9</sup>, the need for more studies about young males (up to 25 years). Some ideas, which are based on discrimination against women, seem to be widespread among them, such as rejecting women leadership in positions such as head of

---

<sup>8</sup> The problem of dress code freedom is usually approached through religious interpretations. This study, however, showed that the problem is correlated to other variables such as income and occupation, among others.

<sup>9</sup> A reference to "*Opinions and Current Attitudes Towards International Agreements on Syria*", TDA, November 2016. This study pointed out the likelihood of the increase of religious extremism amongst young people below 25 years.

a local council (around half), as opposed exactly to their counterparts among women who mostly agree (more than 70%).

Third: In addition to the aforementioned, this study suggests the need to look for innovative alternatives and solutions for issues related to personal status law (such as inheritance) instead of resorting to ready-made models which cannot be implemented except by force. Such alternatives may be supported by the largest proportion of Syrians. Therefore, it is imperative to have open discussion about issues related to these laws and conduct further studies about what can be done.

- To Syrian politicians and legal experts concerned with drafting a new constitution:

Equality of men and women before the law must be clearly and unambiguously ensured. As we have seen, the the largest proportion of men will support this step and it would enjoy great women support as there is a near-consensus among in favour of it. This must be done with active participation of Syrian civil society organizations, particularly feminist organizations.

Syrian women have suffered the horrors of war just like men, probably even more. Women were left alone after losing a husband or a son or their arrest, let alone the severe psychological impact which requires special research. Women were responsible for managing their households and ensuring their survival in extremely dire conditions under siege, bombardment and, more often than not, fear for the lives of the remaining family members.

Hence, it is essential to confront all attempts to exclude women from decision-making positions related to Syria and its future. Aesthetic measures, such as “advisory councils” which involve selected elites, are not enough. As we have seen in this research, the largest number of Syrian women are resolved to reach a Syrian society with more equality and justice.

## The Questionnaire

**1. How do you see the current differences in situation between women and men in Syria?**

- Major differences
- There are quite a few differences
- Minor differences
- Very minor differences
- There are no differences
- I don't know
- No response

**2. What do you think about women working?**

- I support her working provided she is not working directly with men
- I oppose women working under any circumstance (see question 6)
- I support her working provided she is in dire need of it
- Women are entitled to decide for themselves when, how, and where they work
- I prefer not to answer
- Other

**3. How do you see the differences between the situations of men and women in Syria in each of the following cases?**

	Worse than men	Same situation	Better than men	t'Don know/no answer
Opportunities for work				
Monthly income				
Access to senior management positions at work				

**4. What do you think of the following statement?**

	Strongly oppose (see question 6)	Oppose (see question 6)	Not sure	Agree	Strongly agree
Women who are able to work competently in important administrative or political positions are scarce					

**5. Which of the following tasks can women perform as competently as men or more?**

	No	Yes	Don't know/ no answer
Head of a local council/ Mayor			
School principal			
Judge			
Minister			
President of the country			

**6. In case free local elections are held in Syria and a woman runs for the head of a local council/ municipality in your area, do you think she can win?**

- Yes, it's possible
- No, it's not possible
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer

**7. And what about you, would you vote for her?**

- Yes, it's possible
- No, its not possible (see question 9)
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer (see question 9)

**8. To what degree do you think each of the following issues is important or unimportant to you when voting?**

	Not important at all	Important	Very important	Don't know/ no answer
The fact that she is a women				
Her political or ideological positions				
Academic competence or administrative experience				

Her religious sect				
Her clothing or outward appearance				

**9. I will read some statements to you and I would like to know your position on them**

	Strongly oppose	Oppose	Not sure	Agree	Strongly agree
The constitution must guarantee equal rights for men and women in all political, economic and social fields					
Women should not be allowed to marry before 18 years of age					
The next government should support women's associations supporting women's rights					
Inheritance must be divided between men and women equally					
Women have the right to wear whatever they want. This is part of her personal freedom					

**10. What do you think of women's education?**

- She should not go to school at all
- She should study only until the primary stage
- She should complete the preparatory stage only
- She should complete the secondary stage only
- She should complete whichever level of education she wants (see question 10.a)
- I prefer not to answer



10a. How do you see the disparity between men and women in Syria in each of the following?

	I don't know/ no answer	Worse than men	Same situation	Better than men
Obtaining a university degree				
Obtaining a job commensurate with her university degree				

### 11. Gender

- Male
- Female

### 12. Age

(...)

### 13. Current profession

- Farmer
- Government employee
- Employee in a private company/organization
- Combatant
- Free profession
- Student
- Mid-level manager
- Senior-level manager
- Unemployed
- Housewife
- Other

### 14. Level of education

- Illiterate
- Primary
- Preparatory
- Secondary
- University
- Postgraduate

### 15. Nation-Ethnicity

- Arab
- Kurd
- Armenian
- Assyrian

- Turkmen
- Circassian
- I prefer not to answer
- Other

**16. What is your average monthly income?**

- Less than 25 thousand Syrian lira
- Between 25-75 thousand Syrian lira
- More than 75 thousand Syrian lira
- I prefer not to answer

**17. Number of individuals for whose care you are responsible**

(...)

**18. Religion-Sect**

- Sunni
- Shi'a
- Alawite
- Isma'ili
- Druze
- Yazidi
- Christian
- Murshid
- I prefer not to answer

**19. Current Region**

- Hasakeh Governate
- Deir al-Zour Governate
- Raqqa Governate
- Aleppo Governate
- Idlib Governate
- Latakia Governate
- Tartus Governate
- Homs Governate
- Damascus Governate
- Damascus Suburbs
- Al-Suwayda Governate
- al-Quneitra Governate
- Hama Governate
- Daraa Governate
- Camps in Turkey
- Camps in Lebanon
- Camps inside Syria

**20. Civil status**

- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Widowed

**21. When talking about politics and the form of the next state in Syria, there are two main political trends: secularists who want to separate religion from the state and groups of political Islam who want to establish a religious state. The following are a set of numbers from 0 to 10, where zero is maximum secularity and 10 is maximum political Islam. In which place do you find yourself?**

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

